The Political Meaning of Unconscious Guilt

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Modern political science finds some degree of power everywhere, yet many people feel increasingly powerless; guilt is a universal experience, yet political science has almost entirely ignored it. I am not presently concerned with why guilt has been an excluded problem; even poverty, until a few years ago, was left to the economists.[1] Nor do I wish to raise in general terms the question of the relevance of guilt to politics. I will, instead, focus on one type of guilt, "unconscious guilt," inquiring into its political meaning. The term comes from Freud, yet the essential idea of unconscious guilt goes back to antiquity. In both cases, it is offered as an explanation of individual and collective behavior. If we are to believe Freud, this type of explanation is doubly important to us today, for the increasing sense of guilt in modern society is largely unconscious.[2] Unconscious guilt, however, is not really an explanation; it is, at bottom, a metaphor of reconstruction, a weapon of war in the struggle to shape political society.

[1] Our tradition of political analysis, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, tends "to exclude from articulate conceptualization a great variety of authentic political experiences, among which we need not be surprised to find some of an even elementary nature." *The Human Condition* (Garden City, N. Y., n.d.), 215.

[2] Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere (London, 1930), Chap. 8.

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I

It would seem reasonable to begin by asking how one recognizes an unconscious sense of guilt. As it turns out, one must begin with a different question: *who*, in fact, recognizes an unconscious sense of guilt? The citizen in modern society, laboring, according to Freud, under a heavy burden of unconscious guilt, does not recognize it; he only feels a "sort of uneasiness or discontent for which other motivations are sought."[3] The patient does not recognize this sense of guilt either. "As far as the patient is concerned this sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty; he does not feel guilty, he feels ill."[4] Freud seems to suggest, however, that the "pale criminal" or "criminal from a sense of guilt," can, in fact, partially recognize his unconscious guilt.[5] This type of criminal, Freud tells us, does not feel guilty because he commits crimes; rather he commits crimes because he suffers from an oppressive pre-existing sense of guilt which he cannot account for. Like Joseph K. in Kafka's *Trial*, he feels condemned, but does not know what his offense is. In order to account for his sense of condemnation and gain relief from doubt he subsequently commits a crime, fastening "this unconscious sense of guilt on to something real and immediate."[6] Having earlier stressed the criminal's "pre-existing sense of guilt," Freud suddenly confesses that "the pre-existence of the guilty feeling had of course to be demonstrated by a whole succession of other manifestations and effects."[7] Citizen, patient, pale criminal—all are equally blind. Those who suffer from the malady of unconscious guilt are those least likely to know it. Only the analyst, in fact, can detect unconscious guilt; he thus becomes, in Freudian political theory, indispensable to society.

How does Freud decide that a person or society is suffering from an unconscious sense of guilt? He temporarily suspends

[3] *Ibid.*, 124. Hereafter all citations of Freud's books refer to the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (SE)*, ed. James Strachey (London, 1955-64); all citations of his essays refer to the *Collected Papers (CP)*, ed. Ernest Jones (New York, 1959).

[4] *The Ego and the Id, SE*, XIX, 49-50.

[5] "Some Character-Types Met With in Psycho-Analytic Work," *CP*, 4, 342-44.

[6] *The Ego and the Id, SE*, XIX, 52.

[7] "Some Character-Types . . .," *CP*, 4, 342.

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the problem of feelings, turning instead to the problem of overt consequences. Freud believes that he then describes the consequences; what he does, of course, is interpret them. Indeed, one of the problems in relying on his case histories is that "what passes for description in the Freudian method is already judgment."[8] Nevertheless, the assumptions that form the backbone of his interpretation stand out clearly. He assumes that a person or society has an objective interest, even though they may not know what it is. If there are consequences which seem to Freud contrary to those interests, the consequences are interpreted as self-imposed punishment. What lies behind punishment, in the Freudian imagination, is some kind of guilt.[9] If the person or society inflicts punishment on itself without knowing why, then there must be an unconscious sense of guilt present. Freud now begins to use the terms "unconscious sense of guilt" and "need for punishment" as interchangeable concepts.[10] The problem, then, is to find the precise basis for this self-destructive behavior. One engages, therefore, in a historical recollection—psychoanalysis—in an effort to locate and make conscious the sense of guilt which has previously been unrecognized. Thus, in the guise of recollecting guilt, the analyst leads us into accepting guilt. Whether we are made to accept a private guilt, such as hatred of the father, or a public guilt, such as racial discrimination, in the eyes of the analyst the result is an abatement of our self-destructive behavior.[11] Innocence, defined as conformity with our true interests, is subsequent to guilt made conscious. The metaphor of reconstruction has surfaced.

The reconstructive nature of Freud's metaphor becomes clearer if we look at the opposite of unconscious guilt, an unconscious sense of indignation (nemesis) or need to punish. If, as Freud believes, society is becoming increasingly repressive, if man is be-

[8] Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), 321.

[9] We shall see that this is also the classical view.

[10] See, for example, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, *SE*, XXI, 135, and "The Economic Problem in Masochism," *CP*, 2, 263.

[11] This suggests that there are "public" analysts and "private" analysts. Fromm is an example of the first, Freud of the second. A systematic comparison of how the two types of analysts use the concept of unconscious guilt needs to be made.

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ing harnessed more and more to a societal yoke contrary to his deepest impulses, then a basis is laid for man to turn on society in indignation. Viewed in this way, the "pale criminal" acts not from a pre-existing sense of guilt, but from a pre-existing sense of indignation; he commits crimes not in order to provoke punishment, but in order to punish society for its crimes against him. In this perspective, apathy, disrespect, and violence all become means of social sabotage, aimed at punishing society, perhaps ultimately at dissolving society altogether.[12] The destruction of society would, indeed, be only a form of judicial murder. The raw material for this perspective comes, of course, almost entirely from Freud.[13] Yet Freud will have none of it; like Locke, he is a conservative maker of revolutions. Freudian man, for all his apparent aggressiveness and unkind thoughts, seldom acts against authority; aggression always seems to be turned inward.[14] Nemesis appears to Freud, unlike Durkheim, as a metaphor for *dissolution;* to punish *others* is not a way of maintaining the standards of society, it is a way of gratifying our aggressive instincts under the guise of expiation.[15] Freud fears the "honest criminal lurking behind the pious neurotic."[16] Society must be changed, not destroyed.

In a late work, *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud adds a biological portico to the façade of recollected guilt.[17] The result is that the weakness of unconscious guilt as a social explanation be-

[12] The contemporary crisis of authority may be in part a crisis of "inverted nemesis," that is, indignation directed not at the demands, policies, and values of a particular society, but against society itself.

[13] Freud expresses sorrow at the fact that man is inescapably a being who lives in society. Man can attain happiness only within society, Freud says, but still it "would perhaps be preferable" if the individual could avoid "integration in, or adaptation to, a human community." *Civilization and Its Discontents, SE,* XXI, 140. Although saddened by the human condition, the "reality principle" made him accept it. Ironically, however, Freud may have contributed to the emergence of what he would have rejected, inverted nemesis.

[14] *Ibid.,* Chap. 8.

[15] *Totem and Taboo, SE,* XIII, 72.

[16] Rieff, 353.

[17] *Moses and Monotheism* (1934-38), despite Freud's thesis that Moses was an Egyptian, is the most Hebraic work Freud ever wrote. His assumptions about punishment, the sins of the fathers, and the solidarity of the group, go back, however, to the earliest Hebrew traditions; he ignores Job, Isaiah, and the later development of Hebrew thought.

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comes obvious; at the same time Freud's struggle to develop a convincing metaphor of reconstruction becomes more explicit. Freud assumes in this phase of his work that the sins of the fathers are unconsciously "known" to the children, and taken over as their own, "independently of direct communication and of the influence of education by the setting of an example."[18] In effect, Southern children, who had never seen or heard of slavery, would still be unconsciously "aware" of the evils of slavery and would feel guilty about it; German children, born well after the Nazi period and kept in a total informational vacuum, would still know and feel guilty for the horrors of nazism. How can this be? Freud argues that memory is inherited genetically; children get guilty consciences the same way they get blue eyes or curly hair. For the "memory traces of the experiences of our ancestors"—especially the repressed guilt, which etches more deeply the more it is repressed—are transmitted to the descendants.[19] If we accept this assumption, Freud tells us, then "we have bridged the gulf between individual and group psychology: we can deal with peoples as we do with an individual neurotic."[20] We can then talk in social terms about the "return of the repressed"—that is, the appearance of symptoms which indicate a "need for punishment"—after a period of "latency"—the relative quiet following the repression of the original guilt.[21] Thus, any problem which society experienced could be explained as the result of an unconscious sense of guilt, due to the fathers having sinned even centuries earlier. The analyst would become a historian of guilt, seeking parallels between the past and the present, showing a people that it has fallen short of its real interests today because of what was done yesterday.

If, of course, we deny Freud's assumption that memory is inherited, we can no longer treat individual and social psychology as identical. Moreover, there would then seem to be no inherent reason why the children must feel guilt in the present for what

[18] *Moses and Monotheism*, *SE*, XXIII, 99. The problem of tradition, and consequently the relation between individual and social psychology, had bothered Freud for a long time. See, for example, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) and the last pages of *Totem and Taboo* (1913).

[19] *Moses and Monotheism*, *SE*, XXIII, 99-101.

[20] *Ibid.*, 100.

[21] *Ibid.*, 66-92, 124-27.

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their fathers did centuries ago. In short, if we reject Freud's major assumption, we see that unconscious guilt does not explain anything, that it is still a metaphor of reconstruction, the theorist's device for altering society.

In the hands of a skilled artist like Freud, the metaphor of unconscious guilt can take on a great deal of persuasive power. The appeal of the metaphor comes not only from art, however, but from its solid grounding on the psychological fact that most of us are, like Freud, "friends of Job"; in affliction we see punishment, behind punishment lies guilt. Psychoanalysis, Freud points out, merely confirms "the habitual pronouncement of the pious: we are all miserable sinners."[22] The political objections to the idea of unconscious guilt, however, seem to me to be even more compelling. Suffering and punishment, as Job well knew but Freud seems to forget, are not equivalent notions. Nor can one equate all forms of anxiety—the uneasiness of modern man, for example—with a sense of guilt. These, of course, are fallacies on the part of Freud, but they are more than that. They are part of the machinery necessary to carry out the central implication of Freud's political thought—the reconstruction of society by an elite. Felt discontent, anxiety, and suffering can be channeled into a sense of guilt, which can, in turn, be used to alter society.[23] If, however, one sets up a notion of objective interest, one can go beyond the pain men feel to the pain they do not know. A distinction between false consciousness and genuine consciousness becomes necessary and in effect creates the basis for the domination of society by an elite.[24] A "need for punishment" is present whenever the analyst chooses to find it; the "mysteries of state" take on a psychoanalytic cast, a new royalty is born. It is true, of course, that not all acts will be interpreted as punishment—though any given act could be.[25] This only means that the elite

[22] *Totem and Taboo*, *SE*, XIII, 72.

[23] The twin brother of this technique is utilized by Lenin. In order to make a revolution, he seeks to harness discontent and convert it into indignation against the political system. See *What Is to Be Done?* (New York, 1929), especially 75. The techniques of guilt and nemesis have long been familiar to theologians.

[24] The problem recurs in a vivid fashion in Marxism, but the distinction between the two types of consciousness is implicit in any form of elitism.

[25] One of the "unconstitutional" features of the concept of unconscious guilt is its lack of conceptual limits; methodologically it is a blank check.

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can reconstruct society at will, molding it to fit the pattern approved by the elite.

The citizen, who has now become a patient, can be expected, however, to offer resistance to the treatment of his unconscious maladies. "Patients," Freud laments, "do not easily believe what we tell them about an unconscious sense of guilt."[26] Rather they hold fast "to the more obvious explanation that treatment by analysis is not the right remedy. . . ."[27] Freud finally comes to the conclusion, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, that since society will not see that it is sick, and would resist treatment in any case, the only hope for society lies in its being coerced into receiving therapy.[28] Elsewhere Freud notes that therapy is, in essence, interminable.[29]

II

The terminology may be different, but classical Greek thought expresses the idea of unconscious guilt even more clearly than Freud does. By treating guilt as pollution, and therefore objective, the Greeks avoid Freud's confusion between individual and social psychology; at the same time they avoid Freud's conceptual difficulty which emerges with the phrase, "unconscious feeling." The formal pattern of the classical unconscious guilt and the Freudian unconscious sense of guilt are, however, almost identical. The analyst detects illness; he determines that the illness is due to a sense of guilt which the patient (individual or society) has hidden from itself; he announces the means of relief (further analysis); and then proceeds, through an elaborate process of discovery (prolonged analysis), to a precise determination of what has produced the sense of guilt. Making the sense of guilt conscious will not wholly solve the problem of illness, but it makes the problem (the political one) more amenable to solution. Compare with this the pattern found in *Oedipus Rex*.[30] Thebes is in the grip of plague; fields are barren, animals sterile, women suffer "barren agonies of birth," the city reeks with the

[26] "The Economic Problem in Masochism," *CP*, 2, 263.
[27] *The Ego and the Id*, *SE*, XIX, 50.
[28] *Civilization and Its Discontents*, *SE*, XXI, 144.
[29] "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," (1937), *CP*, 5, 316-57.
[30] All quotations from *Oedipus Rex* come from *Sophocles: The Theban Plays*, trans. E. F. Watling (Baltimore, 1947).

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smell of death. The chorus cries out, "From the fire and pain of pestilence save us and make us clean." They discover, with the help of Apollo (through the Delphi oracle), that the plague is due to the presence of a murderer in their midst. To gain relief from the plague they must find the murderer and drive him from their soil. Then begins the process of discovery. Who, precisely, is the polluted one? Oedipus announces that if the guilty person will give himself up, his only punishment will be banishment; otherwise, horrible curses and the brand of shame will be placed upon him, and he will suffer all his life.

Granted then that unconscious guilt follows the same formal pattern in classical thought that it does in Freud's thought, one may still ask whether the functions are the same. Did the Greeks, for example, utilize, as I have argued Freud implicitly did, the idea of unconscious guilt as a means of changing and restructuring society? I suggest that they did, that the crisis of pestilence was also an opportunity, an opportunity to topple rulers, banish one's political opponents, and change the form of regime. The process of purification was an integral part of classical politics.

The outcome of purification was by no means certain; no one could accurately predict where the blame for pollution would fall. It was to one's political advantage, therefore, to control the machinery for uncovering hidden guilt. Aristotle mentions a case in which a court, "selected from the nobility," passed a verdict which declared that a sacrilege had been committed: "thereupon, the bodies of the guilty were removed from the tombs, and their family was exiled. . . ."[31] In this way, Cleisthenes could be banished, not as a dangerous radical, but as a man stained by the pollution of his ancestors. Control of the initial verdict, however, was not enough. The city had to be purified through special rites known only to prophets and healers, men like Epimenides of Crete, who cleansed Athens of the sacrilege mentioned above.[32] Only through careful selection and coaxing could one avoid the danger that the prophet might discover a different source of pollution from that formally announced.

[31] Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, translated and edited by K. von Fritz and E. Kapp in *Constitution of Athens and Related Texts* (New York, 1950), 1, 1.

[32] Epimenides possesses a knowledge of the mysteries of purification; he is prophet and healer. The family resemblance with Freud is strong.

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The classical use of unconscious guilt for political purposes can be confirmed, too, by way of a powerful exception, the tragedy of Oedipus. Oedipus is willing to accept the verdict of the blind prophet, Teiresias, until the prophet names him as the murderer. As a political man, Oedipus understands the selectivity that goes into uncovering the guilt which lies behind plague. He now suspects Creon of hand-picking the prophet in order to gain the throne. Teiresias, whom moments before Oedipus had praised lavishly, becomes a "pedlar of fraudulent magical tricks, with eyes wide open for profit, but blind in prophecy." Oedipus initially suspects, then, that his tragedy is a political one, that he is about to be toppled in the name of unconscious guilt. He then discovers that his tragedy is personal rather than political, that he is indeed polluted and no one else can take his place in banishment. Oedipus had looked through political eyes to no avail; he blinds himself in his anguish at the personal.

Given the political nature of unconscious guilt, an assignment of blame followed by banishment did not put an end to the matter. It signaled, rather, the beginning of the struggle for return to power and influence. The living might be driven out, the bones of the dead taken up; still, Thucydides notes, the "cursed ones" would try to return. In one case a faction was driven out several times over a number of years; "for all that," Thucydides reports, "they came back afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city."[33] In another case,[34] Aristotle reports that one faction managed to overthrow the existing tyranny, "for it could hardly be denied that it was the Alcmeonidae who played the most important part in the overthrow of the tyrants, since they almost incessantly made political trouble for them." Yet no sooner had the tyranny been overthrown than the leader of the Alcmeonidae, Cleisthenes, was attacked by the aristocrats for being "among those who were under a curse." As a result, seven hundred Athenian families—supporters of Cleisthenes—were expelled as accursed. Cleisthenes, nevertheless, managed to become ruler by promising the common people a democratic regime. The curse was, in effect, politically neutralized. Some years later,

[33] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Crawley (New York, 1951), Bk. I, 126-27.

[34] Aristotle, 20, 1-4.

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however, Sparta, on the grounds that it was concerned for the honor of the gods, ordered Athens to expel the Alcmeonidae. But, as Thucydides tells it,

> they also knew that Pericles . . . was connected with the curse on his mother's side, and they thought that his banishment would materially advance their designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war [which Sparta was seeking a pretext for] would be partly caused by his misfortune.[85]

Unconscious guilt had become a weapon in international politics, a means of provoking war while weakening the opponent's ability to fight.

III

Unconscious guilt is not an explanation; it is a metaphor to induce political change. No two versions of this metaphor, though, will be identical; style, content, and purpose will vary. The marks of the theorist remain in Freud's version; the heavier hand of the politician is visible in the classical approach. Freud is potentially more radical than the Greeks: he can create disease at will; they must wait for nature to provide opportunity in the form of plague. Freud thinks he is dealing with sickness, not with politics. Classical thought also does not adequately distinguish politics from nature; the Greeks have discovered, however, that the gods can be appeased by expiating the sins of one's opponents. Freud sees the citizen as a patient who must be forced to accept his guilt; the Greeks are content to awaken nemesis against their opponents. As for the ends or purposes which lie behind the use of the metaphor, these will vary with the elite, faction, or theorist. The concrete implications of the notion are therefore open to specification in each case; the concept tends to take on the characteristics of its master. At bottom, however, the general implication of any concept of unconscious guilt is that politics is yoked to the notion of disease. What is a remedy for illness is at the same time a metaphor for the reconstruction of

[85] Thucydides, Bk. I, 126-28. The Athenians responded by ordering the Spartans to drive out those under a similar curse in Sparta.

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of England distributed as willingly as Lady Bountiful her keys and jewels to Bagshot and Hounslow.

Let us first recall what the opposition to the ballot box was about, then turn to that footnote in the *History of Greece* where Grote puts his case for the sophist as teacher of democracy against the Christian Socialist F. D. Maurice.

"A Long Tenour of Deceit"

We are forbidden to trust the aging Wordsworth:

> Two voices are there: one is of the deep;
> And one is of an old, half-witted sheep . . . .
> And, Wordsworth, both are thine.[3]

The wit of Sydney Smith cannot so easily be put down. But for Napoleon and the war in Germany, Smith would have gone as a young curate to the University of Weimar with his charge, Michael Hicks Beach. As it was they "put into Edinburgh" and the *Review* was cultivated "on a little oatmeal."[4] Now this tenuous link, this intention toward Weimar, offers a vantage point for hindsight into Smith's hostility to the box we shall seize, however poor the excuse.

The Weimar of the Republic, a century later, invented the *isolierzelle*, the isolation "cell" in which the voter could enjoy perfect privacy. Once there was trouble in the *Reichstag* because of a report that in a recent election the voter's feet could be seen at the bottom of the *isolierzelle*. The Republic was careful about secrecy. Sworn in, so they say,[5] among the props and scenery for *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, how did this quintessence of "democratic" security arm the voter for those days when, in the same Weimar theater, Hitler came to see a play by Mussolini? How did it prepare the Foersters, the Wagners, let alone little Willi Schmidt, whose feet, no doubt, could still be seen under the *isolierzelle* on the day he voted in secrecy for the death of democracy?

This was Smith's theme in his essay on the ballot: the box,

[3] James Kenneth Stephen, "Lapsus Calami."

[4] Smith, Preface.

[5] See "In the Twenties," extracts from the diaries of Count Harry Kessler, *Encounter*, July 1967, p. 6.

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democracy, and courage. He thought the risks poor men were said to run in voting openly had been exaggerated. In any case, sacrifice of some sort was necessary to any great virtue; a device which sought to dispense with risk would be a "serious impediment . . . to the formation of good public opinion in the multitude."[6] In short, Smith saw the secretive devices, whether "dagger" or "mousetrap," as educational threats to a way of life, as impediments to the moral stature of democracy.

The ballot would compel the strong to conform to the timidities of the weak: this is demoralization. For if some must vote in secret then so must all. You could not have one stabbing his candidate's card or putting his finger in the trap secretly while another stood and cried openly, "I vote for Grote."[7] Men who hated to be secretive would be forced by those who lacked the courage of their convictions to withdraw with them into the shadows.

When men act in the dark, alone, their power to discriminate between good and bad is diminished.

"In this way the families of the poor, under the legislation of Mr. Grote, will become schools for good faith, openness, and truth!"[8] On the contrary, the ballot, Smith believed, would accustom the English to "a long tenour of deceit."

"Mr. Grote knows the relative values of gold and silver; but by what moral rate of exchange is he able to tell us the relative values of liberty and truth?"[9]

Sydney Smith's case, or the heart of it, was that the ballot would corrupt the opinion of the very people it would also claim, with some justification, to protect—the masses. If they did not know what good men really thought, how could they form a proper, public opinion? The tendency of the ballot, by concealing the judgments of those few men in a town whose views carried weight, would be to "exterminate the natural guides and leaders"; and henceforth no man's declaration would be believed.

"Is this the way in which Mr. Grote would foster the spirit of a bold and indomitable people. . ."?[10]—by so obscuring human

[6] Smith, 772.
[7] The jingle is mine, not Smith's.
[8] Smith, 781. Smith's tabular account of the Wiggins' morals is amusing.
[9] Smith, 782.
[10] Smith, 773.

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actions that men could no longer put, with any assurance of an answer, the questions by which they establish each other's responsibility. Only when such questions could be asked, and honestly answered, would men display the courage necessary to public life and encourage others to do the same. Grote's policy "tells us that the bold cannot be free, and bids us seek for liberty by clothing ourselves in the mask of falsehood. . . ."

In reading Smith's essay I was reminded of the way Miss Hannah Arendt describes the life of the *polis*, the "public realm," as she calls it, in classical Athens. The *polis* was "the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were."[11] This is the *zōon politikon* in which, as Aristotle seems to say, men become both truly free and truly men, for the one is necessary to the other, whereas paternal and herile rule is subhuman—men share it in some sense with the animals. The family offers a sheltered life; the *polis*, "merciless exposure" calling for "the virtue of courage as one of the most elemental political attitudes."[12] Freedom, responsibility, and therefore courage: the Aristotelian requirements for humanity fulfilled; but, Smith is saying, for the new democracy now on the horizon in England, security, the suppression of the bold, the sheltered life of the family extended to the whole "city."

"The Irreverent Mr. Mencken,"[13] too, tells a story which suits Smith's theme. He tells how Henry Lincoln Johnson, "a swart statesman" of the twenties, displayed that courage and skill which could give the lie to the so-called disfranchised condition of American Negroes, herding colleagues of "the Nordic race" at the Republican National Convention in 1920 "in a public and lordly manner," "voting" them "as if they had been stuffed chemises."[14] Mr. Mencken's point, as I take it, was that courage would cure many of the so-called disabilities of the Negroes. "If the blacks in the backwaters of the South keep away from the polls today it is only because they do not esteem the ballot highly enough to risk the dangers that go with trying to use it. That fact, it seems to me, convicts them of unfitness for citizenship in a democratic state."[15] If

[11] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958), 38.
[12] *Ibid.*, 33.
[13] Title of a book on Mencken by Edgar Kemler (Boston, 1950).
[14] H. L. Mencken, *Notes on Democracy* (New York, 1926), 86.
[15] *Ibid.*, 86.

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the potential voter values his peace and security "more than he values the boon for which the Fathers bled," then, said Mencken, he certainly has the right to choose but he is unfit for democracy. So the satirists of America and England join hands over the century. Both think the political good requires courage, but Smith is more obviously serious—at a critical moment in English history he truly believes harm is to be done by the institution of the ballot.

Yet, after all, George Grote was a Benthamite of the inner circle. Ought he not to have put first the reduction of pain, whether the pain of real persecution for openly voting the wrong way or the pain of fear lest someone find out and then persecute you? The calculus of pleasure required an analgesic, not a school for heroes, a pain-free rather than a "bold and indomitable" people.

Nor were Benthamites ever unreservedly and without exception committed to democracy. Two days after old Jeremy's death in June 1832 the first Reform Bill became law. *Pillé par tout le monde . . .* the dissected body of Benthamism exuded little warmth for democracy though Halévy says the radicals gave the movement for reform the "doctrinal solidity" it would otherwise have lacked.[16] The principle "every man to count for one and no man for more than one" was called by A. V. Dicey a deduction from the axioms of utilitarianism.[17] He said it formed a link between Benthamism and democracy. Minimal democracy, surely, even when translated into universal suffrage. While few utilitarians would have taken their stand beside "Finality Jack" Russell in 1832, by 1859 John Austin wanted no more democracy,[18] Robert Lowe, that "rigid utilitarian" and "last of the Benthamites,"[19] took to the Cave of Adullam to fight reform, and, whatever his protests after losing the election of 1868,[20] John Mill would not, with Harriet, have spoken of the people as an "uncultivated herd" out of pure trust in and passion for democracy.

[16] Elie Halévy, *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism* (London, 1928), 511. The quotation at the beginning of this sentence is attributed to Talleyrand: *Pillé par tout le monde, il est toujours riche.*

[17] Albert Venn Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1905), Lecture VI.

[18] John Austin, "A plea for the constitution" (1859), a pamphlet referred to by Dicey, Lecture VII.

[19] The phrases quoted are Dicey's.

[20] John Mill, *Autobiography* (London, 1873), Chap. VII.

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The Mills wanted the herd educated; so did Lowe, Viscount Sherbrooke. But so did Sydney Smith, for in his sermon on the duties of the new, young Queen Victoria, he told her from the pulpit of St. Paul's that her *first* duty was to educate the people.[21] Here Grote was way out ahead of his critic. Take only his part in the founding of University College, London. The Grotes were bankers of Bremen. Some Grote money flowed through George into the foundations of this "radical" academy in Gower Street; more flowed, from George's father, to its rival—the Anglican college, King's, in the Strand—a policy, some say, meant to make clear that Jewish money could finance Christian as well as agnostic dreams.

Now those simple souls who believe that all works calling themselves "educational" must necessarily promote a way of life called "democratic" should have no further doubt about George Grote and his democracy. Such innocents might also believe that the Grote Chair in Philosophy of Mind and Logic could not but seat forever professional philosophers as dedicated as George himself to the ancient democratic dream. For George *was* so dedicated. A. D. Lindsay calls him "the fervent defender of Athenian democracy"[22] against, no doubt, that staunch monarchist and anti-Jacobin, William Mitford, whose *History* Grote's displaced. The dream, no doubt, is what we find in Grote's footnotes as elsewhere in the *History*, a dream somewhat at odds, I think, with Balloto-Grotical democracy and the calculus of pleasure; yet a dream nonetheless, as hindsight at least suggests, which was not so very far from reality among the possibilities in the mid-nineteenth century. For politics is an art of possibilities.

"The Essential Ugliness"

Over the dust of the sophists, "misconceived as well as misesteemed,"[23] Grote tangled with Frederick Denison Maurice. Grote, who had withdrawn from Gower Street when James Mill and others yielded so far to Dissenting demands as to permit a clergyman to teach philosophy in place of Charles Hay Cameron, tangled with

[21] Smith, 704.

[22] A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to George Grote's *A History of Greece* (London, 1906), viii.

[23] Grote, *History*, VIII, 311.

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Maurice who, at one stage, spread his "broad" churchman's seat over no less than three professorial "chairs" in the Strand.[24]

In 1848, when only part of Grote's work had been published, Maurice published his *History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*. Grote's chapter on the sophists was already out; Maurice accepted Grote's account of them as "the Platonical and true one" and declared that what he called Grote's "flattering sketch" nevertheless made abundantly clear the "essential ugliness" of the sophists themselves. We may have some difficulty in seeing how one and the same account could be flattering, accurate, and derogatory at the same time, but this need not deter us from studying Grote's reply, the subject of his footnote.[25]

Maurice, the Christian Socialist,[26] accuses the sophists of holding out "the acquisition of political power as a prize to be obtained." He finds them "essentially ugly" because they taught young Athenians—among others—how to think, speak, act so "that they might guide the people according to their pleasure." These charges, incidentally, accord very well with those brought against Socrates, particularly, Xenophon tells us,[27] because of his alleged influence on politicians like Critias and Alcibiades; yet Socrates was adored by nineteenth-century enemies of the sophists as the one who meant to save Athens from such "corruption."

The charges are as follows: first, that political power was made to look desirable and obtainable; second, that the enjoyment of it with sophistic skills meant that the sophists' students got their own way in politics. Now some think power is desirable as means, others, as an end and for itself; but Maurice's complaint against the sophists was that they publicized its enjoyment and made it seem attainable. You could meet this objection by veiling power in mystery and reserving it for the few. But Maurice, of course, believed in the value of cooperation—a belief which played its part in T'owd Lane and the rise of the Cooperative Movement. The belief in a cooperation which would dispense with power and its "essential ugliness"

[24] Maurice held chairs in English language, English literature, and divinity.
[25] Grote, *History*, VIII, 319-22.
[26] John Mill calls him the originator of Christian Socialism in his *Autobiography*, but G. M. Trevelyan finds "socialist" inappropriate and prefers "Christian radical." See Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After* (2d ed.; London, 1937), 281.
[27] Xenophon, *Memorabilia of Socrates* (London, 1913), Bk. I, Chap. II, Sect. 12.

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is certainly an integral part of the Socialist dream; nor has it noticeably impeded enjoyment by "top" Socialists of the power it offers to usurp.

Maurice's other charge against the sophists derives from a comparable sentimentality: what is power, benign or malignant, if it does not mean that the powerful can please himself? Let us if we will distinguish good governors from bad by appraising what pleases each, or good constitutions from bad by the provisions each makes to ensure that what pleases the governors shall not too greatly displease more than a few at a time. But government apart from the facility for governors to please themselves must, like wholly permissive parenthood, involve us in contradiction. The two charges are essentially one—that of distributing political power; and this is where Grote's reply begins:

> There are only two modes of governing society: either by persuasion or by coercion. Discredit the arguments of the sophist as much as you can . . . but when you discredit his weapon of intellectual and persuasive force as if it were nothing better than cheat or imposture . . . you leave open no other ascendency over men's minds except the crushing engine of extraneous coercion with assumed infallibility.[28]

Is this "Balloto-Grotical" democracy? I think not. In his reply to Maurice, Grote, every bit as much as Sydney Smith or William Wordsworth, exhibits the political virtues; more than Smith I think he understood—at least for the Athenians—how "education" in a democracy was but another face of the public way of life, an initiation into its essential virtues.

"Create a public of competent hearers and judges": this is the only way to reduce the admittedly evil potential of speech; for at least the sophists taught men to contend with the tongue, not the sword.

Grote was wrong, I think, in proposing only two general, alternative styles of government, though he could hardly help himself. Even so, the inference for democracy and education was sound whatever faults there may have been in his enthusiasm for the ...ts. In discovering his error we shall also more fully appreci... insights.

Maurice condemned the skills the sophists transmitted he

... ry, VIII, 322.

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was also, Grote said, condemning parliamentary institutions, the free press, and all free expression of public opinion. For you must either uphold these and *therefore* approve those who enhance their competence, or condemn both. Not to want to extend the number of those who can effectively participate in the political discourse we call "democracy" is to contradict its fundamental principle.

Elsewhere, in a note to his *Plato*, Grote derides the contemporary idealist belief in a universal, impersonal reason allegedly able to dispense with argument and persuasion. "The Universal Reason can only make itself known through an interpreter. The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility?"[29]

So it is in the political life: dissension there must be (the message of the Protagorean *dissos logos* is loud and clear); the best we can do is to provide persuasive disciplines to diminish its evils by enlarging the number of those who can participate and by increasing their competence. The alternative, he says, is coercion by "assumed infallibility"—the infallibility, we suppose, of Pope or people, of party or prince.

Coercion or persuasion: forgetting for the moment the "bad press" persuasion has been getting under the influence of such writers as J. A. C. Brown, Vance Packard, and William Sargant,[30] let us concentrate on Grote's simple alternatives, taking as our guide, a devil's advocate perhaps, His Fordship Mustafa Mond, resident controller for Western Europe in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. Mond told his audience of young alpha initiates how, faced with the choice between world control and destruction, "the Controllers realised that force was no good." They turned, however, not to democratic persuasion in the mode of Grote's Athenian dream, but to "ectogenesis, neo-Pavlovian conditioning and hypnopaedia." Here are possibilities Grote was bound to miss. Dark misgivings about the future were not, of course, lacking even to the Benthamites. They had their Malthus; Mill in his mental crisis pondered gloomily what would happen if, when utilitarian reform had succeeded,

[29] Grote, *Plato and other Companions of Socrates* (London, 1865), II, 361.

[30] J. A. C. Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion* (London, 1963); Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (London and New York, 1957), and *The Naked Society* (London and New York, 1964); William Sargant, *Battle for the Mind* (London, 1957).

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pleasure should exhaust itself[31]—I take this to be a doubt, at least, whether all the possibilities of human nature, for good or ill, had been exhausted in the opening sentences of Bentham's *Principles*.[32] But they could see no further.

"That modern democracy is not favourable to the higher forms of intellectual life"[33] was a judgment accepted by far more men than William Hartpole Lecky. It was a commonplace confirming the indifference rather than quickening the dedication of intellect to the educational requirements of democracy." . . . an education contrived by clerks for a nation of working men"[34] was one consequence. The abandonment of philosophy in the face of those very technological advances which should have stimulated it was another.

Even Huxley thought, at first, that six centuries would pass before the time of Mustafa Mond, before the post-human era of psycho- and bio-chemical engineering. True, by 1946 he was prepared to say "The horror may be upon us within a single century,"[35] but by then many were already mesmerized by the Bomb, a spell which would incline their children more to Mond's ways. But by then, too, Huxley could put about the slogan, "better fun with fungi than idiocy with ideologies"—hardly the words of a man wholly persuaded that his own "non-utopia" was all "horror."

Grote's choice of the persuasive style now stands out. The choice is no longer between crude force and enlightened persuasion—between Ormuzd and Ahriman—but between coercion of various sorts, on the one hand, and, on the other, either persuasive methods of differing kinds or the slow dominance of post-human engineering of wants and satisfactions to suit some experts' conception of the good life.

"Discredit the arguments of the sophist as much as you can . . . but when you discredit his weapon of intellectual and persuasive force . . . you leave" men open to forms of government some of which radically change their nature. The horror of some such forms is that they grow less fearful the more we are immersed, for their

[31] Mill, Chap. V.

[32] Jeremy Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford, 1789).

[33] William H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty* (London, 1913), I, 131.

[34] Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (4th ed.; London, 1923), xxxix.

[35] Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (London, 1946), 14.

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appeal is to inferior yet most powerful wants, the control of which in pursuit of higher values has been the principal work of civilization. Ironically, the Benthamites themselves, Grote's friends, appeared to reduce men in this way to the level of pains and pleasures. As if, indeed, Grote's ballot box with its promise of security and deliverance from courage were the "Pandorian gift" Wordsworth imagined it to be.[36]

Did Grote see something, however fleetingly, that we have missed—"we" here including the founding fathers of English democracy and education in the nineteenth century? Whether or not his account of the sophists suffers from what A. D. Lindsay calls his fault of "reading the prejudices and passions of modern politics into ancient history,"[37] we need not confuse the canons of "scientific history" with the search for wisdom, the quest for the public philosophy. If we recall what happened in the "new" democracy we may be in a better position to say what was missed.

"Our Future Masters"

By 1870 it looked as if Disraeli's "leap in the dark" (over Gladstone's back, or his whigtail, like Zarathustra's clown?) had pulled England into the light. "We must compel our future masters to learn their letters," said the last of the Benthamites, fresh from the Cave of Adullam. "The lower classes ought to be educated to discharge the duties cast upon them." And again: "I am anxious to educate the lower classes . . . in order to qualify them for the power that has passed and perhaps will pass in a still greater degree into their hands."[38]

If education is not only initiation into a way of life—as Professor R. S. Peters says[39]—but also a way of life in itself, within its favored institutions (ill, or well adjusted to the wider community which tolerates it) we are entitled to ask what kind of life it was Lowe and indeed Forster and the men of 1870 had in mind for their "future masters"; what kind of men they intended, and what sort of "mas-

[36] William Wordsworth, "Protest against the Ballot," in *Sonnets*.

[37] Lindsay, in Grote's *History*, I, viii.

[38] Robert Lowe, "Primary and Classical Education," address delivered to the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh in 1867, in S. J. Curtis and M. E. Boultwood, *A Short History of Educational Ideas* (London, 1956), 443.

[39] R. S. Peters, *Education as Initiation* (London, 1963).

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tery." In one respect we may think that Lowe himself was not far from Grote and his sophists—in the usual importance he attached to the English language. As lawyer, administrator, and politician, both at home and in Sydney, Lowe attributed his success in large part, rather as Winston Spencer Churchill was to do, to his exceptional attention to the English language.

"English is not merely the medium of our thought; it is the very stuff and process of it . . .," an official report was to say,[40] and half a century earlier Lowe seemed to say the same, though, admittedly, with more concern for upper- than for lower-class education. For the rest, bare literacy was enough, a view which most would seem to have shared at the time.

Here, I think, the Grote of the *History* would have gone much further. Of course the enemies of the sophists, following the greatest of them, Plato, have dismissed their teaching as mere verbal trickery, and Grote himself attends to the sophists as part of a more general account of Greek Drama, Rhetoric and Dialectic: all of which may suggest to some little more than verbal arts. But by his talk of persuasion and reason, by his accounts of Protagoras' and the other sophists' teaching, and above all by his firm reference of it all to a democratic way of life he shows he sees more in language than literacy and in democracy more than the vote. James Mill, his fellow Benthamite, also wanted more than literacy for the lower classes; he wanted them exposed to a variety of opinion, to choose, and to make their choice effective through the vote. So Grote; rightly or wrongly he appreciated the sophists as teachers whose teaching increased the number of "competent hearers and judges." No such intention seems to me to dominate educational thought in England since the rise of democracy in the nineteenth century.

The procedures called "voting" and "representing" together with the party structures which built upon them were the substitutes we found for democratic dreams. From "every one to count for one" we deduced "one man, one vote," for "government by the people" we substituted government by party organizations and administrators. Yet even such procedural substitutes implied educational requirements which would, had their logic been appreciated, have taken us toward and not away from the dream. For what is involved

[40] *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Teaching of English in England* (London, 1921).

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in voting, supposing this to be the intelligent, public action of a free, responsible person? "Knowledge," indeed; but of such a sort that a word which "education" increasingly restricts to mere information, techniques, and vocational requirements is hardly an aid any more to understanding.

Compare voting with playing a game. If I know the rules of a game and have mastered, also, the proper movements, I can play anywhere, with anyone, though I cannot always win (it would not be a "game" if I did). It is true that we sometimes call politics a "game," but that is usually when we are thinking of those few professionals sometimes, curiously, called "representatives," who use our votes as counters in the game of party conflict. Voting and the way of life it proposes are different; they are certainly more *unlike* a game than like and neither the knowledge nor the skill it calls for is strictly comparable.

In the first place I vote about situations—critical situations, I shall call them, that is, situations calling for judgment. Now a situation is such that it is not possible to have knowledge about it in the same sense as I have knowledge about a game. True, "public decision in rational politics . . . implies a guess about the future derived from experience of the past," as Arthur Schlesinger says, but the same writer adds in the following paragraph that "the lessons of history are generally so ambiguous that the antecedent reasons determine the choice between alternative historical interpretations."[41]

There may be, some day, some way of subsuming critical situations under general laws, laws formulated in the academies by historians or social scientists, but even if that were conceivable without our changing our conception of man and a human way of life all it would come to would be that there were no critical situations. For if the situation resolved itself into a problem the answer to which could be read off from a properly programmed computer all that would count as critical would be the program, and the programmer.

In the meantime we have critical situations, and votes. To say that I understand such a situation is not to say that another man who also understands "it" will act as if this were the same situation,

[41] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "On the Inscrutability of History," *Encounter*, November 1966, pp. 10-17.

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that is, as two men will behave who are playing the same game of golf. If there could be one authoritative account of such critical situations binding upon all, then politics would indeed be a game and the public life one long olympics. But that is not how it is. Not only are we called upon to decide what should be done *in* a situation, but some of us, some few of us perhaps, knowingly or unawares, determine to a large extent what such a situation shall be.

Take what the newspapers called the Middle East "situation" during 1967. Imagine how this seemed on different ends of the Allenby Bridge around midsummer: how it seemed to an Arab on the east side, waiting to come back, to an Israeli on the west side, brooding on the threat to his own people of a large, hostile minority. How it *seemed*? Isn't "seemed" a bit of academic pedantry, the sort of finicking which philosophers enjoy? Surely, in a critical situation what *seems* is "to all intents and purposes" what *is*—for what can matter more in such situations than "intents and purposes"? A United Nations observer above the bridge in a "chopper" does not see a "neutral" situation in which he acts wholly as an umpire; he sees a third and different situation which he may, of course, hope to "sell" to the others below. But in the meantime he must decide within it and not be led astray by "seeming."

"Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are; of those that are not, that they are not." Protagoras, chief among the sophists Grote defended, must have given hours of happy animosity to generations of philosophers with that one proposition. Walter Kaufmann says of Hegel that he is known "largely through secondary sources and a few incriminating slogans and generalizations."[42] Thanks partly to Plato the sophist, Protagoras' reputation is in a far worse state; what Plato did not use he abused. Nevertheless, this fragment, "man the measure," the *metron anthropon*, puts very well what I am saying about critical situations: Man—the race, the species, the group, the collective—determines what situations shall be, and what shall not be. Some component "facts" may be given; the situation—which is what we have to live with, our world—is determined by Man. We are both the race which determines the situation and the individuals called upon to vote within it.

[42] Walter Kaufmann, *The Owl and the Nightingale* (London, 1959), 89.

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"Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other."[43] Despite Diogenes Laertius he probably was not, but this saying, the *dissos logos*, together with the other, the *metron anthropon*, suit democracy and democratic theory; they set up the right approach to political education, though taken by themselves, of course, they might just as easily lead to all that Platonists, Hegelians, and Marxists have made out of "dialectic," little of which would be called "democratic" in Grote's sense.

Before men vote, then, with or without Grote's box, decisions have been taken—not all deliberate, aware—decisions which set up situations, constructed out of the "given," situations within which we are asked to make further decisions. (No Arab will be asked to vote on the question whether Israel should be allowed to keep old Jerusalem, Sinai, Sharm el Sheikh, or the heights of Kuneitra. No Israeli will be asked if Dan should be exposed once more to Syrian shells). What then does it mean to vote in a democracy? Or how shall a voter be taught?

The voter is the community which determines the situation; he is also *not* the community. He, the community, and the situation are interdependent variables and anyone who tries to teach him anything is likely to modify all three. But then so is he, when he votes. Each vote, each refusal to vote, each voice or refusal to speak threatens a shift in the delicate balance of the components making up his tenuous self. How is a man to be prepared for such involvement? How much may he become without it? How is he to begin to know that life is of this sort and he in it?

On the one hand there is the need to decide, seeing the question and the decision as peculiarly your own. Some see this as an animal may see pregnancy or other pain or a saint the beatific vision: as calling for withdrawal, darkness, isolation, self-immolation. Only in secrecy will my unique and uniquely valuable insight swell and blossom into decision. On the other hand, some see public accounting as the only educator of the worthwhile vote both because the act done in daylight in its turn teaches the group and also because I do not know what I believe until I have said it, how much it is

[43] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (London, 1960), Bk. IX, 51. On Protagoras' originality in this respect, see Mario Untersteiner, *The Sophists* (Oxford, 1954), Chap. III.

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worth until called to account for what I have said, or even who I am until I find myself paying for what I said I believed.

"We decide or debate, carefully and in person, all matters of policy, holding, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."[44]

A more pedestrian writer than Thucydides might have made Pericles say—more accurately?—"the city is foredoomed to failure if it neglects the dialogue and therefore such acts, whatever their apparent, 'pragmatic' success, must in the end defeat us." But the democratic idea is clear enough and it is sufficiently Grote's as it may well have been Protagoras', seeing that this sophist was a friend of Pericles.

Now Grote must have seen the fundamental difficulty of democracy, the difficulty in which we are all involved when we want to be free but do not want to be held responsible—a bit like wanting to drive but not wanting to steer. Grote also saw part of the answer —competence. For we will always do more readily what we know how to do; men would accept the entailment of freedom, and therefore more wholeheartedly believe in free societies, if they had been taught how to behave in them, as responsible members. Grote saw something of this. Nevertheless, neither he, his nineteenth-century successors, nor we who come after them have done much to increase the number of "competent hearers and judges."

"Competent Hearers and Judges"

Learning how to behave in a responsible society is like learning a language. Professor Michael Oakeshott[45] makes a similar point when talking about the methods of political education. But I want to say more, and other, than he says. More, because a very large part of the behavior essential to responsible society *is* language. Other, because Oakeshott is too happy to leave things to chance, too indifferent, I suspect, to human *possibilities* in politics. Grote and his sophists, even Lowe and his emphasis on the English language, were very close to the heart of the matter. Just as you may miss the nuances of a situation because you lack the words to dis-

[44] Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Bk. II, Chap. VI.

[45] Michael Oakeshott, "Political Education," in *Rationalism in Politics* (London and New York, 1962), 111-36.

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tinguish them (I am poor at talk about color and even fail to recognize shades because I lack a discriminatory vocabulary), so you will more readily yield to a given account of the situation for lack of alternative value-words, for lack of the idiom of value-judgments. Men do not turn their back on the commerce of civilization only through base yearnings and regressive lusts; they may withdraw, the newcomers, and act as if indifferent to the good life for the same reason as alien tourists will behave sometimes as if they despised the people and the places around them—they simply don't know what to do or, to be precise, they don't know what to say.

A man knows well enough, intuitively, what he wants for himself or his family. He cannot get far in evaluating such wants, ordering them, fixing priorities, without symbols of some sort. As for the public good, the vocabulary must be richer by far, flexible, subtle, or, literally, sophisticated. Yet this Oakeshott would leave to chance, to the haphazard, as he calls it. He is arguing against rationalistic assumptions, text- and hand-book procedures, and ideological models in political education: properly so. Yet the alternatives to these are not the random, the haphazard. Much that family, village, church, and work-group did in political education was not formal or rationalistic, but neither was it haphazard. A public way of life into which I can be initiated only by the contagious, face-to-face example of a "master" steeped in political experience is an in-group, in-bred way of life, an elite, like the civil service of yesterday, perhaps, but, almost by definition, not democracy, not responsible society. Yet it is this to which the haphazard would commit us.

With our large population, increased annually by newcomers not only of new generations but also of other races—immigrants—with our institutions crammed and our teachers overwhelmed, under-prepared, any tradition of behavior abandoned to chance is quite simply—abandoned. We are embarked on Professor Oakeshott's uncharted political sea without paying proper respect to Francis Bacon's admonition: "They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they see nothing but sea."[46]

Political—or public—education for responsible society has three principal areas in which to work, no one of which may today be safely left to chance, or to civil servants. The first is the struc-

[46] Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (Oxford, 1900), Bk. II, Chap. VII, p. 115.

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ture and style of government in schools, colleges, and indeed in families and other educational institutions. The second is in the general methods of teaching in all, or practically all "subjects." The third is in deliberate and systematic introduction to the ways of thinking, speaking, and judging which are called for by critical situations. I propose here merely to indicate what I mean by political education in all three areas, having in mind Grote's phrase about competent hearers and judges.

(1) The government of schools and colleges has seldom been taken seriously as an integral part of the public way of life that it plainly is. Some schools have advertised "child-centered" arrangements as if this bore some relation to responsible society—which it does not. Others depend on the caprice of a head teacher or the fiats of bureaucracy. Few make systematic, properly thought-out attempts to engage teaching staff, let alone older children, in decision procedures or to work out ways and means of distributing graduated responsibility among their members. Some colleges and universities, on the other hand, having for long enough given no manifest attention whatsoever to the way of life they exemplify, now look like yielding at a touch to chaotic demands for what will undoubtedly be called "democratic" participation by students with little thought save for the party, union, sectarian, or bureaucratic conveniences at stake. Such changes are likely to abuse "democracy" quite as much as they will abuse academic values. Yet both schools and colleges are of immense importance as initiators into public ways of life, whether or not these support or diminish the larger way of life which subsidizes and tolerates them.

As for the family, this all-important group has in many cases abandoned its educational obligations altogether. Slogans and catchphrases from pseudo-psychology have been used to excuse adult indolence or timidity and to disguise indifference itself as a new, enlightened form of "love."

(2) By the general methods of teaching as part of political education I mean more than the fashionable dread of "indoctrination" encourages. Good teaching certainly follows Protagoras, exemplifying the *dissos logos*, the "open-ended" structure of most questions, to the discomfort of indoctrinators. But good teaching does not rest there. Protagoras would not have grown rich on sophistry had he done no more than point out "the two sides to every question." In

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particular, the teacher who belongs to a way of life dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom understands the commitment, the belief which is essential to knowledge, the choices he has to make, the obligations belief entails. "Teaching" which is nothing but the recital of other men's utterances (annual repetition of a "good set of notes" before the class) betrays both its objects (the many-sided, volatile phenomena) and its subjects (teachers, learners who may be put off learning forever by having to cross over this valley of dry bones to reach experience). On the other hand, "teaching" which lays out all possible "views" like wet fish on a stone slab, taking delight only in hooking men's beliefs, gutting and splaying them out for observation, is at least not more worthwhile.

A free society learns neither by rote nor reduction—or not by these alone. Crises do not repeat themselves—yesterday's logic may be today's misology—yet freedom must have hopes and visions. We use the dialogue to keep free of the stereotypes, but nihilism only follows if we make a virtue of timidity, equate intellectual doubt with disparagement, identify the dilettante with experimenter, turn all enquiry into subversion, and make a philosophy of no-saying. Some of what passes for teaching is of this sort today.

(3) I am particularly interested in an unworked area coming closest to Grote and his sophists—the area of systematic initiation into the "know-how" of self-government, but especially into the ways of thinking, speaking, and judging called for by critical situations. And what this comes to in the first instance is—pushing actual situations just that fraction out of place so that they confront the initiate long enough for his imagination to be provoked into judgment and thereby for the need of a language to be quickened. It is true, of course, that the vast majority of newcomers in our society are remote from what we call, narrowly, political situations and likely to remain so. But it is also true both that the "political" is a great deal broader than our specialized habits incline us to suppose, and that young children, as well as older newcomers, are daily as close to critical situations as any client of the sophists was to the *agora* or the *dikasterion*. Close, but often lacking attention because lacking recognition and its symbols.

Thus, a child crossing a busy street, let alone sitting in a car beside the driver, brushes close by even if he does not enter situations bristling with possibilities in public, political education. All

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that academics seize and store away under such museum-labels as "natural law," "ethics," "philosophy of right," and so on has its being in such situations. But a child also lives in a family and has friends—how is it possible for him not to acquire "haphazardly" the equipment he needs to recognize and intelligently participate in judgments of value, discernment of ends, awareness of good and evil, and so forth? One answer is that in a way of life which advertises for his attention to so wide a range of sights and sounds without compelling him to be active, only a special kind of effort will shift his gaze the fraction necessary to bring the critical in focus and stimulate the search for words. (Just as the moral dogmatist, speaking from the dais—yet one more ad-man intruding between scenes—will blur vision again and stifle the demand.)

We have to learn how to put the proximate situation before newcomers without falsifying them to suit a text, yet without fancying we can detach them from the world in which they arise. Our aim is to teach the habits and language of evaluation so that newcomers shall neither be fooled by unscrupulous persuaders nor remain indifferent to the community of experience in which they live. Teachers of history and of literature have always seemed well-placed to provide this perspective in education, but not well-placed enough. Only the few will pass from judgments on the past or on imaginary situations to existential problems, nor is there much sign that the "best educated" today are so much better equipped than the illiterate, for much of their acquired language is inappropriately specialized and much of their intellectual habits inhibiting rather than informing evaluative insights.

"Balloto-Grotical" democracy—to recall Smith's dreadful nickname—might well prefer the same basic, minimal language which Orwell designed for *1984*: the fewer words you have, the more stereotyped, the less risk there is of "deviating," aloud. Responsible society, on the other hand, is inconceivable without the dialogue, "the conversation of mankind," to borrow a phrase of Michael Oakeshott's.[47] The dialogue needs not only the languages of in-groups and specialists but also the public, purposeful, intentional language of good, better, and best, of evil, of right and wrong, the language of grading, of priorities in the larger ends of mankind,

[47] Oakeshott, "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind," in *Rationalism in Politics*, 197-247.

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the language of men responsible both for their private and their public worlds, of men in search of the good life. If this is the "sophistry" George Grote thought necessary to democracy I think he was right, but we have come a long way from it; or rather, we have taken no discernible steps toward it in this first (or last?) hundred years of educated democracy.

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The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation*

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> For if men know not their duty, what is there that can force them to obey the laws: An army, you will say. But what shall force the army? Were not the trained bands an army? Were they not the janissaries, that not very long ago slew Osman in his own palace at Constantinople? I am therefore of your opinion both that men may be brought to a love of obedience by preachers and gentlemen that imbibe good principles in their youth . . . and also that we will never have a lasting peace till . . . the ministers know they have no authority but what the supreme civil power gives them; and the nobility and gentry know that the liberty of a state is not an exemption from the laws of their own country.
>
> Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*

The purpose of this paper is to call attention to some difficulties common in academic explanations of usurpation by standing armies. We overemphasize the importance of force, and hence the soldier's ability to initiate or check the process. The misconception arises from a failure to appreciate usurpation as a crisis in allegiances which simultaneously splits both soldiers and civilians alike. In order to focus on matters which bear universally on soldiers as soldiers, I have ignored variable considerations such as class

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affiliations and private ambitions not inherent in the military occupation.

I

Ever since World War II most political scientists have treated military usurpation as a transient feature of historical development. They have distinguished three types of state, "traditional," "modernizing," and "modern." Traditional states *always* have unruly armies. In modernizing ones armies *may* depose governments to accelerate the inevitable movement toward the modern millennium, where the possibility of usurping armies, like that of coercion in Marxist doctrine, withers away.[1]

The difficulties of this view are immense. In principle, as long as we can distinguish between a government on the one hand, and the armed and unarmed portions of its public on the other, military usurpation is always conceivable; and, in fact, history gives little support to the supposition that an unmistakable movement from military insubordination to subordination exists. Traditional states like the Ottoman empire of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and those of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth controlled their armies. The Ottomans lost this ability in the seventeenth century, never to regain it, while the Spaniards and Portuguese followed suit in the nineteenth. France and Prussia-Germany have had more difficulties with their armies since 1789 than in the century and a half before that time, and when the Fourth Republic fell, Raoul Giradet, a distinguished student of French military history, wondered whether the increasing burdens most *modern* states place on their armies might not induce new waves of military usurpations in the future.[2]

Schemes of development have value but they are no substitute for an explicit statement of the universal conditions of military

[1] See, for example, Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, 1964); John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1962), especially Chap. 1; and Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962), 217-36; and Halpern's *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1963).

[2] "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic," in S. P. Huntington (ed.), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe, 1962), 141-45.

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usurpation, a task very few contemporaries have attempted. Mosca is probably our most distinguished exception, and his view is worth examining for several reasons. Most general statements derive from it; a similar view also is reflected in discussions of particular contemporary usurpations, and the argument, wherever it appears, displays a peculiar indifference to the nature of usurpations, standing armies, and political communities.

Mosca argued that our presumption should be that a standing army *could* overturn its government whenever it had the *military* resources—training, equipment, number, and organization—to do so.

> Native or foreign, once regularly organized mercenaries have become the preponderant force in a country, they have normally tried to force their rule upon the rest of society. . . . The more perfect their organization, and the more complete the military disorganization of the rest of the society, the more far-reaching has the influence of mercenaries been. . . .[3]
>
> In a bureaucratic state, which represents the most complicated type of social organization, the standing army will absorb all the more belligerent elements, and, being readily capable of prompt obedience to a single impulse, it will have no difficulty in dictating to the rest of society.[4]

Mosca apparently could not find reasons for distinguishing between the factors critical to battle and those to usurpation. But a

[3] *The Ruling Class* (New York, 1939), 226. Similar views are expressed by S. Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (London, 1954), 26-28; K. Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (London, 1943); and S. McKinley, *Democracy and Military Power* (New York, 1934). The argument obviously is a crude version of the Marxist view that the state is simply a rule of force. In this respect it is worth noting that all three writers join Mosca in arguing that the military is subordinate only when recruited from the same social class which dominates government. The thesis may explain why the English army is loyal but will hardly do for those of Latin America which are not.

[4] *The Ruling Class*, 228. Exceptions are explained by the subjective determination of soldiers to submit to constituted authority, a point to be discussed below. It must be conceded that Mosca's chapter on armies is more puzzling and less coherent than the two quotations suggest. But its theme clearly is "that the class that bears the lance . . . regularly forces its rule on the class that handles the spade." (*Ibid.*) Perhaps the major difficulty is that he cannot distinguish legitimate and illegitimate rule, and thus sees no fundamental difference between a state whose governments are deposed by its soldiers and one where the major officeholders have military responsibilities.

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direct look at particular usurpations will compel the thoughtful student to find some.

Compare the virtually bloodless uprising which toppled the Fourth Republic with the abortive bloodless attempt to collapse its successor three years later. French civilians in Algeria started the initial revolt and soldiers joined them to assume the brunt of leadership. Paris stood firm and mobilized civilians in France. The usurpers, finding that they had miscalculated, desperately linked their cause with the only uncommitted civilian with great prestige—Charles de Gaulle. After he indicated willingness to accept executive power, popular sentiment deserted the government. Losing its nerve and unwilling to accept responsibility for a civil war, Paris reluctantly invested de Gaulle with legal authority. Later the military conspirators discovered that de Gaulle was not their candidate after all, and they rose again—this time without a clear indication of popular discontent. Although the conspirators seemed to have the support of the entire military establishment, for some reason they hesitated to use force, giving the indomitable de Gaulle time to make a television broadcast declaring his intention to fight. When civilians responded to the call to arms, the usurpers this time could not face the prospect of civil war, whereupon the rebellion collapsed.

In the two French examples the ebb and flow of political sentiments among civilians was the primary determinant of military possibilities. The public was provided with extra-institutional opportunities to judge respective claims to rule. Once its view was unmistakable, the violence no one really wanted could be avoided.

The process illustrates some of the major differences between battle and usurpation. The commander on the battlefield attains his goal when the enemy gives up the fight. But the usurper has more than one opponent; no one party can give him what he needs most —legitimacy; and it is always possible that in eliminating his most immediate rival he has only opened the door to a more dangerous one.

The commander on the battlefield anticipates that the issue will be decided by force alone; a victory without bloodshed is so rare that it is doubtful whether we can speak of it as even resulting from battle. Usurpations, on the other hand, can be bloodless. (In fact, for reasons discussed later, generally they are so in the modern

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world.) The antagonists do not know whether their forces will be loyal or not, they aim to preserve the resources of the entire community, and may yield simply because they think they would have to fight otherwise.

Usurpers and the governments they mean to overthrow, in other words, do not relate as independent entities. They function in a political context with other potential competitors, and ultimately the public which stands above them all awards the prize. Engels understood the process clearly; it depends "upon moral influences which in a fight between armies of two warring countries do not come into play at all or do so to a much lesser degree."[5]

II

The distinctions I have been making are transparent; they are incorporated in our language but they rarely form integral parts of our analyses. At least we do not emphasize the soldier's search for a favorable judgment, and so we fail to see how that quest demonstrates the fragile quality of his own resources or reveals him often as a mere plaything of forces he cannot regulate.

A. The Concern for a Favorable Civilian Judgment

To two distinguished authorities in different fields the unique elements of the French experience must have seemed more meaningful than its universal qualities. Mosca's thesis was still the relevant one for the underdeveloped world.

[5] *The Revolutionary Act* (New York, 1922), 22. Engels was referring to the effect of a popular uprising on an army, but the principle is the same. Simmel's discussion of competition is relevant to usurpations. Although "victory over the competitor is the chronologically first necessity, it itself means nothing . . . the business man who succeeds in having his competitor suspected of unsoundness by the public gains nothing if the public's needs are suddenly deflected from his business." *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (Glencoe, 1955), 57. From the perspective of strategy, there are fundamentally two types of usurpation. The first, which is what we shall be concerned with, is against a ruler considered illegitimate by much of the public; the second, which Shakespeare discusses in *Macbeth*, is against an unquestionably legitimate ruler. In the former the usurper gains by revealing his conspiracy, but in the latter he would lose all by doing so.

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> The states of sub-Saharan Africa are not threatened by military usurpation because they scarcely have any military forces.[6]
>
> While the armed forces of Africa remain small in proportion to the total population and the area of the countries . . . they are unlikely to establish military regimes. This is almost certainly the answer to those who pose the possibility of military coups in Nigeria or more particularly Ghana when ennui or resentment against the current regime become dominant emotions.[7]

To explain how an army of seven thousand could depose a government representing fifty million Nigerians, the journalists first noted the obvious—the masses greeted the soldiers as deliverers—and then they reasoned backwards to reconstruct the situation as the usurpers must have understood it. In a few years of independence the government squandered its credit transforming enthusiasm, optimism, and trust into despair, pessimism, and suspicion.[8]

Everywhere military usurpers are consumed with finding the right political moment so that they can act before the situation changes or someone else has exploited it for his peculiar advantage. Thus, the puzzling characteristic mistake of usurpers—one the commander on the battlefield never makes; they often act as though they believed that it was the trumpets and not the Israeli host which brought the walls of Jericho down:

> . . . the colonels and generals believed that they had only to raise a shout in a garrison to have its echoes ring through all the length and breadth of Spain.
>
> Believing this, the conspirators were not in the habit of setting up auxiliary bodies or even of preparing adequate means of combat. Why

[6] Edward Shils, "The Political Development of the New States," in Johnson (ed.), 54; also see J. S. Coleman and B. Brice, "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *ibid.*, 359.

[7] W. F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (London, 1965), 143-44. The same year Herbert Spiro argued that African governments were virtually immune from military usurpation because their armies had low *prestige*. Spiro's emphasis on political considerations is sound, but he forgets that prestige depends upon circumstances which may change, and that if the prestige of existing governments deteriorates, soldiers may be the immediate beneficiaries. See Spiro's "The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in W. C. McWilliams (ed.), *Garrisons and Government* (San Francisco, 1967), 264-72.

[8] A correspondent of *The Observer*, March 6, 1966, writes, "One gasps at the small force it takes." Should he have added that a much stronger foreign army might never have been able to destroy this particular government, because only the Nigerian army had credentials to represent the Nigerian public?

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> should they? They did not believe that, in order to win, it was going to be necessary to fight. Sure that almost all the world was of their opinion, though perhaps in secret, they had a blind faith in the magic effect of "pronouncing" a phrase (pronunciamento). *They were not going to fight: they were going to take charge of the government.*[9]

The Spanish officers, like most military usurpers, failed much more often than they succeeded, because they misjudged immediate circumstances, not because their fundamental principle was unsound. Almost anyone *can* overthrow a government which everyone else has abandoned.

En passant I should note that the modern conception of office, which derives from the Western medieval heritage, drastically limits the personal stakes of usurpation and hence maximizes the possibility that a contemporary usurpation *can* be bloodless. The Romans could not distinguish clearly between the emperor and the office he held. No emperor could resign in the face of an uprising, and *all* allegiances were considered binding until he was dead.[10] There was simply no way to escape the choice between killing or being killed, and every usurpation *had* to be violent. A rudimentary distinction between office and officeholder was understood in the Byzantine and Arab empires. By maiming a ruler one made him ineligible to hold office and simultaneously dissolved all oaths of allegiance. It was not an attractive choice, but some men preferred to finish their lives as a cripple. Among the Turks only a male member of the House of Ottoman could become a sultan. A deposed ruler always retained an unrenounceable claim. But he might choose to be imprisoned, and when the number of potential heirs declined, the Janissaries made certain to leave some deposed rulers alive, lest the House, the Janissary body, and perhaps the empire itself perish. In contemporary states where the distinction between offices and men is fully developed, resignation is a complete renunciation of all formal claims, and *if* usurpers are willing, members of a government can become private citizens and as such are at liberty to remain in the country or leave as they see fit.

[9] Ortega y Gasset, *Invertebrate Spain* (London, 1937), 57 (Ortega's emphasis).

[10] Nero, I believe, was the only emperor who tried to resign in the face of an uprising, but he was not permitted to. In the later period the concept of the office began to change under Diocletian, but resignations to ward off trouble were still unknown.

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Among the Romans obligation was created only by a direct personal oath to the emperor. His death created an enormous vacuum, and if various candidates received oaths of allegiance in far parts of the empire, enormous bloodbaths were required to dissolve the pledges taken. We, however, swear fealty to an entire constitution, and when a government resigns, the normal constitutional bodies for confirming successions may be left intact. Thus, the National Assembly appointed de Gaulle, the usurpers' choice, as premier when the next to last government of the Fourth Republic resigned, legally obliging every member of the public in the process. Nineteenth-century Spain perfected the art; could any Roman have understood the conceptual subtleties which made it possible?

> King Alfonso was placed on the throne. . . . [in] 1874. It is generally thought he owes his retention of it since 1875 to statesmanship of a novel kind. As soon as he assures himself that the army is in earnest, he changes his ministers.[11]
>
> When risings occurred every year or two, it became the rule that any government which shed blood in Madrid had to resign. Why not, when as an Italian historian has said, the Spanish idea of fair play is to allow everyone a little revolutionary activity against the government.[12]

As far as one can tell the Roman soldier was legally free to determine whom he would obey upon an emperor's death. Yet the decision was not a private affair; he had to justify it as consistent with the public interest, as the most infamous deed in the Praetorian Guard's history suggests. By convention *after* he received allegiances, an emperor would distribute donatives. In one interregnum period some Guards openly *solicited* bids *before* they took the oath. Interpreting the act to mean that allegiances could be bought and sold like merchandise, the citizens became so outraged that other Guards could not endure the disgrace and "*shamefully* delivered their *unscrupulous* comrades and Julianus (the highest bidder) to the Senate for execution.[13] Within a political community men are mu-

[11] Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government* (London, 1909), 16.

[12] Gerald Brennan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge, 1962), 85. However, as the "fair-minded Spaniard" discovered in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, every usurpation breeds a possibility that civil war will follow. In presidential systems a common practice is to take advantage of the automatic succession rule and swear in the vice-president.

[13] Dio's *Roman History* (London, 1927), IX, 74 (my emphasis).

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tually bound by conventions. Even if they do not feel obliged they cannot appear to talk the language of Thrasymachus or that of the Athenians before Melos.

The example indicates the difficulties in the common belief that only in systems professing democratic principles will the usurper be concerned with the public's mood.[14] A governmental office always belongs to the public, can never be treated like private property, and therefore every usurpation necessarily creates the possibility that large numbers of the public will become involved.

The issue was first discussed by the seventeenth-century writer Gabriel Naudé.[15] Rulers, he noted, derived power through a formally designated procedure and the presumption behind the ceremony was that they would rule on the public's behalf. Usurpers always argue that the ruler has forfeited his claim to obedience, and the public could function as a last albeit extra-institutional court of appeals. Usurpers, Naudé thought, would only risk acting against governments alienated from their publics.

In a variety of ways virtually every early student of the practical mechanics of military usurpation made the same points. In the context of his discussion of usurpation David Hume came to his celebrated conclusion that all government depends upon popular opinion. Gibbon, Ferguson, Montesquieu,[16] and others, noted that military uprisings in ancient states generally came in response to

[14] Finer, 205-43.

[15] See my "Coup d'État: The View of the Men Firing Pistols," in C. J. Friedrich (ed.), *Revolution* (New York, 1966), 53-74. Naudé's view of government obviously presumes a social contract and incorporates Hobbes' psychological requisites for usurpation: discontent, hope of success, and transfer of right. Unless we really believe that a ruler can publicly justify his rights in the language of Thrasymachus, a concept approaching the social contract is necessary for explaining usurpation.

[16] Gibbon describes the ancient praetorian states as "floating between the extremes of absolute monarchy and wild democracy." *The Decline and Fall . . .* (New York, 1899), I, 235. Ferguson notes: "In the disorder of corrupted societies, the scene has been frequently changed from democracy to despotism, and from the last too, in its turn, to the first. From amidst the democracy of corrupt men, and from a scene of lawless confusion, the tyrant ascends a throne with arms reeking in blood. But his abuses or his weaknesses, in the station which he has gained, in their turn, awaken and give way to the spirit of mutiny and revenge. The cries of murder and desolation, which in the ordinary course of military government terrified the subject in his private retreat, are carried through the vaults, and made to pierce the grates and iron doors of the

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popular disturbances, and, were they so inclined, could have supported the argument by additional material from the available primary sources of contemporary non-European states.[17]

In the Ottoman empire, for instance, successive seventeenth-century Venetian, Prussian, French, and English eyewitnesses reported that high prices, unemployment, corruption, and military defeat provoked angry criticisms in the coffee-houses, public baths, and mosques leading to student disturbances, urban riots, and finally to military conspiracies.[18] So unmistakable was the explosion of public anger accompanying a Janissary uprising that one *present-day* student has even declared that the Janissaries "succeeded because they always represented the will of the majority."[19] We need not accept this language in order to agree that successful conspirators needed a favorable public mood to justify all that they might do.[20]

B. *The Soldier's Weakness*

The usurper is obsessed with reading public moods because resistance even on a minor scale requires him to seek vigorous support from his comrades whom he knows could be divided by the ensuing moral crisis.

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seraglio. Democracy seems to revive in a scene of wild disorder and tumult; but both the extremes are but the transient fits of paroxysm or languor in a distempered state." *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Edinburgh, 1966), 72. Montesquieu's description appears in *Considerations . . .*, XVI.

[17] Zagelin, a Prussian official at Constantinople in 1768, described Turkish political life in this way: "Though the form of government is despotic, it is such that when the people is enraged, the Government is no longer master and must yield to the torrent." Quoted in Mary L. Shay, *The Ottoman Empire From 1720 to 1734* (Urbana, 1944), 28.

[18] Shay, 23.

[19] A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (London, 1956), 60 (my emphasis).

[20] Quite obviously the terms public and population represent two different concepts. The government of Sparta did not pretend to rule on behalf of the Helots and would not feel bound to hear their claims. In the ancient despotism the public was enormously expanded, which led early students of military usurpation to use the adjective "democratic." In most contemporary states, whether underdeveloped or modern, the gap between public and population has been greatly narrowed. But there have been and still are important exceptions—the slaves in the American South, Jews in Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent blacks in South Africa. A disturbance in the non-public sphere produces effects similar to those induced generally by wars against foreigners and for similar

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> The soldiers here are so vilified, scorned and hissed that they are ashamed to march; and many officers when they go into the city dare not even wear their swords for fear of affronts; and thus God hath blasted them and they are vile in the eyes of the people.
>
> The soldiers say they will not fight, but will make a ring for their officers to fight in.[21]

The true significance of the usurper's concern for reading public predispositions correctly lies not in the forces civilians could directly add to his cause, but rather in the possibility that civilian hostility might reveal that he never had any to begin with! The more one ponders this fact the more cautiously the conventional explanations of the usurper's assets must be treated.

> The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly in arms. . . . In practically every country of the world . . . the army is marked by the superior quality of its organization. Even the most poorly organized or maintained of such armies is far more highly and tightly structured than any civilian group. The fact that not all armies were highly organized in the past, or that they need not necessarily be so, is irrelevant here. Modern armies are *cohesive* and *hierarchical*. . . . The principal object is to fight and win wars. The highly peculiar features of its organization flow from this central purpose.[22]

The military usurper *may* have overwhelming force but he knows that he does not need it to succeed. What he does require is credibility; he claims to represent the army, he accuses the government of grave misdeeds, and he makes attractive and presumably redeemable promises. Obviously, the skeptic and the deeply committed may regard claims, accusations, and promises as mere words, and if the usurper cannot produce a down payment when a demand is made,

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reasons; it welds the army to the public and the public to the army, for the threat appears as a direct menace to all. In their most mutinous days the Janissaries would meet a Christian disturbance as resolutely as a white army in South Africa is likely to deal with a black uprising.

[21] An entry in *Pepys' Diary*, quoted by C. H. Firth, *Cromwell's Army* (London, 1921), 384.

[22] Finer, 6-7 (Finer's emphasis). The description coincides with Mosca's except that Mosca does not believe that modern armies are inherently more cohesive than their predecessors were. Finer's argument, or a variant thereof, forms part of every contemporary description of usurpation I am familiar with.

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his position becomes impossible. Thus the disproportionate effect of token civilian resistance, and the scarcely remembered fact that military usurpers everywhere fail more often than they succeed.[23] Even when usurpers become the government, they often lack staying power and are the victims of street mobs provoked by a minor incident.

Among contemporaries, as the previous quotation suggests, there is an inexplicable tendency to treat historic armies as fundamentally different from modern ones. The distinction between formal structure and cohesion is recognized as significant for the former but not for the latter. Yet no political scientist would use the constitution of Ecuador as a reliable guide to the politics of that troubled land; is there a better reason to believe that we can depend upon the organizational charts of her armies?

Every army is a formal structure; its members share explicit common purposes which justify all activity. When action and organizational aim seem inconsistent, unity must be seriously affected. Only on paper will the army involved appear the same.

In principle usurpation has enormously divisive potential. No army will be permitted to recruit members publicly for usurpation purposes. In violating constitutional law, the usurpers are striking at the ultimate sanction for military discipline, and if, as is generally the case, the usurpers are not the highest ranking officers, they are directly challenging the normal structure of command. All officers swear oaths of allegiance, so some must think usurpation immoral. Without a guarantee of success, an impossible condition, some will be loath to jeopardize their careers. A portion may have sympathies with the existing government and others will be reluctant to take sides for fear the ensuing bitterness and possible violence will destroy the army's capacity for national defense—a task soldiers everywhere publicly acknowledge as their principal aim. Every officer deeply concerned with the unity of his organization can appreciate the force of General von Seekt's logic in refusing orders to crush the Kapp Putsch: "Troops do not fire on troops. Do you

[23] My general impression is that for every successful usurper there are six who fail. The ratio seems fairly constant in history and only includes attempts which have gone beyond the plotting and into the execution stage. For a variety of reasons the statistics may not be fully accurate, but it is indisputable that the failures greatly outnumber the successes.

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intend perhaps, Herr Minister, that a battle take place before the Brandenburger Tor between soldiers who have fought side by side against a common enemy? When Reichswehr fires upon Reichswehr, then all comradeship within the Officer Corps has vanished."[24]

No usurpation can be prepared publicly; when struck, the blow will leave the greatly surprised overwhelming majority with only three alternatives—to support the usurpers, to oppose them, or to remain uncommitted until the latter's purposes and fate are clearer. Since immediate circumstances condition reactions, as the former change, so must the number and dispositions of each faction.

The experience of the Weimar Republic during the Kapp Putsch is illustrative. Some troops supported General Luttwitz, the chief conspirator, in the initial phase; a much smaller number declared themselves willing to fight for the government, but the largest number remained "neutral," making it possible for the conspirators to drive the government from Berlin.

Although the old government was unpopular, lacked the appeal of tradition, came to power illegally, and was beset by great economic difficulties, its political credit was not yet exhausted. The workers responded to the government's call for a general strike. Some of Luttwitz' supporters refused to fire on civilians; the neutral element now had to take sides, and many declared their sympathies with the government. When the Putsch collapsed the government discovered that its Marxist supporters continued to strike —this time for a "truly democratic" state. The army's help was solicited and at last virtually every soldier responded.[25]

Where usurpations are commonplace the impulse to support or resist any particular act on grounds of abstract principle will be minimized; most soldiers will want to retain their jobs which means that they will not commit themselves until it is safe to do so or dangerous not to. In Bolivia where the number of military usurpations seems as high as the altitude everyone understands "the rules of the game."

[24] Quoted in D. J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat* (New York, 1961), 124-25.

[25] The French forces also appeared to divide and unite in various ways during the two insurrections previously discussed. Quite possibly the Fourth Republic fell because the government believed that it did not have an army to fight with, while the Fifth maintained itself because the would-be usurpers came to the same conclusion—self-fulfilling prophecies? In any event, the flow of military sentiment *followed* the pattern among civilians.

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> During uprisings it is usually the policy of hinterland officials to ignore government orders and notices. Everyone, in fact, is quite happy when regular communications are interrupted by the revolutionaries. At such moments no news is good news, and permits officialdom to adopt a safe Fabian policy. Many functionaries so isolated declare themselves neutral in order to be "on the side of the people" no matter which side wins. News had come to the small Bolivian town in which I was stationed that a revolt led by young officers had developed in the capital. I asked the police captain in my precinct if he had enough arms and ammunition to maintain order in our área. "Colonel," he replied, "as you know I am a loyal police officer and will always carry out my orders. But first, I am sorry to say, I don't know anything about the revolution. Second, about the ammunition: I sent yesterday most of our firearms to Headquarters for cleaning and repair because they were in bad shape. If Headquarters doesn't send them back, there is nothing I can do."[26]

The indifference of most Bolivian soldiers to the outcome of a particular venture means that each new government occupies a loosely anchored seat—an open invitation for those who remain discontented to try their hand at tipping it.

C. *The Soldier's Vulnerability to Pressures for Deposing Governments*

In the preceding paragraphs we have been discussing the ebb and flow of loyalties which usurpation presumes. But the act itself is a deliberate decision; could one occur if soldiers were really firm in their allegiances? Should we not hold them fully responsible and distribute praise and blame accordingly? Mosca certainly thought so—the only reliable guarantee against military usurpation was the subjective determination of officers to restrain themselves from abusing their great powers.[27] His argument is repeated by a variety of modern commentators. Huntington marvels at the restraint of the officer in Western states, and because he can find no one in the "Babylon . . . of Main Street" to compare him with, asks us to imag-

[26] Kurt Arnade, "The Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," in A. N. Christensen (ed.), *The Evolution of Latin American Government* (New York, 1951), 313.

[27] Mosca, 232.

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ine what the devotion of the medieval monk must have been like.[28] Finer condemns the officers of the underdeveloped world in equally striking terms. Their activities consist of "little or nothing more than . . . attempt[s] upon feeble but nonetheless operative civilian institutions by a small group of willful men, armed with lethal weapons, nurtured in arrogance, and pricked on by pride, ambition, self-interest, arrogance, and revenge."[29]

Obviously the soldier cannot subordinate himself without wanting to do so, but it does not follow that the intensity of the desire is the only critical factor. A soldier may find it relatively easy to submit to government, or he may discover that despite a desperate desire to do so he cannot. We fail to appreciate the predicament because we isolate him from his political environment, and because we misconceive what subordination has implied in the West and must mean elsewhere.

Mosca notes that the remarkable subordination of Western standing armies ever since their foundation more than three and a half centuries ago is without parallel in history,[30] and he attributes this to the officer's concern for honor.[31] The facts are correct, but the logical connections are faulty or incomplete. When men are honorable, they cannot obey dishonorable commands; therefore, disobedient as well as obedient officers can be honorable. Western governments continued to recruit officers who felt their occupation honorable;

[28] *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 410-20. Janowitz argues that the subordination in modern democracies is accomplished by "professional ethics alone." *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, 1960), 440. The more strongly a commentator emphasizes selfishness as the key to interpreting politics, the more bizarre the soldier's behavior must seem. Karl Mannheim saw Western politics as a "haphazard compromise between conflicting groups . . . refus[ing] to look beyond their own immediate interests." But *if* we were all so selfish the soldier would have to be more important in politics than Western experience warranted. Consistency must yield to plausibility: Mannheim would not surrender his description of politics, so the soldier had to become the most conspicuous exception to the general rule. See *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (London, 1951), 127-28.

[29] Finer, 241-42.

[30] "The great modern fact is the huge standing army that is a severe custodian of the law, is obedient to the orders of a civil authority and has little political influence, exercising at best indirectly the influence it has. Virtually invariable as that situation is in countries of European civilization, it represents a most fortunate exception, if it is not absolutely without parallel, in human history." Mosca, 229.

[31] *Ibid.*, 232.

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and since those officers remained obedient, it follows that the duties governments imposed upon them were consistent with the dictates of honor.

> There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the laws, by religion, and honor, as submission to the prince's will; but this very honor tells us that the prince ought never to command a dishonorable action, because this would render us incapable of serving him. Crillon refused to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but offered to fight him. After the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX sent orders to the governors in the several provinces for the Huguenots to be murdered. Viscount Dorte, who commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the King: "Sire, among the inhabitants of this town, and your majesty's troops, I could not find so much as one executioner; they are honest citizens and brave soldiers. We jointly, therefore, beseech your majesty to command our arms and lives in things that are practicable." This great and generous soul looked upon a base action as a thing impossible. There is nothing that honor more strongly recommends to the nobility than to serve their prince in a military capacity . . . because its success, and even its miscarriages are the road to grandeur. *Yet this very law of its own making honor chooses to explain: and in case of any affront, it requires or permits us to retire.*
>
> . . . Those things which honor forbids are more vigorously forbidden, when the laws do not concur in the prohibition; and those it commands are more strongly insisted upon, when they happen not to be commanded by law.[32]

Honor is merely a principle of legitimacy—an abstract standard providing men with a rationale to make judgments in concrete situations. Nowadays officers talk less about honor and more about constitutional obligations, but the problem is the same. For the powers government claims are not always those constitutionally granted. The difference can sometimes bewilder the most subtle lawyer, and one can understand why the legal philosopher Duguit thought it absurd to permit rude men of war to question the pretensions of existing governments.

> The military must be a passive tool in the hands of government. The latter can only fulfill its mission if it has the military completely at its disposal, so that government may use it as an unconscious material force. This excludes all possibility of military leaders in any way re-

[32] Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, IV, 2 (my emphasis).

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> fusing to comply with governmental orders . . . . The state would no longer exist if military leaders were allowed to question its orders. The ideal military force would be one that government could activate simply by pressing a button.[33]

Finer more recently has expressed a similar anxiety. "The moment the military draw this distinction . . . they begin to invent their own private notion . . . and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian government."[34] Few outside the ivory tower, however, have heeded the alarm. The public prefers soldiers who may misinterpret their obligations to those who have surrendered their judgments; everywhere officers swear allegiances to the constitution rather than to the existing government.

Every concept of legitimacy can open a Pandora's box, but the dangers have not yet materialized in most Western states, because the commands governments issue are generally authorized by the constitution, major parties respect the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional acts, and each believes the others will act responsibly.

The soldier who wants to be loyal is rarely perplexed,[35] and when an officer believes that he may betray his oath by obeying orders, he will be allowed to resign in dignity. When these political conditions are not satisfied—when no general civil agreement on constitutional principle exists, when neither government nor opposition has faith in the other's intentions, when each attempts to use the army for partisan domestic purposes, when resignations can be de-

[33] Cited by Giradet, 121.

[34] Finer, 26. Although soldiers have often abused the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional powers, and thus have drawn Finer's ire, he cannot believe the distinction to be "mystical" as he claims.

[35] "I ceased believing in the virtues of obedience one day in November, 1942, when I received two contradictory orders in the space of two minutes; one from my commanding officer for my platoon to join the American landing force, the other from my colonel to hold out to the bitter end." Quoted by Giradet, 146. Giradet mars an excellent analysis, however, by a confused account of the nature of military obedience. The loyalty of the nineteenth-century French army was, he claims, "perpetual and irrevocable," but in the twentieth century loyalty has become conditional. It would be more meaningful to view the issue in its universal dimension before judging historic practices. There is necessarily a limit to the loyalty any government can reasonably ask. Nineteenth-century French governments stayed more clearly within permissible boundaries, while twentieth-century governments, for various reasons, did not.

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nounced as treason—the soldier faces a far more confusing predicament.

The difference in the two situations may be illustrated by the curious aftermath of the 1955 Brazilian presidential election. A defeated party rebelled, claiming that the election was "fixed"—a frequently believed, and often justified, charge in Latin America. The acting-president, sympathizing with the rebels, refused to do his duty. Portions of the population clamored for the army to preserve the constitution, whereupon the war minister, General Lott, resigned his post.

When this failed to bring the chief executive to his senses, Lott induced the garrison in the capital to depose the negligent official, enabling the legislative body to elect a new acting-president. After the rebellion was put down, Lott submitted his action to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which exonerated him and validated the election results. Finer declares General Lott's act an example of "military intervention"—"the constrained substitution of [his] own policies . . . for those of the recognized civilian authorities," but then goes on to agree with the Court's opinion that the act was necessary to save the constitution,[36] a confusion which ironically mirrors the soldier's own agony. When he "only obeys orders" many will condemn him for lending his support to an illegal regime, but if he "refused orders" others will accuse him of exceeding his authority.

The soldier who usurps powers acts in a political situation he did not create,[37] and in doing so he may be mounting the proverbial tiger. He cannot get off and return to his station without being certain that those ousted will not attempt to regain government and use its powers to punish him. Not until the attitudes of the nonmilitary elements change will the soldier again be able to subordinate himself.

III

Hitherto, I have been discussing specific shortcomings of contemporary explanations of military usurpation. In the subsequent and

[36] Finer, 37-38.

[37] Soldiers can seize the initiative by creating "incidents" which will undermine a government's reputation; but before a fabricated circumstance will bring it to its knees, a government must already be on very shaky grounds. For an interesting discussion of one such case, see Arnade, "The Technique. . . ."

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summary paragraphs I will offer a more general statement of the phenomenon itself.

The phrase "military usurpation" makes sense only in a context where the public—the body on whose behalf government claims to rule—consists of armed and unarmed members. When all citizens are soldiers and all soldiers citizens, as in the early Greek polis, no military usurpation is conceivable. Later when the polis experiences waves of conspiracies and counter-conspiracies, foreign mercenaries are employed to keep order but still no military usurpation occurred. As mere hirelings the ancient mercenaries, like their white counterparts in contemporary black African states, could not expect citizens to recognize their claims. To govern, they would have had to make a conquest (that is, reconstitute the public), a much more difficult task and one apparently beyond their means.[38]

Soldiers cannot usurp powers from a government considered legitimate by the unarmed portion of its public. The strategic factor, therefore, is always the status of the title to rule—a title all governments win conditionally because every principle of legitimacy is, at the same time, a critical standard.

A discredited government that cannot or will not resign must use soldiers to suppress citizens who claim that it has betrayed a trust. Since the primary military obligation is to *defend the public*, soldiers cannot be used indefinitely to quell public disturbances without arousing their suspicions concerning the government's culpability.[39] Officers in such circumstances become peculiarly sensitive political barometers knowing at first hand the depth of popular antagonisms, and how far their men are prepared to go in suppressing citizens.[40]

[38] Aristotle and Machiavelli discuss numerous conspiracies in the polis, but, as far as I can tell, neither speaks of one organized by mercenaries.

[39] Janowitz, *The Military*, 100, notes that the history of underdeveloped countries might have been different if their desire for "international status" had not led them to create armies. But insecure governments need armies for domestic reasons, and without a healthier political climate it is fanciful to think that the governments of the underdeveloped world would not have yielded to the pressure.

[40] Dealing with criminals, or individuals who have no intention of abiding by legal rules, is different from suppressing persons who are protesting the injustice of an administration. Moreover, by the time soldiers are required to aid the police, a disturbance may be so massive that it seems to involve a political question when in fact it may not. The revival of interest in military institutions among social scientists recently has completely ignored police responsibilities. Janowitz's view is typical. Unable to see anything significant in the soldier's

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By the nature of its training an army generally gives its government the benefit of doubt and follows orders, but every trust has limits, and several alternatives are possible when a government's credit becomes exhausted.

An army can literally disintegrate, as one did during the French Revolution when members took their stand as *individuals* in the political struggle—an event partly caused by the fact that military units were not separately billeted or geographically isolated from the public, and thus had become immediately vulnerable to popular passions. Military reformers consequently imitated the Roman imperial practice of insulating troops in self-contained garrisons. The device was so successful in creating artificial social distance, that Engels conceded at the end of the nineteenth century that the day of popular insurrections was over.[41] But he underestimated the significance of moral sentiments; military disintegration occurred once again during the Russian Revolution.

An army composed of large numbers of conscripts and short-term volunteers, as most European forces have been, may disintegrate during civil crises. One composed entirely of professional soldiers, who depend upon their military occupations for economic subsistence, more likely will seek other courses. It may stand aside and pledge support to a victorious party.[42] Alternatively, it may depose the government and rule directly or "transfer" power to others.

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notorious reluctance to assume police duties, Janowitz urges the soldier to discard "antiquated prejudices" and step more fully into the "modern world." By describing the soldier as a "specialist in violence," Janowitz emphasizes means and obscures purpose, and thus the soldier's attitude toward police work seems irrational. A comparison of this view with a traditional one by the distinguished military historian, Sir John Fortesque, is instructive. Fortesque argues that the British army became "modern" only when Parliament decided to establish a professional police force and free the soldier from the potentially disastrous divisive strain of involvement in domestic political crises. The establishment of the police thus was "the greatest and most far reaching *military* reform" in British history. (Compare Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 419, with Fortesque, *History of the British Army* [London, 1899-1930], IX, 105 [Fortesque's emphasis]). It is incomprehensible to this observer that the lack of an adequate federal police force which has made regular army units necessary in American cities has not generated public discussions about the potential catastrophe involved, especially since the racial composition of the army is changing rapidly.

[41] Engels, 18 *ff.*

[42] Traditionally, in Latin America when armies have allowed revolutionary groups to seize control of government, the military's privileges have been

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Ultimately, the decision is limited by the principle of legitimacy. Prior to the development of popular sovereignty, the most that usurpers could do was to appoint *one* of their number to rule directly.[43] Usually their choice was confined to the "great men" of the state who may not have participated in the conspiracy, and, as Roman and Ottoman histories amply illustrate, the new ruler, fearful that soldiers who *had once* been disobedient might be so again, often prosecuted those who had placed him on the throne for their challenge to his predecessor!

Since the French Revolution one of the striking features of military usurpation has been the ability of conspirators to govern directly through a collective body—the *junta*. But as the term suggests, the *junta* is only a provisional committee of public safety, obliged to retire when the national crisis is resolved. To continue governing it must secure repeated public affirmations through elections, plebiscites, and referenda, because a standing army, always a subordinate part of a body politic, cannot confer legitimacy. The usurper must seek his right through a procedure toward which he has just displayed conspicuous contempt, and thus the decision to go to the public is fraught with danger. In Latin America elections always exacerbate domestic tensions. Yet sooner or later a military usurper will hold one, although everyone knows that most coups occur at such times. No wonder military governments rarely demonstrate staying power,[44] and are so fertile in devising constitutional forms too new to be despised.

The study of military usurpation demonstrates quite clearly that the ability to seize power must never be confused with the strength to use it. Fundamentally, the usurper capitalizes more on negative public sentiments than on his own positive assets.

With each new usurpation the disparity between these two dimensions grows. A military hero or well-known high ranked officer

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kept intact. But in Bolivia (1952) and Cuba (1960) the standing armies were dismantled, and Latin American soldiers have been more prudent ever since.

[43] Standing armies were never employed by collegial or republican governments until the late eighteenth century. The New Model Army during the Protectorate might be an exception, but was it meant to be a permanent force?

[44] I have not discovered a systematic comparison of the tenure of civil and military governments, but my impression is that Gerald Brenann's conclusion that in Spain civilian governments generally lasted much longer than military ones can be substantially demonstrated elsewhere. *The Spanish Labyrinth*, 57.

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generally leads the first usurpation, but successive ones are led by untested lower-ranked officers whose major strength is that no one *yet* has found reason to oppose them. As more people become capable of usurping power, the result, though unintended and unwanted, is predictable. "*Anyone has the strength to undo*—the soldier, the workman, this or that politician, this group or that of newspapers—*but no one has strength enough to do anything, not even make sure of his own rights.*[45]

[45] Ortega, 57 (Ortega's emphasis).

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Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927*

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The Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927 was one of the most dramatically unsuccessful international gatherings of the twentieth century. The three principal naval powers—Great Britain, the United States, and Japan—came together in a spirit of goodwill with a view to consolidating their existing amicable relations by agreeing to economies in defense expenditure. But, as in Sir Winston Churchill's famous fable about the animals' disarmament conference, the very discussion of the subject of arms control aroused on all sides feelings of jealousy and suspicion, which had hitherto been largely dormant or even nonexistent. The course and outcome of the Geneva negotiations had a particularly severe impact on Anglo-American relations, which became more strained than at any time in the interwar period. In February 1929, for example, as a direct result of the events of 1927, the American government secured congressional approval for a Cruiser Construction Bill, which at first seemed likely to provoke a naval arms race with Great Britain comparable only to that between Germany and Great Britain before the First World War.

President Calvin Coolidge made the opening move in the disastrous sequence of events when, on February 10, 1927, he in-

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vited the principal maritime powers to commence negotiations for an extension of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Under this instrument five powers—Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy—had agreed to limit their capital ships and had settled for a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 respectively.[1] Coolidge assumed mistakenly that it would be a relatively easy matter similarly to limit other categories of fighting vessels—destroyers, cruisers, and submarines—and thereby achieve further economies. He failed to realize that the accord reached at Washington had depended not simply on a mutual desire for agreement but on an unusual coincidence of technical factors, which had made it possible for all the parties involved, without jeopardizing their respective national securities, to accept both a mutually satisfactory ratio and a mutually satisfactory level of tonnage in capital ships. When it came to limiting auxiliary categories of fighting vessels, however, the technical problems were not so easily overcome.

The first setback for Coolidge came when the French and Italian governments declined to participate in a naval conference.[2] Although an exception had proved possible in the case of capital ships, they did not desire a treaty covering all maritime armaments unless agreement was simultaneously reached with regard to land and air weaponry. They therefore preferred to continue negotiations to this end exclusively through the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations. Naturally the case for the interdependence of the three categories of armaments appealed less to the other three naval powers, since their territories were invulnerable to attack by land.[3]

[1] On the Washington Naval Treaty, see Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy between the Wars, I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929* (London, 1968), Chap. 8, and Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), Chap. 9.

[2] Herrick (Paris) to Kellogg, Feb. 15, 1927, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, *FRUS*), 1927, I, 10-13; Fletcher (Rome) to Kellogg, Feb. 21, 1927, *ibid.*, 14-16.

[3] The French and Italian approach, while generally unpopular in London, Washington, and Tokyo, had at least one prominent supporter in British Cabinet Minister Viscount Cecil, who wrote: "Mr. Coolidge's proposals are, in themselves, sound and attractive . . . . On the other hand, the French are likely to resent them . . . . at the outset of the disarmament discussions at Geneva in December, 1925, the two Latin Powers insisted that naval questions must not be

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Still more ominous for the future was Great Britain's reply to the Coolidge invitation. The British government, while agreeing in principle to a conference, pointedly drew attention to the "special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communications, and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies."[4] From this answer it should have been clear that no simple extension of the 1922 ratios was likely to prove acceptable in London. Unfortunately this had not been adequately appreciated by the Americans when the so-called Coolidge Conference actually opened on June 20, 1927, at Geneva. Consequently, the delegates of the three participating powers—Japan had also accepted Coolidge's invitation—soon found themselves faced with the extraordinarily difficult task of reconciling divergent positions, which had not been explored or even understood beforehand.

I

After the opening preliminaries the American and British delegations, having taken no prior diplomatic soundings, each presented the conference with a set of conflicting proposals. The Americans' approach was deceptively simple. They urged that a 5:5:3 ratio in overall tonnage be applied to each of three categories of auxiliary vessels. They also indicated that the ratio must relate to a level of tonnage which would not involve them in vast expenditure on further construction. They suggested the following figures (in tons):

	United States	*British Empire*	*Japan*
Cruisers	250,000-300,000	250,000-300,000	150,000-180,000
Destroyers	200,000-250,000	200,000-250,000	120,000-150,000
Submarines	60,000-90,000	60,000-90,000	36,000-54,000[5]

The British proposals were similarly designed to secure economies although not in every category of fighting ship. While willing

dealt with apart from other disarmament topics, and we assented to this proposition provided the Americans would agree to come to Geneva to discuss the whole disarmament question, which they did. To go back upon that arrangement would, at the present stage, be I think unjustifiable." Cecil Memorandum, Feb. 14, 1927, Cecil Papers, British Museum (hereafter, CP), Add. 51103.

[4] Houghton (London) to Kellogg, Feb. 22, 1927, *FRUS, 1927*, I, 22-23.

[5] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Relations, 1927* (London, 1929), 44-45.

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to see the further reduction of capital ship construction and even the complete abolition of submarines, the British delegates made no suggestion for the overall limitation of cruiser construction. They attempted to divide cruisers into two categories on the basis of gun caliber and tonnage. They were prepared to accept, in strict accordance with the Washington ratios, limitation of vessels displacing more than 7,500 tons or possessing guns of larger caliber than six inches; but they did not propose any limitation on the construction of smaller cruisers.[6] At this stage the British avoided producing concrete figures, although it soon became apparent that they, unlike the Americans, preferred limitation by units rather than by total tonnage.

Both the United States and Great Britain sought to gain immediate and full support from the Japanese, but in this they were unsuccessful. Claiming that they had to seek instructions from Tokyo, the Japanese delegates confined themselves in the first days of the conference to platitudinous expressions of goodwill. Accordingly, each Atlantic power next sought to appeal directly to the other's public opinion, making particular use of the economy theme. The British had far less success than the Americans in this exercise. The bulk of American opinion contemptuously rejected the British plea for a further reduction of expenditure on capital ships with the powerful argument that, in the absence of France and Italy, no alteration to the five-power agreement of 1922 was feasible; and withering scorn was poured upon the absence from the British proposals of any reference to a limitation of small cruisers. Much British opinion took the same line. The British government was in fact widely—and correctly—suspected of seeking superiority over rather than parity with the United States in fighting craft.

By June 29 the volume of opposition both at home and abroad to the initial British approach reached such dimensions that the Cabinet felt obliged to modify its preconceived plans and to authorize its delegates in Geneva to make an immediate declaration conceding full parity to the United States. The original British strategy and the way in which it was changed by the Cabinet is revealed in the following extract from a critical letter

[6] For further detail on the British proposals, see *ibid.*, 46-47.

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sent to Lord President of the Council Earl Balfour by Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to both the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence:

> I expect you were surprised after the Cabinet this morning when I expressed some doubt as to whether it was desirable to make a declaration in regard to cruiser strength such as you contemplate, and perhaps I ought to give my reasons. . . .
>
> As I understood the First Lord's plan of operation in regard to cruiser [*sic*] at Geneva it is as follows. As regards the larger cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns, we should agree at once to the battleship ratio of 5:5:3. As regards other cruisers we should ask for limitation to 7,500 tons with guns not exceeding 6-inch, and in the first instance we should ask for no limitation in numbers. That is to say each Power should build what it requires. That would be the first stage. If the Americans then ask for parity in cruisers of all kinds we should say to them: "Before discussing parity we should like to explain to you how many cruisers we require and why we require them. You and the Japanese can then explain to us how many cruisers you require and why. We are prepared to do this in open conference and set forth our reasons *urbi et orbi*." This would, the Admiralty believe (if I understand them aright), put the Americans in rather a difficult position. It would be difficult for them to justify to an expert audience so large a cruiser programme as we require, and their demand for parity would thereby be weakened. If, however, they insist on parity for reasons of *amour propre*, I understand that the First Lord, at any rate, was willing in the last resort to consider it. Their position before American public opinion, however, in making the case for actual expenditure would obviously be weakened, and the proceedings in plenary Conference at Geneva would give much ammunition to the advocates of economy in America.
>
> The first stage has gone according to plan. The second stage has just been entered upon, and so far . . . has also gone according to expectation. The Americans have demanded parity and we have offered to make our proposals as to actual numbers, though the plenary meeting at which our case is to be developed has not yet taken place.
>
> It is at this moment that the advocates of a big Navy in America have put down a heavy barrage designed to stampede us into granting parity at once, before our case has been developed in detail. Personally I do not see why we should agree to be stampeded. I believe it is better to let our representatives at Geneva carry through

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> their own plan of operations, and that we shall not strengthen our case by a declaration [on parity] at the present moment. I have been at many conferences with the Americans. Time after time we have been told that if we made this concession or that concession, we should secure goodwill in America. . . . I have never seen any permanent result follow from a policy of concession. I believe we are less popular and more abused in America than ever before, because they think us weak. . . . I would refuse either to be blackmailed or browbeaten and stand absolutely to our preconcerted plan.[7]

Hankey was not alone in objecting to the alteration in British policy. According to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, strong protests against conceding parity were made by First Sea Lord Earl Beatty, who received some support from a minority of Cabinet ministers.[8] The critics, moreover, having been defeated in their efforts to prevent "parity" becoming an official British declaratory position, began to canvass with more success semantical definitions of the term. For example, Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill was presently to argue against the concept of "mathematical parity" and in favor of what he called "maritime parity." He maintained that if there were to be meaningful equality between Great Britain and the United States, the greater commitments of the former required her to have numerical superiority over the latter in fighting craft.

When, however, at the end of June, the principal British delegates to the Geneva Conference, William Bridgeman (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) conveyed to the American delegation their government's acceptance of parity, they believed that they were using the term in the mathematical sense.[9] It was on this assumption, too, that the American delegation, led by Hugh Gib-

[7] Hankey to Balfour, June 29, 1927, Balfour Papers, British Museum, Add. 49704.

[8] Austen Chamberlain to Cecil, July 5, 1927, CP, Add. 51079.

[9] Cecil, for example, wrote to Austen Chamberlain: "Personally I was extremely glad that the Government telegraphed urging that we should admit the American claim to parity. I had myself been pressing it very strongly for a long time past. I remember an old legal friend of mine saying that you should always admit what you know the other side can prove, it gives a good impression and can do you no harm, and since the Americans can obviously always build as many ships of any class as we can it seems to me folly to object to their claim to do what they obviously can do." July 2, 1927, CP, Add. 51079.

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son, welcomed the British statement. Indeed, for a further fortnight none of the delegates at Geneva realized that any other interpretation was possible. During this period, therefore, parity itself was not an issue in the negotiations. But the apparent acceptance of the *principle* of parity by Great Britain, though psychologically important, did not obviate the need for hard bargaining. Above all, the mere pronouncement of a slogan could not overcome fundamental differences regarding the proposed *level* of parity and the relative value of different categories of vessels.

The British, for example, continued to press for a reopening of the capital ship question despite American and Japanese insistence that agreement must first be reached concerning auxiliary vessels; and when, on July 8, they finally reversed their order of priorities they expressly reserved the right to make a full public statement on the capital ship issue if the conference should eventually break down.[10] Nor did the atmosphere improve when negotiations on the auxiliary categories began in earnest, for although substantial progress was made regarding submarines and destroyers,[11] the chasm between the United States and Great Britain concerning cruisers proved impossible to bridge.

On cruisers the Americans insisted that, as at Washington, parity must be established in terms of overall tonnage, while the British, even after conceding the principle of parity, held to the thesis that the number and character of the fighting units had to be taken into account. The point of view of the British Cabinet was succinctly expressed in a telegram drafted by Lord Birkenhead (Secretary of State for India) and despatched on July 7 to the delegation in Geneva:

> How can we usefully argue matter in terms of tonnage . . . ? If for instance we were limited [to] e.g. 450,000 tons it would become necessary to so employ limited allotment of tonnage as to secure maximum protection which our peculiar situation requires. This would or might involve large scrapping of our smaller cruisers and large measure of construction in more powerful vessels. Such a develop-

[10] British Empire Delegation in Geneva (hereafter, BED) to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 165, July 8, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

[11] Toynbee, 56.

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ment . . . would involve us and other countries concerned in greatly increased expenditure.

It would further appear to be very important to insist constantly upon vital distinction between larger type of fighting cruisers and smaller type which we require for the purpose of our imperial communication. This distinction is as vital as that between battleships and cruisers. In relation to the former class we are prepared to assent to basis of equality with United States. In relation to the second and less important class we cannot for reasons we have given surrender our freedom of action and we do not question right of other countries to decide at their discretion upon their own arrangements.[12]

The argument contained in the first part of this telegram was obviously a powerful one. In 1929-30 it formed the basis of the British negotiating position with the result that a yardstick was devised whereby the United States, while having more large cruisers than Great Britain, accepted a smaller overall tonnage. In 1927, however, the British concentrated on the case embodied in the second part of the "Birkenhead telegram" and developed the dubious thesis known as the "doctrine of requirements." The British argued that, because of the scattered nature of their empire and their dependence on maritime commerce, they had an "absolute need" for a fixed number of cruisers. Lord Jellicoe, speaking at Geneva on June 28, asserted that Great Britain must possess a minimum number of fifty-five small and fifteen large cruisers.[13] Against the American argument that one country's fighting forces could only be justified in comparison with those possessed by other states and that no arms limitation negotiations could profitably be conducted on any other assumption than that needs were essentially relative, the British could only advance the questionable proposition that small cruisers, unlike larger ones, were "defensive" in character.[14] Yet even Cecil, the most conciliatory of the British delegates, saw some merits in the "doctrine of requirements." At the end of August, for example, he wrote to Philip Noel-Baker congratulating him on pro-

[12] Austen Chamberlain to BED, telegram no. 103, July 7, 1927, CP, Add. 51104. For evidence that this telegram was drafted by Birkenhead, see Austen Chamberlain to Baldwin, Balfour, and Beatty, July 7, 1927, Balfour Papers, Add. 49749.

[13] Toynbee, 53-54. The Jellicoe Papers (British Museum) were examined but found to contain nothing of value for this study.

[14] Gibson to Kellogg, July 6, 1927, *FRUS, 1927*, I, 74-75.

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ducing a draft booklet on the Coolidge Conference, but adding this criticism:

> I still think however that you a little underrate the force of the "requirement" argument. After all, it is true that the length of territory, whether marine or terrestrial, that has to be guarded does form an element on which the size of the defending army depends.
>
> Switzerland does require a smaller army than Russia, and since our frontier on the sea really extends over all the oceans in a sense it is true that we require a larger naval force than if we were a self-contained country. I do not say it is the only consideration. Far from it. But I do say that the minimum number of smaller cruisers is really required to protect British commerce not against a great fleet or a large number of war vessels but against raiders such as existed in the late war, or such as might exist in a war with several different countries. . . . Whether the demand for seventy cruisers is or is not too large is quite another question on which I am not wholly satisfied.[15]

This explanation of the "doctrine of requirements," however, makes sense only in the context of small cruisers. It does not account for or justify Great Britain's initial claim for fifteen *large* cruisers and her equally precise insistence that the Americans must not seek to exceed this number. The British were in effect requiring the United States either to construct exactly fifteen large and fifty-five small cruisers or alternatively to forego parity in one or both classes.

Apart from objecting to Great Britain's take-it-or-leave-it approach, the Americans argued that they could have no possible use for fifty-five small vessels whose limited cruising radii would render them unsuitable for operations in the Pacific, where they, unlike the British, lacked an adequate network of naval bases. The American thesis on this point has been accepted uncritically in most scholarly accounts of interwar naval disarmament negotiations;[16] but at the time a serious attempt was made to counter it. On July 11, Austen Chamberlain told the American ambas-

[15] Cecil to Noel-Baker, Aug. 29, 1927, CP, Add. 51106.

[16] See, for example, Toynbee, 53; Tate, 153; Benjamin H. Williams, *The United States and Disarmament* (New York, 1931), 174; J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-1931* (London, 1932), 114; L. Ethan Ellis, *Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1961), 170.

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sador in London, Alanson Houghton, that most smaller cruisers had normal cruising radii of 7,000 to 8,000 miles and that "such cruisers, therefore, could proceed from America throughout the whole line of American naval bases and could reach wherever the United States Government might desire to send them."[17] The American experts at Geneva, it is true, indignantly rejected this contention and the British, perhaps mistakenly, did not pursue it further. All the same, it may be that the Americans' prejudice against small cruisers owed less to the sparseness of their Pacific naval bases than to fears that in a war such vessels might have an insufficient margin of superiority over the potentially armed merchantmen, which Great Britain possessed in such abundance. Certainly these fears were significant later in the conference when the Americans insisted that they must be allowed to arm their small cruisers with eight-inch guns.

II

In making explicit statements regarding their exact cruiser needs in terms of units, the British, almost without realizing it, also found themselves able to provide the Americans with an estimate of their approximate requirements in overall tonnage. This was initially put at the vast figure of 600,000 tons, which was thirty-three per cent higher than the maximum total acceptable to the United States and also a considerably larger tonnage than Great Britain actually possessed in 1927.[18] Faced with a chasm of this magnitude, the negotiators at Geneva might have been forgiven if at this point they had abandoned all hope of accord. But with the Japanese acting as patient mediators, careful consideration was given to three avenues of possible progress.[19] One sugges-

[17] Memorandum by Austen Chamberlain, July 11, 1927, Foreign Office Confidential Prints, Public Record Office (hereafter, PRO), F.O. 411/6. See also Houghton to Kellogg, July 12, 1927, *FRUS, 1927*, I, 97-98, and Gibson to Kellogg, July 13, 1927, *ibid.*, 103-04.

[18] According to one calculation, the initial British demands would have meant a thirty-five per cent increase in existing British tonnage in auxiliary vessels. See Philip J. Noel-Baker, *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference* (London, 1927), 27.

[19] One writer has advanced the curious thesis that the Japanese navy and empire were the "shoals upon which the conference grounded." See Gerald E.

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tion was that cruisers and destroyers might be treated as a single category in order to introduce more elasticity into the bargaining; a second was that a considerable proportion of small cruiser tonnage might consist of obsolescent vessels over sixteen years in age; a third suggestion was that the powers might at the very least agree on a short-term building program without establishing any long-term precedents or obligations. The first two possibilities occupied the center of the Geneva stage from July 9 to 17, while the last assumed more importance in the last days of the conference.

The first indication that an agreement might still be feasible came on July 12 when junior members of the three delegations succeeded in drawing up a tentative plan for the consideration of the principal delegates. Its provisions were as follows:

> The British Empire and the U.S.A. not to exceed 550,000 tons of auxiliary surface combatant craft under the following ages:—
>
> Cruisers—16 years.
>
> Destroyers—12 years.
>
> Japan to accept a similar total tonnage limit on approximately the 5-3 ratio. This would be subject to conditions as follows:—
>
> (a) Each nation to have the right to retain an additional 20 per cent of this total tonnage in vessels over the age limits specified above.
>
> (b) 10,000 ton cruisers to be limited in number to 12-12-8.
>
> (c) All other cruisers constructed in future are not to exceed 6,000 tons or to mount a gun exceeding 6 inches.
>
> (d) York, four Hawkins class, four Furutakas and ten Omahas to be scrapped before 1945.[20]

When this scheme was discussed by the principal delegates on July 13, a British representative obtained this impression:

> Result of this morning's private meeting showed sufficient general agreement to enable plenary meeting to be fixed for tomorrow afternoon at which tone will be mutually conciliatory and hopeful.
>
> Americans appeared likely to raise some difficulty in regard to limitation of smaller type of cruiser at 6,000 tons displacement. They may press for some latitude enabling them to build a number

Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931* (Columbia, Mo., 1963?), 143.

[20] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 176, July 12, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

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> of 7,500 ton ships. Possibly some such arrangement might be fitted into the scheme on condition that armament does not exceed 6-inch. But I feel very doubtful if Americans will agree to 6-inch guns.[21]

The British delegates quickly discovered that the Americans were not alone in having doubts about the compromise proposals when they were urgently requested to return to London for consultations. This came as a particularly severe blow to Cecil who had been finding it surprisingly easy to win over his principal colleagues in Geneva, Bridgeman and Admiral Frederick Field, to relatively conciliatory policies.[22] He certainly had good reason for wishing to avoid a return to London, where strong opponents of his approach were in leading positions in both the Cabinet and the Admiralty. It was, therefore, a fortunate coincidence that Cecil was able to resist the government's request on grounds of ill-health. As he telegraphed on July 14 to his brother, the Fourth Marquess of Salisbury and Lord Privy Seal in Baldwin's Cabinet:

> Am rather perturbed by Government telegram recalling us for a week. Doctors only reluctantly agreed to my coming here and I feel strongly that if I were to go home for a week the extra exertion would be of doubtful prudence. . . . Subject therefore to your advice I should wish it to be understood that if Government insist on this step, I should come home for good.[23]

Faced with this threat, the government gave way and on July 15 telegraphed its concurrence to the delegates' remaining in Geneva.[24]

On the same day, however, the British delegates also received the following unwelcome instructions:

> . . . we cannot admit by Treaty that in regard to small cruisers case of British Empire resembles that of other Powers; or that parity of number means parity of strength. We cannot consent therefore to in-

[21] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 179, July 13, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

[22] Cecil subsequently wrote: "When I got there [Geneva] I found myself working very closely with Willy Bridgeman, and after a very few days he fell before the atmosphere of the place and together with his advisers out there became extremely reasonable." Cecil to Lord Irwin (later Lord Halifax), Sept. 29, 1927, CP, Add. 51084.

[23] Cecil to Salisbury, July 14, 1927, CP, Add. 51086.

[24] Austen Chamberlain to BED, telegram no. 124, July 15, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

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sertion in a great international instrument of any provision which could be interpreted as meaning that we had bound ourselves to any arrangement which placed us in a position of permanent inferiority. . . .

Although therefore ready to agree to a ratio for 10,000 ton 8-inch cruisers, we could not agree to fixing *by Treaty* a permanent total tonnage limit for all classes of ships whether specified in classes or lumped together. But we are ready to approve an agreement fixing actual units of annual programmes of new cruisers for three Powers during say next five years or if absolutely necessary up to 1936, and of course tonnage of individual units when added up could be embodied in agreement. . . .

As to period of agreement, we should much prefer shorter as it better safeguards our position and affords better chance of agreement. Longer period nearer Americans may come to equality of numbers in practice as distinguished from theoretical right to parity and . . . equality of numbers in the case of nations of such different needs and perils would result in actual inferiority for us.[25]

Here, then, was the first unmistakable sign that the opponents of the principle of mathematical parity were beginning to get the upper hand in London. The news was received with dismay by Cecil, who duly sent indignant letters to Austen Chamberlain and his brother. To the Foreign Secretary he wrote *inter alia:*

It cannot then be intended now to suggest that all the time we did not really accept American parity, or rather only accepted it in the sense that they might have as many cruisers as we in proportion to the asserted needs of the two countries. . . . if we were to hint it at this time we should be rightly accused of vacillation amounting almost to sharp practice. When we said we accepted American parity we here [in Geneva] certainly meant parity in ship strength and nothing else, and it is equally certain that the Americans so understand us.[26]

He then wrote to Salisbury about the unwisdom of regarding the United States as a possible enemy:

If we ever did go to war with America, we should have to have an immense number of cruisers to make ourselves safe from American raiders (far more than we are working for at present) because we could not possibly blockade the American fleet as we did the German

[25] Austen Chamberlain to BED, telegram no. 125, July 15, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.
[26] Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, July 17, 1927, CP, Add. 51079.

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fleet in the late War. As a mere strategical matter, it seems to me that we shall have to exclude the Americans as possible enemies if we are aiming at complete security, and that the doctrine of equality is much more directed to the *amour propre* of the two countries than to any strategical considerations.[27]

Meanwhile Cecil and his colleagues in Geneva had continued to negotiate with the Americans and the Japanese as if the controversial telegram on "maritime parity" had never been received. On July 14 Gibson had stated, somewhat optimistically, that if the British and Japanese delegates could between themselves reach agreement on the outstanding issues raised by the compromise proposals of July 12, the United States "would have no difficulty in completing the triangle."[28] Accordingly the British and Japanese delegates met on July 15 and after mutual concessions provisionally endorsed the broad proposals of the twelfth. The British obtained an increase in the percentage of permitted overage tonnage from twenty to twenty-five per cent, while the Japanese secured an increase in their ratio in surface craft from sixty to sixty-five per cent. The British delegation cautiously commended the compromise to its government in the following despatch:

In view of the fact that the . . . figures are within measurable distance of our needs, should we be justified in not proposing it [the compromise] to the Americans with chance of agreement and all that it means for the sake of this margin? At present responsibility rests with us in view of Mr. Gibson's statement yesterday to effect that if we and Japanese could agree Americans would have no difficulty in completing the triangle. . . .

In discussion with them [the Japanese] they doubted very much whether the United States would agree to the 6,000 ton cruiser with a 6-inch gun and stated that they would not have any objection inasmuch as they would not be replacing more than one or two small cruisers before 1936, and therefore the question of building new 8-inch cruisers would not arise during the probable term of this treaty.[29]

The Japanese were only too correct in their forecast regarding the American attitude toward the six-inch gun problem. But

[27] Cecil to Salisbury, July 18, 1927, CP, Add. 51086.
[28] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 191, July 15, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.
[29] *Ibid.*

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Cecil at least remained optimistic, judging by an account he subsequently prepared for his brother:

> When we showed them [the Anglo-Japanese proposals] to the Americans they said that there were one or two other minor points which we should have to discuss, but that their main difficulty was the prohibition of the eight-inch gun. We then discussed one or two possible ways round. They pointed out that on the limit of tonnage proposed they could not build many cruisers large enough for such guns beyond the 10,000 tonners and they hinted that very probably they might not decide to build any. We replied offering them one or two such cruisers to balance the "York" etc. They did not seem to jump at that, but they suggested what they called a "political clause" whereby, if any party to the Treaty thought the building programme of another party disquieting, a fresh conference might meet and the agreement be put an end to. I then pointed out that such a clause was too vague and was otherwise objectionable, and suggested a clause by which each party should declare that they did not anticipate the necessity of building any more eight-inch gun cruisers, but that if they decided to do so they should give notice to the other parties and that, after conference, the agreement might be put an end to. They did not reject this *in toto* and expressed the view generally that we were on the right road to agreement.[30]

Before this avenue of hope could be fully explored, however, the British government brought the negotiations to a standstill on July 19 by recalling its delegation to London in an extremely peremptory fashion. The Anglo-Japanese bases of agreement had caused such a furor in the Admiralty and in a section of the Cabinet that consideration for Cecil's health had to take second place to the need for a showdown before Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin left Great Britain on July 24 for a long-planned visit to Canada.[31]

III

The first full Cabinet meeting after the delegates' return was chaired by the Prime Minister and resulted in an apparent defeat

[30] Cecil to Salisbury, July 31, 1927, CP, Add. 51086. For the American version of this conversation, see, especially, Gibson to Kellogg, July 19, 1927, *FRUS*, 1927, I, 117-19.

[31] For details of the discussions leading to the recall of the delegates, see Cabinet Paper by Hankey, July 21, 1927, PRO, Cab. 24/188, 211(28).

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for the opponents of mathematical parity. When Churchill canvassed his semantical definition of parity, both Cecil and Bridgeman, according to the former, argued that they were "quite committed to the other proposition, that we had been authorised so to commit ourselves and that we would not go back to Geneva and say anything else."[32] It was accordingly accepted by the Cabinet majority that the delegates should return to the conference and negotiate on "the lines of the Anglo-Japanese proposals, subject to such modification of detail as the Admiralty might suggest."[33] At this stage, therefore, the matter was placed in the hands of a Cabinet committee and Baldwin departed for Ottawa, leaving Austen Chamberlain in charge of the government.

In Baldwin's absence events took an unexpected turn. The first development came when the Cabinet approved Balfour's draft of a parliamentary statement, which was duly read to both Lords and Commons on July 27. Without repudiating Great Britain's acceptance of mathematical parity with the United States in the short term, the statement insisted that no long-term precedent would thereby be created.[34] On the subject of this draft statement Cecil had written on July 24 to Austen Chamberlain as follows:

> [It] has filled me with misgivings. It seems to me quite certain as it stands to lead to a breakdown of the negotiations. The Americans will say that when the British conceded "parity" (by which they understood equal cruiser strength) they were playing with us. "It now appears that the British proposed a temporary arrangement which will in fact give them by their old cruisers a considerable advantage and they give us notice that at the end of the temporary period they will seek to perpetuate that state of things in new cruisers". . . . Hankey told me that he was sure the Americans would not accept the Balfour document and rather rejoiced at it. . . .[35]

[32] Cecil to Irwin, Sept. 29, 1927, CP, Add. 51084.

[33] Cecil to Salisbury, July 31, 1927, CP, Add. 51086. See, also, Conclusions of Meetings of the Cabinet (hereafter, Cabinet Minutes), July 22, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 43(27), 1.

[34] Cabinet Minutes, July 26, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 44(27), 1. The Statement was read to the House of Commons by Austen Chamberlain and to the Lords by Salisbury. See Great Britain, 5 *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CCIX (1927), 1246-49; and Great Britain, 5 *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), LXVIII (1927), 933-36.

[35] Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, July 24, 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library. According to the Cabinet Minutes, Bridge-

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Cecil suffered an even more severe setback after the Cabinet had considered its committee's detailed verdict on the Anglo-Japanese proposals, as is revealed in the following account, prepared by Cecil for the information of Salisbury:

> In the Committee one modification proposed was that the agreement should be limited to 1931 and that, if so, liberty to all parties to build 8-inch gun cruisers should be permitted. This suggestion was warmly supported by Winston, and though Beatty preferred a 1936 agreement, he did not think that a 1931 agreement on these lines would be much worse except that it might increase expenditure. Meanwhile, news from Washington came in making it clear that the Americans attached essential importance to the 8-inch gun. When, therefore, the Cabinet met on Tuesday, the 25th [*sic*], Winston announced that he no longer supported the proposal to limit the agreement to 1931 with our eight-inch gun [*sic*] because he thought in that form it would be more likely to be accepted by the Americans, and in this he was supported by Birkenhead. In other words he wanted to insist on the 6-inch gun and a 1936 agreement because he wanted to wreck the negotiations and though for different reasons in spite of the opposition of both Bridgeman and myself, who asked for liberty of negotiation in this matter, the course proposed by Winston was adopted by the majority of the Cabinet.[36]

At this point Cecil warned his colleagues that if the conference broke down on the question of the eight-inch gun, he might have to consider his position.[37] Several other ministers, however,

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man strongly favored Balfour's statement. Cabinet Minutes, July 26, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 44(27), 1. It is, therefore, very surprising that after the collapse of the Coolidge Conference Bridgeman wrote: "It was decided that in Parliament a statement should be made on behalf of the Government on the subject of parity—and a casuistical essay was prepared mainly by Balfour and read to both Houses while we hurried back to Geneva. It was obvious when we got back that the American attitude had greatly stiffened against us, and I attribute it to the pronouncement on parity which may well have been thought a recession from our former attitude." Bridgeman diary entry, June-Aug., 1927, Bridgeman unpublished diary in the possession of the Second Viscount Bridgeman, 157.

[36] Cecil to Salisbury, July 31, 1927, CP, Add. 51086. Tuesday was July 26 not 25. See, also, Cabinet Minutes, July 26, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 44(27), 1. For the probable origin of the decisive telegram from Washington, see the account of the meeting on July 21 between Frank Kellogg, American Secretary of State, and Sir Esmé Howard, British ambassador in Washington, in Kellogg to Gibson, July 21, 1927, *FRUS*, 1927, I, 122-23.

[37] Cabinet Minutes, July 26, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 44(27), 1.

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felt no less strongly on the subject, although on the opposite side of the argument to Cecil. Austen Chamberlain, according to his own account, had at one stage "four resignations threatened, three of them actually in my hands."[88] It had begun to look as if the Prime Minister would be returning to find a somewhat depleted team of ministers.

IV

When, on July 28, Bridgeman and Cecil returned to Geneva they were at once plunged into an extremely suspicious and hostile atmosphere, largely created by the British government's provocative declaration in Parliament on the previous day. But the outstanding problem remained essentially what it had been at the point when the British Cabinet had recalled its delegates, namely, whether or not the Americans should be permitted to mount eight-inch guns on their smaller cruisers. Gibson lost no time in confirming that his government's attitude on this issue was likely to be inflexible.[89] He explained that, in the American view, small cruisers armed with guns of less than eight-inch caliber might turn out to be only marginally superior to armed merchantmen. The British experts, while denying the validity of the American thesis, maintained with equal vehemence that cruisers armed with eight-inch guns would be more than a match for those equipped only with guns of six-inch caliber. It was on the rock of the incompatibility of these two positions that the conference finally foundered.

Clearly more was at stake than mere prestige. Politicians and experts on both sides of the Atlantic were consciously or unconsciously basing their policies on the hypothesis that an Anglo-American conflict could not wholly be ruled out. The principal justification for this outlook rested, of course, on the long-standing and unsettled dispute between the two countries on the subject of blockade rights in a war involving only one of them.

[88] Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, Aug. 7, 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers. This letter includes the following passage: "Neville [Chamberlain] will tell you of all these excursions and alarums though I am not sure that he knows *all* the resignations. Ask him about NAPOLEON and smile with me when he tells you." "NAPOLEON" was presumably Churchill.

[89] Gibson to Kellogg, July 28, 1927, *FRUS*, 1927, I, 137-38.

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The only leaders in either the United States or Great Britain who in 1927 consistently behaved as if a war between the countries was unthinkable were Bridgeman and Cecil. Although the rigidity of both the Americans and their own Cabinet colleagues was abundantly evident, they persisted in their efforts to secure a compromise. On July 28 Bridgeman sent the following telegram to Austen Chamberlain:

> After today's conversations it looks as if Americans would hold out against 6-inch gun limit, while not regarding any of our other proposals as insuperably objectionable. . . . If their objection to 6-inch gun is maintained, the conference must break. The only alternative I can see is an attempt at compromise on gun between 6 inches and 7.5 which would eliminate argument with which Americans are obsessed about armed merchantmen.[40]

On the arrival of this message in London, a Cabinet was hastily summoned for July 29. Once again feelings were running high, as may be seen from a letter written by the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, to Austen Chamberlain just before the Cabinet met:

> I have just read Bridgeman's telegram . . . in which he makes a suggestion for an alteration in the size of cruiser guns.
>
> I write however at once to say that I sincerely trust that you would not, as acting Prime Minister, authorize anything of the kind.
>
> The advice given to the Cabinet on the last occasion by the Naval Lords of the Admiralty was of such a serious character that many of us feel that we should be well out of the agreement and certainly any further concession should be impossible.[41]

The outcome of the deliberations was that the Cabinet decided "that nothing has occurred to cause them to alter their previous decision about 6 and 8 inch guns." They accordingly informed the delegation that they could not authorize the "offer of any compromise."[42]

[40] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 213, July 28, 1927, CP, Add. 51104. This message was later to be a subject of controversy between Cecil and Bridgeman. The former claimed that they had actually recommended the compromise, whereas the latter maintained that the wording gave no clue to the delegates' attitude. See CP, Add. 51099.

[41] Joynson-Hicks to Austen Chamberlain, July 29, 1927, Austen Chamberlain Papers.

[42] Austen Chamberlain to BED, telegram no. 134, July 29, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

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The delegates in Geneva, however, despite the firm character of the Cabinet's instructions, persisted in trying to secure a positive result. The Americans refused to despair and as a token of their desire to keep the negotiations going offered the following formula, known as the Dulles Clause:

> In the event that prior to December 31st, 1936, any one of the Contracting Powers shall consider that the tonnage allocation in the cruiser class has been utilized by any of the other Contracting Powers in a manner to call for an adjustment of the total tonnage allocation of that class, such High Contracting Party may, at any time subsequent to January 31st, 1931, and upon six months' prior notice, convoke a meeting of the Powers parties to the present treaty with a view to ascertaining whether such an adjustment can be made by mutual agreement.
>
> In the event that no agreement is reached at such a conference, any of the High Contracting Parties may give notice of the desire to terminate the present convention, and this notification shall be effective within one year after the receipt thereof by the other parties to the treaty. . . .[43]

To this offer the British delegates had one overriding objection: it contained no reference whatever to the eight-inch gun problem. They therefore decided on August 1 to telegraph to London suggesting that the Dulles Clause might be acceptable if amended to allow the reconvening of the conference if any party should at any time desire to construct cruisers mounting guns of larger caliber than six inches.[44] At the same time Cecil telegraphed to Salisbury threatening resignation unless the Cabinet made a concession on eight-inch guns.[45] Then, on the next day, the Japanese also produced a compromise formula, which suggested an agreement on a building program limited to 1931.

The advice of Beatty appears to have been decisive in persuading the Cabinet to remain inflexible. Cabinet Minutes, July 29, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 46(27), 1. But the First Sea Lord, who was in the process of retiring from office, feared that "they will be going back on it and eventually come to a compromise, which I for one would never accept." Quoted in W. S. Chalmers, *The Life and Letters of David Earl Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Borodale of Wexford, Baron Beatty of the North Sea and of Brooksby* . . . (London, 1951), 415.

[43] Toynbee, 68.

[44] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegrams nos. 223 and 224, Aug. 1, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

[45] Cecil to Salisbury, Aug. 1, 1927, CP, Add. 51086.

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It is significant, however, that the British delegates in relaying this plan to London refrained from recommending it.[46]

On August 3 the British Cabinet met to consider the three clauses suggested respectively by the Americans, the Japanese, and their own delegation. Immediately afterwards Salisbury sent a message to his brother in Geneva:

> The Cabinet sat from 12 to 5 with a short interval for luncheon. They did not like the Dulles Clause—which is not surprising—nor your improved Dulles Clause, though it was the subject of a good deal of discussion and though it evidently had a good deal in its favour. On the other hand they were deeply impressed with the necessity of keeping in with Japan if possible, and all the more if an agreement with America turns out to be impossible. Finally Neville [Chamberlain, the minister of health] and Eustace [Percy, the president of the Board of Education] proposed certain amendments to the Japanese scheme, but it is necessary to have the opinion of the Admiralty on them before we can decide if we can adopt them. An adjournment till tomorrow was therefore indispensable. . . .
>
> Austen and I thought it right to read to the Cabinet your private telegram to me. It had a most marked effect. The discussion was very long and very difficult. There were several threats of resignation on the Winston side.
>
> I am in good hopes we may be able tomorrow to send you a reasonable proposal, but I have but slight hopes that the Americans will do business with us. . . .[47]

Salisbury's fears concerning the American attitude were confirmed before the Cabinet could reconvene, when on the evening of August 3 Gibson announced that his government refused to treat the Japanese proposals even as a basis for discussion unless the British total cruiser tonnage did not exceed 400,000 tons, a condition quite unacceptable to the British delegation.[48] Since

[46] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegrams nos. 225 and 226, Aug. 2, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

[47] Salisbury to Cecil, Aug. 3, 1927, CP, Add. 51086. See, also, Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 3, 1927, PRO, Cab. 23/55, 47(27). The Cabinet's objection to the delegation's suggestion rested on fears that Great Britain would continue to spend large sums on cruisers with six-inch guns, which would at once become obsolete if at any point the United States decided to call a new conference and embark on a program of 8,000-ton cruisers equipped with eight-inch guns. Austen Chamberlain to BED, telegram no. 145, Aug. 3, 1927, CP, Add. 51104.

[48] BED to Austen Chamberlain, telegram no. 228, Aug. 4, 1927, CP, Add.

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the suggestion for an amendment to the Dulles Clause had been vetoed in London, there was clearly no longer any glimmer of hope. Accordingly, on August 4, a final plenary session was held at Geneva, each delegation making a formal restatement of its case. Thus ended the disastrous Coolidge Conference.

V

Realizing that domestic and international recriminations were inevitable and that the Americans would be likely to profit from a dramatic ministerial resignation, the British Cabinet made a considerable effort to persuade Cecil not to carry out his threat. Salisbury, for example, wrote:

> I do not of course deny that the action of the Cabinet—especially in summoning Willie [Bridgeman] and you home—may have had a serious effect, but the breakdown actually occurred because the Japanese proposal which we were in process of working into shape was repudiated by the Americans. . . .
>
> . . . I know well your feeling—the horrid disappointment, the disgust with Winston and Co., the conviction that the chance for this great object has been missed—Still one must not look on the iniquity of colleagues, but upon the effect outside the Government. . . .[49]

Cecil, however, was unconvinced and accordingly, on August 8, submitted his resignation to Downing Street, although Baldwin was not due to return until the twenty-fourth. In reply to an appeal from Austen Chamberlain to reconsider, Cecil wrote:

> . . . in my view the Conference brought out the latent but profound differences between Winston and me and that in the controversy that ensued he was in effect victorious. . . . Inside the Government under present circumstances I have no chance as was demonstrated when he carried the Cabinet of July 26th with him in a proposal which, as he openly stated, was designed to wreck the Conference. . . .
>
> Before I went back to Geneva I had intimated to the Cabinet that if they insisted on their irreconcilable attitude about the 8-inch guns and the Conference failed I should resign. . . . Nevertheless they not only insisted on the decision of July 26th but rejected two other

51104; Kellogg to Coolidge, Aug. 3, 1927, *FRUS*, 1927, I, 148-52; Gibson to Kellogg, Aug. 4, 1927, *ibid.*, 152-53. See, also, Toynbee, 69, especially n. 5.

[49] Salisbury to Cecil, Aug. 4, 1927, CP, Add. 51086.

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compromise proposals recommended by Willy and me. They even told us in so many words "offer no compromise." True, at the very last moment, they expressed themselves as being ready possibly to consider some modification of the final Japanese suggestion. But the telegram was so worded that I understood it to mean that we were to manoeuvre so that the odium of the rejection of the suggestion should fall on the Americans which we obediently did!

Moreover we never believed that anything could be done with the Japanese proposal as it stood and did *not* recommend it. . . .

Do not think I am resigning with a light heart. I realise all it means for the future. I know what an "extinct volcano" is, for I have seen many of them and I know that that may easily be my fate. Even that is better than to make myself responsible for a policy which I think disastrous.[50]

The appeals to Cecil made by Salisbury and Austen Chamberlain were significantly not supplemented by any from Baldwin on his return to London. "I formed a distinct impression," wrote Cecil of his parting interview with the Prime Minister, "that he had scarcely read and had not appreciated either of the letters I had written to him. I also formed the impression that he was on the whole glad to be rid of me."[51]

Cecil's resignation was finally made public on August 30.[52] His premonition that he would never again hold Cabinet office turned out to be correct. Instead, a possibly more worthy future

[50] Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, Aug. 10, 1927, CP, Add. 51079.

[51] Cecil to Salisbury, Sept. 2, 1927, CP, Add. 51086.

[52] Cecil's published resignation minute (*The Times* [London], Aug. 30, 1927) concentrated on his dissatisfaction with the administration's general foreign policy over a period of nearly three years and avoided detailed comment on the Cabinet's conduct during the Coolidge Conference. (For details of his more general discontent during the period of Baldwin's second administration, see David Carlton, "Disarmament with Guarantees: Lord Cecil 1922-1927," *Disarmament and Arms Control*, III [1965], 153-61.) The minute took this form because Baldwin found Cecil's previous versions "quite impossible" for publication and threatened to advise King George V to refuse to release him from his privy councillor's oath. (Cecil to Salisbury, Sept. 2, 1927, CP, Add. 51086; see, also, various items in Cabinet Registered Files, PRO, Cab. 21/297.) But subsequently, during the course of a speech in Parliament, Cecil revealed many of his detailed criticisms of the Cabinet's policy on the Coolidge Conference. See Great Britain, 5 *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), LXIX (1927), 84-94. See, also, a letter by Cecil in *The Times* (London), March 19, 1928. The original resignation minute was eventually published in Appendix II of Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, *A Great Experiment* (London, 1941).

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lay ahead of him, for in the nineteen-thirties he was to be the most consistent and the most militant of all the British opponents of "appeasement" and, after the failure of the World Disarmament Conference, an unequivocal advocate of all-out British rearmament. He was thus destined, by an irony of history, to serve as one of the closest allies of Churchill in the days of Neville Chamberlain's premiership.

VI

In retrospect it is possible to describe the aims of the two Anglo-Saxon powers in the Coolidge Conference as fundamentally incompatible. The Americans, fearing British armed merchantmen, wished to concentrate on constructing large rather than small cruisers and to arm any small cruisers with eight-inch guns. By contrast the British, already possessing a large number of small cruisers mounting only six-inch guns, sought to prevent the Americans building a fleet that could outmatch these existing vessels, the early replacement of which would have been disastrously expensive. They also inclined, albeit with some uncertainty and some confusion, toward a policy of seeking to maintain a fighting superiority over the Americans in order to compensate for the potentially higher vulnerability in wartime of Great Britain's food supplies relative to those of the United States. But although the gap between the aims of Washington and London was for practical purposes unbridgeable, most of the negotiators at Geneva were slow in recognizing this truth. Somehow, they believed, it must be possible to find a way out of the impasse. But only Cecil had in mind a clear and feasible solution, namely, that one country, for the sake of an agreement, should deliberately accept a degree of military inferiority. He took the even more unusual line of arguing that his own country should make the greater sacrifice.

While it is arguable that Cecil's proposals were justified in the case in question because of the special circumstances of Anglo-American friendship and the knowledge that in any case the United States could easily outbuild Great Britain, it is more difficult to maintain that this approach has any universal validity.

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On the contrary, in disarmament negotiations between potentially hostile states, it is usually considered to be the duty of statesmen on each side to maintain unimpaired the relative balance of forces obtaining at the outset of the talks. In such circumstances far-reaching agreements may prove unattainable not because of any lack of mutual desire for a reduction in the arms' burden, but because technical considerations, as in 1927, render any mutually fair accord difficult or even impossible of achievement.

In general it may be said that the more radical the proposals for arms reduction, the more formidable will be the difficulties involved. This derives from the truism that if a state possesses very few weapons, particular importance will then attach to its *potentiel de guerre*, which by definition cannot be abolished as long as states remain separate and sovereign. The most extreme case in point concerns the Soviet Union's proposals for general and complete disarmament. These are likely to continue to be unacceptable to the Western powers because they would have the effect of giving to the Soviets in a disarmed world irreducible advantages in geographical position and manpower.

The same moral may be drawn from the naval disarmament negotiations in the nineteen-twenties. In 1922 an agreed ratio was fixed for capital ships, whereas in 1927 accord was not reached on auxiliary craft. The principal cause of the failure on the later occasion was that in the nature of the case basic geographical factors and the potential menace of armed merchantmen assumed a far greater significance than in 1922.

It is, of course, true that in 1930, after prolonged negotiations, an accord between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan was indeed reached. But whether or not it was mutually equitable is open to question. The British Labour government, despite initial Admiralty protests, proclaimed an "absolute need" for only fifty cruisers, a reduction of twenty on Jellicoe's figures of 1927. Great Britain also consented to the United States possessing a superiority of three large cruisers. But in return the United States government, despite protests from the Navy General Board, tacitly accepted the British thesis that small cruisers should be equipped only with six-inch guns. The Japanese government for its part accepted a level of submarine limitation which many of

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its experts regarded as the height of imprudence.[53] Hence, in 1930, there were naval advisers in all three countries maintaining that their political masters had imperiled national safety by conceding more than their rivals. While the three sets of experts could not all have been correct, it does not follow that they must all have been incorrect. With so many imponderable factors involved, good luck as well as good judgment must certainly have played a part if—and it is even now a subject for dispute—the mutual concessions of the three powers resulted in no alteration in the relative fighting strength of the three navies. It is therefore fair to conclude that the London Naval Treaty of 1930 would not have materialized unless the principal statesmen of the day—Herbert Hoover (the Quaker President), Ramsay MacDonald (the former pacifist), and the last liberal leaders of Japan —had not been prepared to overrule the pessimists among their naval advisers, and, in the phrase of the period, "to take risks for peace." In 1927 the leading figures were more cautious and, for good or ill, more typical.

[53] For details of the London Naval Conference of 1930, see Raymond G. O'Connor, *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1962), and David Carlton, "The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour Administration, 1929-1931" (unpublished London University Ph.D. thesis, 1966), Chaps. 4 and 5.

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The Importance of Being "Relevant": An Exchange of Views

The managing editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY *have preferred in the past not to publish letters to the editor, but, where possible, to reply to them as a matter of private correspondence. The questions raised in a recent letter seemed, however, to present an issue of substantial general interest on which a statement of editorial policy was not inappropriate. We are, therefore, taking this occasion to publish that letter and a reply to it. As a matter of general editorial practice, we shall revert to our usual policy of considering letters to the editor as private correspondence, reserving the right to publish them only when they deal with issues of broad editorial policy and substantial intellectual importance.*

TO THE MANAGING EDITOR:

I have just received the latest issue of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, and I found it very interesting, very scholarly, and very irrelevant.

The world is in turmoil: the Russians have invaded Czechoslovakia; America is engaged in a military action in Vietnam; students are creating riots in Europe and America; people are starving in Biafra. Why do I remind you of these things, of which we are all aware? It is because you seem not to have heard anything about them. No one who reads the latest issue of the QUARTERLY would

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have any indication of the kind of world in which it was written. There is nothing in it that relates to the problems and issues which we, as members of the world, must face.

We are members of the world, even if we do call ourselves "political scientists." The academic label does not excuse us from the necessity of having to live in the same world as mechanics, street cleaners, salesmen, or any other people. If we have chosen political science as our special field of inquiry, it should be in order to be better equipped to understand political and social problems, not to avoid them.

The student rebels today are demanding that the universities give them an education more relevant to the issues of the world. If the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reflects the quality of teaching in our colleges and graduate schools, it is easy to see what the students are complaining about. We live in a period which is in a process of total change and upheaval in its political, social, and economic affairs. A publication of an association of scholars appears. All is calm. No one mentions the storm raging outside, as we all sit by the fire and chat among ourselves.

The storm cannot be ignored forever. Sooner or later we must all go out into it. In our private lives we all consider and react to these problems. Why does this concern not affect our lives as scholars?

If our knowledge and training are not brought into action in an effort to understand and to lead the way to the solution of these problems, we have greatly neglected our responsibilities. If the educated will not reflect on events, the ignorant will act without reflection.

An academic journal like the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is the proper place for the scholarly discussion of intellectual matters. However, it should also provide some opportunity for scholars to discuss, in a specialized way, the problems we share. Even the medical journals publish papers on real diseases and their treatments. Surely a publication of political scientists should consider the real ailments of our time.

It is necessary for us to discuss these issues among ourselves, and to increase our insights into them. As political scientists, we must be concerned with seeking solutions to the political problems of our age. Leadership is one of the tasks of the educated, and we

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fail in our responsibility if we take only the pleasures of scholarship and evade its duties.

If we lived in a happier age, we could try to devote ourselves to pure scholarship without harming anyone but ourselves. In our time, our common humanity demands that we give the best we have to solving our problems. If the academic community does not even discuss these problems, we have failed—as political scientists and as human beings.

YVONNE GROSEIL
New York City

DEAR MISS GROSEIL:

I am afraid that in the past I have not been as responsive as I should have been to letters to the editor of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, not because I preferred it that way but because we suffer from such a shortage of secretarial help that I felt that the time of our staff is better devoted to putting out new issues of the PSQ than to answering complaints about old issues. But your letter raises a question of considerable editorial—and intellectual—importance, and I am grateful to you for providing me an opportunity to discuss it.

To put it as bluntly as I am sure you would wish me to, I am afraid that I cannot agree that the last issue of the PSQ was, to use that currently fashionable word, "irrelevant," that I "seem not to have heard anything about" the events which have the world in turmoil. Relevance, as I am sure you appreciate, is not a simple matter. Issues which seem at times to have no urgency at all yet may turn out to be of great moment and relevance. Would you have said, for example, that Gregor Mendel, experimenting with sweetpeas in his monastery, was producing relevant knowledge? Or that Darwin, observing Galapagos tortoises and finches, was concerned with a relevant issue? And would you have said that, aside from the fact that they were relevant—that is, concerned with an issue then widely debated in the U.S.S.R.—Lysenko's experiments had anything else to commend them? Durkheim wrote about suicide and Weber discussed forms of authority in the lost worlds of history, but were not their findings relevant to our under-

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standing of the forces that convulse us today? History itself has a way of changing our minds about what we feel to be relevant, and it is one of the obligations of thoughtful people not to confuse the relevant with the merely fashionable. Do I need to say as well that relevance, at best, is a criterion of timeliness, and not necessarily of truth or even of importance?

But I am willing to concede, and quite ungrudgingly, that relevance—even when construed simply as timeliness—is of considerable importance. Even so, however, it is not always easy to know what is relevant and what is irrelevant, for surely you will agree that a relevant article is not only one which deals with a timely and important issue, but one which—irrespective of the subject with which it deals—produces knowledge necessary for the understanding of that timely issue. "Legitimacy" is a subject much in vogue these days; in that sense it is a relevant issue. But an article dealing with the "diffidatio" of feudal law may also be relevant because it tells us a great deal about the conditions under which authority may be held to be legitimate or illegitimate, even though it does not discuss disciplinary cases in universities or the Cuban revolution.

Nor can I agree with an implication of your letter that the only kind of knowledge worth pursuing is relevant knowledge. Relevance is not a quality that is inherent in some subject-matter; it is what an intelligent and imaginative mind, concerned with some problem, sees in that subject-matter. Since none of us can know all of the problems which invest phenomena with significance for their investigators, since none of us can know what the future will find relevant to the problems it is interested in, then surely it is the obligation of us all—and especially of the universities—to keep open the doors of enquiry as wide as possible, lest we be fashionable rather than profound. What I am afraid you would call "irrelevant" knowledge is not waste; it is evidence of our recognition that none of us knows as much as God and of society's recognition that while one must live in one's time one need not be tyrannized by it.

Having said that much to indicate that the question of relevant knowledge is by no means a simple and obvious one, let me take up specifically the contents of the last issue of the PSQ, the one you mentioned in your letter.

It is true that there is nothing in that issue on the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, on student riots in Europe and America,

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or on Biafra. But does the absence of articles on those issues really mean that the PSQ gives no "indication of the world in which it is written"?

The revolution against Nkrumah in Ghana was also part of the turmoil of our world and of our time. The lead article in the September issue dealt with that problem, and in an especially important way, for a careful reading reveals that it discusses not only the events of that revolution but also the inadequacy of present political theory, particularly the question, What is wrong with the present state of thinking about the politics of Africa that accounts for the utter failure of the "experts" to predict the revolution against Nkrumah? Was the following conclusion of Professor Goody's article—dealing, as I have said, not only with recent events in Africa but also with our mode of thinking about all political systems—irrelevant: "In the last analysis, all behavior of man and nature is 'functionally interdependent.' The question here is one of relevance. Too great a stress on the systematic aspects of beliefs, ideologies, societies, and cultures renders incomprehensible the inconsistencies in behavior . . . the contradictions between attitudinal elements . . . and the developmental aspects of belief"?

The second article in the September issue dealt not with Czechoslovakia, but with Poland. Are not recent events there, too, part of the turmoil of our time? Is not an article dealing with the elements of compatibility between the Polish intelligentsia and the Socialist regime just as relevant as, say, an article dealing with the elements of compatibility (shall I say complicity?) between American academicians and the present regime (shall I say establishment?)?

Did you really find the article on "Unlimited Debate in the Senate" to be irrelevant, even though at the very time the September issue of the PSQ was being published the United States Senate was engaged in a filibuster to prevent the appointment of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the Supreme Court?

And how can you have found the article on "The Myth of Hyperfactualism" irrelevant when it takes up the cudgels in behalf of a "mode of enquiry which employs real types, whose research is informed by meliorism, and whose rules of procedure lead to . . . fact-gathering and social prescription"? Surely this is what you had in mind when you wrote that political science should equip us better to understand political and social problems, not to avoid them.

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That leaves only the fifth and final article in the September issue, "Charles Gravier de Vergennes: Profile of an Old Regime Diplomat." I think myself that an article on conceptions of statecraft among diplomats even of an earlier period, an article which attempts to relate issues of diplomacy to prevailing conceptions of social order and the means for effectuating them, deals with issues of substantial general importance, even though it does not speak of the events of 1968. You may not agree; even so, would you say that an issue in which four out of five articles deal with subjects of immediate relevance shows no reflection of the world about it? It perhaps does not reflect those aspects of the present world that you are most interested in, but that, of course, is another matter.

Let us consider for just a moment the book reviews and book notes in the September issue. There were forty-seven of them, of which thirty-six deal with the world since 1900, only eleven with what might be considered as historical topics. The book reviews dealt with such issues as: negotiating for peace, disarmament, foreign aid, the test-ban treaty, Soviet rule in Central Asia, dialectical materialism, witch-hunts in Washington, Negroes in Southern politics, Negroes and the unions, women in the labor force, the British general election of 1966, regional and city planning in Socialist Poland, African nationalisms, the Social Democratic party in Japan, the Communist party in Japan, rural Mexico, Arab and Turkish modernization programs.

In all of this, is there no mention of the "storm raging outside"? Is it really true that "all is calm"?

In the June issue there were, again, five articles. Was it the article on "Interventionism, Liberalism, and Power-Politics" that was irrelevant? Did you perhaps overlook the conclusion of the author of that article: ". . . if the tensions between the United States and its major rivals become more acute, through a further escalation of the Vietnam war, through an intensification of the armament race, or through direct confrontation elsewhere, for instance in the Middle East," then such "a development would bring to the fore a coalition of military men, scientists, technocrats, politicians, and 'realist' intellectuals who would combine a virulent anti-Communist ideology with an unrestrained primacy of military and strategic needs. It would lead to the gradual suppression of dissent and move the United States closer toward the society of 1984"? I do not think that

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this is "ignoring the storm," or "sitting by the fire and chatting among ourselves."

Was the article "From Resentment to Confrontation: The Police, the Negroes, and the Outbreak of the Nineteen-Sixties Riots" irrelevant? Or was it "ignoring the storm outside"? "American Military Government and the Education of a New German Leadership"—was this the irrelevant article? The Russians, who invaded Czechoslovakia because of the alleged German "threat," would not have agreed with you. Perhaps it was the article on "Epidemiology and the Slave Trade" that you found irrelevant. Black people, I am sure, did not, for they are interested, as was the author of this article, in the factors that "influenced economic decisions and economic patterns, the demography of tropical America, and the planters' preference for African over other workers." Would you not agree that it is relevant to know—really to know and not merely to assume we know—why slavery and the plantation system were established in the Americas? I would not agree that even the article on Jean Bodin and taxation is irrelevant—for I cannot possibly know all the problems that life and scholarship will churn up for which this article might provide a nugget or two of significant knowledge—but in the interest of amity I will give you that one. Still, four out of five relevant articles isn't bad.

How about the five articles in the March issue? Was it really the irrelevancy of Harold Macmillan's article on "The World Today" that you objected to, or its politics? You may not like the policy implications of the statement ". . . I ask, boldly but unequivocally, for a return to direct meetings between Russia and America, and their allies" but surely it deals with an issue in the real world. Even Mr. Nixon and Mr. Humphrey thought so in the recent election campaign.

Was it the article on "Dean Acheson and the Korean War" that turned you off? Or the one on food aid programs? Or the one by an African scholar on the politics of assassination in contemporary Africa? Those are so clearly relevant by any criteria that it must, on the contrary, have been the article on Sorel and Machiavelli. But would the students at Nanterre and Paris last spring, one wonders, have felt remote from Sorel who was, after all, the apostle of the "élan and social solidarity" to be found in "revolutionary syndicates of workers" (and students, too, one might add). And, rightly

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or wrongly understood, has the statecraft of Machiavelli had no influence on the theory and practice of later ages?

I will go back only as far as the December 1967 issue, so as to include the last full year of the PSQ. "Urban Problems and the Federal Government" is so obviously an issue of our time that it seems quite unnecessary to argue its relevance. Has fascism become so much a problem "merely" of history that an article on "The Wilhelmstrasse and the Nazi Era" no longer has contemporary relevance? The three remaining articles of that issue create a bit more of a problem, but not much more. A discussion of manpower problems in Britain during the Crimean War might seem remote, but only, I think, on a superficial view of the matter, for, as the author of this article attempts to point out, the British, faced in World War II with the need to mobilize all their resources, totally forgot that they had had experience with that same problem in the mid-nineteenth century. Is it not important to know why a society does not learn from its own experience? Indeed, is it not one of the tasks of scholarship which purports to be relevant to make such an inquiry? The article on medieval baronial rebellions might also seem remote, but it is so only, I assure you, as the historical crow flies. "Rebellions were not meant to be exercises in collective intellectual activity," wrote the author of this article; "if the rebels chose a specific legal fiction as being well suited to their needs, it is our task to correlate this fiction with the political, social, and economic motives which drove them to arms, as well as to determine why this particular fiction was adopted time after time." And what is necessary for analysts of medieval baronial rebellions is also true, is it not, for analysts of student rebellions and of nationalist revolts: the correlation of the ideologies in terms of which rebellions are carried out with the political, social, and economic motives which drive men to rebellion. Frankly, I'm not sure what—if anything—is relevant in the article on Bolingbroke and Locke; I accepted it because I found it interesting—and that, I feel, is a good enough reason.

With respect to the point you make concerning the necessity to live in the same world with other—non-academic—people, I should like to say only that in the editing of the PSQ I have tried, sometimes very hard, to break through the ivory tower and involve others than academics in the task in which "we" as well as "they"

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are in need of education. If you consider the reviewers in the past four issues of the PSQ, for example, you will find journalists, community workers, consulting economists, psychiatrists, judges, and political figures. If we included another year or so of the PSQ we would find the former head of the Communist party of the United States, the former Labor prime minister of Great Britain, the former secretary of state of the United States, a number of senators and congressmen, labor union officials, psychologists, medical doctors, lawyers, businessmen, and the like. I do not know the politics of all these people—what concerns me are their competence and their honesty—but I am sure I reveal no secrets when I call your attention to, among others, William Appleman Williams, Gar Alperovitz, and Staughton Lynd, prominent in various phases of the current historical revisionism movement; Joan Robinson, one of the foremost academic Marxist economists in the world; Kenneth Boulding, for years one of the leaders of the American peace movement; and many, many others.

One final point: I would ask you not to be so quick to judge, and not to be so harsh in your judgments. Would you have chastised us for irrelevance if we had had articles or reviews by, for example, Fidel Castro, or Anthony Eden, or Richard Nixon, or Juan Bosch, or David Ben Gurion, or Habib Bourguiba, or Mohammed Ben Bella (forgotten now, perhaps, but before his arrest and imprisonment a very "relevant" man in Algerian politics)? We have tried to get them—from these men and from many others—not to provide them with a forum from which to speak about whatever moves them, but to elicit from them opinion and information on matters about which they may be deemed competent to speak. We have tried to get such articles and we will continue to do so, just as we have tried to get articles on Periclean Athens and Rousseau, on John Adams and Edmund Burke, on medieval constitutionalism and the Berlin theater—and we will continue to try to get those as well.

We are not omniscient; we see even the present but slightly better than we see the future. That being so, I cannot as managing editor of the PSQ allow either my own views or those that are currently fashionable so to tyrannize this journal as to rule out the appearance of others. Perhaps relevance, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, but all is not relevant that says it is and some things that do not blatantly advertise their relevance may yet be so. Besides,

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there are worse things in the world than to be accused of being irrelevant. After all, one may be wrong or, worse yet, dishonest.

SIGMUND DIAMOND
Managing Editor

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Book Reviews

Freud: Political and Social Thought *by Paul Roazen. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.—xii, 322, ix pp. $6.95.*

Freud himself was the first to extend his psychoanalytic theories to the phenomena dealt with by the social sciences. He believed that "as a 'depth psychology,' a theory of the mental unconscious, it can become indispensable to all the sciences which are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as . . . the social order." Since Freud's own work, of course, political scientists and historians have been increasingly interested in "applying" psychoanalysis to their disciplines. It is Paul Roazen's thesis that they have focused on Freud's social ideas, ignoring or misunderstanding their clinical basis, while, on the other hand, the analysts who have tried to meet them half-way have neglected Freud's work in the social realm. This claim, I believe, is an overstatement, especially in its second part, yet it motivates Roazen to undertake a needed task: the re-examination of Freud's social and political thought. This Roazen does in the course of chapters dealing with Freud's psychoanalytic theories, and then of Freud's views on religion, social controls, and civilization. There is also a most interesting epilogue on the Freud-Bullitt *Woodrow Wilson* (unlike most critics, Roazen emphasizes Freud's responsibility for the book). Throughout, the footnotes serve as a mine of bibliographical information. Roazen's main strength is that he deals with Freud's social thought as linked to clinical analysis and to an analysis of Freud himself (though this is occasionally dubious) and does so from an unusually informed position on the theories of psychoanalysis. His other strength is that he has a salutary awareness of what psychoanalysis can and cannot do in explaining civilization and the social order.

With these strengths, it is regrettable that the book as a whole is so uneven. As Roazen admits, "the theories within this book tend to move in several directions at the same time." Thus, the book is, alternately, an exercise in intellectual history, a summary of Freud's

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theories, a psychoanalysis of Freud, and a consideration of the uses of psychoanalysis in political philosophy (for this is meant rather than political science). The result, alas, is often a lack of focus and an annoying mixture of elementary and advanced ideas. One suspects that it is partly the result of Roazen rewriting his Ph.D. thesis into a book; in his personal scholarly development he has not sufficiently shed his earlier skin. Other drawbacks (space precludes me from citing instances) are a habit of making sweeping generalizations without a hint as to the evidence supporting them; the absence of judgment on or efforts at evaluation of secondary authorities quoted; lapses in grammar and style; and a most perverse index.

Surprisingly, Roazen's citation and knowledge of present-day work in political science appears fragmentary, perhaps because he defines the field essentially as political philosophy; consequently, the book is frequently stronger as intellectual history. Nevertheless, on balance this is a book very much worth reading by all social scientists. In spite of its trying qualities, it does provide one of the best extant examinations of Freud's social and political thought (bearing comparison with Philip Rieff's work), with many fresh insights and a sure handling by the author of the psychoanalytic side of his subject as allied to the perennial problems of political philosophy.

BRUCE MAZLISH
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Two Tracts on Government *by John Locke, edited with an introduction, notes, and translation by Philip Abrams. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.—x, 264 pp. $7.50.*

Between 1659 and 1662 while England stumbled from republicanism and the sects back to Charles Stuart and the re-established church, John Locke wrote two short polemical tracts which he never published. In English and Latin, Locke argued that the civil magistrate had authority over indifferent things in religion. What God had neither commanded nor forbidden Christians to do about the time, place, manner, dress, and ceremony of their worship were matters indifferent—and these might be prescribed and enforced by the civil magistrate. Despite his claim to be a lover of liberty (p. 120) which he subsequently validated, Locke argued in these tracts for submission to authority. After twenty years of civil disturbance heated by religious conflict, Locke put peace before liberty.

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The English tract replies to Edward Bagshaw's argument for individual liberty of conscience in *The Great Question Concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship;* the Latin tract is more general and more formal, but Locke's position is the same in both. Whether the magistrate is entrusted by God with his authority, or he receives it from the consent of his subjects who divest themselves of their liberty, the magistrate is empowered to legislate about matters indifferent. The substance and extent of his enactments have been committed to the magistrate's discretion. No divine law forbids him to exercise this power. Christian liberty consists not in freedom to do as one's conscience directs, but in freedom from believing that outward forms imposed by law are necessary to salvation. The only control over the magistrate is God, and subjects are bound to obey even those laws which are sinful for the magistrate to enact.

John Locke in 1660 showed little promise of becoming the author of *A Letter Concerning Toleration,* which reverses the argument of the *Two Tracts* by denying to either government or governed a right to impose religious practice by force, restricting the legitimate power of government to civil affairs, and reserving to each conscientious individual (not atheists) the right to worship God as he pleases, provided that his worship involves no loyalty to a foreign power (that is, the pope) and that it does not invade others' rights to life, liberty, and property.

Cambridge University Press is to be commended for following Peter Laslett's critical edition of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* with this companion volume of *Two Tracts.* Philip Abrams has produced well-edited texts, a clear translation of the Latin tract, along with an extensive introduction and notes. He is especially informative about Locke's sources and the historical context. But it is decidedly peculiar to minimize Hobbes' influence by mentioning (pp. 76-77, 230-231 n.) authors with Hobbist views in the mid-sixteen-forties while overlooking *De Cive* (1642) and *The Elements of Law* (manuscript circulated in 1640).

Abrams' own view of Locke's politics in 1660 is forcefully presented (p. 67): "He has a sceptical and anti-rationalist view of human nature; a besieged-city conception of political values; a conspiracy theory of political life; and a classical, teleological idea of the state." I think his interpretation exaggerated—he has wrested the besieged city and the conspiracy of zealots from their contexts; Locke's conservatism is less virulent. Let the reader purchase, peruse, and judge for himself.

M. M. GOLDSMITH
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The Political Philosophy of Rousseau *by Roger D. Masters. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968.—xxiii, 464 pp. $12.50.*

Rousseau and the Spirit of Revolt *by William H. Blanchard. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1967.—xiv, 300 pp. $8.50.*

Mr. Masters has written a genuinely interesting and serious book on Rousseau. Not least among his virtues is that he never patronizes Rousseau, but accepts him for what he was: an extremely intelligent and well-read man. In spite of the author's modest claims, this is much more than a mere explication of texts. Each work is interpreted, not only in terms of Rousseau's other political writings, but also of those classical authors who are most relevant to his concerns. Following a suggestion of Rousseau's, the works are discussed in reverse order of their actual composition. This has the happy result of putting *Emile*, the most comprehensive of Rousseau's works, at the beginning. It is the best possible introduction; everything is there. The *First Discourse*, Mr. Masters' though not Rousseau's favorite, comes last, to be followed by a quite separate section on the *Social Contract*, apart since it is not here regarded as a philosophical work, but as one of prudential political advice.

The first point to emerge from the close study of *Emile* is that Rousseau's metaphysical and religious ideas were "detachable," because he regarded them as propositions of only a doubtful validity. However certain Rousseau was in matters of psychology and politics, his philosophical skepticism was extreme. Secondly, Mr. Masters reveals very ably Rousseau's complex relation to the ancients, especially Plato, whom he addressed over the heads of his detested contemporaries. The debt to the past was, however, greatly modified by Rousseau's ready acceptance of the scientific thought of his own time, most notably that of Buffon and Condillac, but also of Newton, whose mechanics were an all too rich source of metaphors and analogies for him. Nor is that all. Rousseau abandoned the notion of a human nature in favor of a psychology of development, or "perfectibility." The rejection of natural law is also well explained here. What is insufficiently stressed is Rousseau's obsessive concern with inequality. Mr. Masters mentions it, but not nearly enough. He also tends to exaggerate the mechanical character of Rousseau's vision of society. The "body politic" is based on a psychology far more aware of sensibility and feeling than he would allow. However, his pages on the relativistic, practical, and also curiously formal character of the *Social Contract* are extremely revealing and warrant a rereading of that celebrated text. Finally, Mr. Masters' analysis of the different voices Rousseau used in addressing various audiences is highly illuminating. The general public, the "philosophes" and his peers, the wise of the past

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and possible future, were each treated to distinct views. However, it is futile to neglect his ultimate allegiance to "man in general," even when he knew himself to be a man apart. One could praise and argue with Mr. Masters forever, which means that he ought to be read, and carefully.

Mr. Blanchard's book is a very minor contribution to the Rousseau literature. His main thesis is that Rousseau was a sado-masochist and that this made him both politically authoritarian and wildy radical in his rejection of his own society. His liberal impulses were always drowned out by totalitarian urges that sprang from his diseased psyche. Not only did he partake of the "essence" of totalitarianism, he was also a master myth-maker who projected his sado-masochistic needs upon society, which in turn inspired those attitudes in his readers which led directly to the French Revolution. For this terrible disaster he must bear much of the blame. The use of psychoanalytic terms to discredit historical figures is now a common practice, but so far it has served to raise more questions about its own scientific value than about the merits of its subjects of examination.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
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Fortschritt und Gegenrevolution: Die Gesellschaftslehre Comtes in ihrer sozialen Funktion *by Otwin Massing. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1966.—229 pp. 28 DM.*

This book contributes next to nothing to the analysis and elucidation of Auguste Comte's thought, nor can it be taken seriously when it pretends to uncover the social roots and functions of his doctrine. It is a violent polemical onslaught, an exposé in which the author convicts Comte with relentless and fanatical zeal of the crime of not having been a Marxist.

Serious examination of an author's impact on his times, of the social functions of his work, requires, first of all, careful and sustained listening to the voice to be discussed and "located." It requires a certain amount of empathic understanding of what he attempted to do. When such an effort of imaginative projection into another man's thought is absent, the result can only turn out to be crude debunking based not on *Verstehen* but on *Misverstehen*. Mr. Massing never brings himself to listen seriously to Comte; he is concerned only with assembling a brief for his indictment.

The author holds the view that a social science which is concerned

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only with the controlled observation and theoretical interpretation of the social world is conformist by its very nature since it refuses to attack the conditions which it analyzes. This seems to me a profoundly obscurantist view. It implies the disutility of all those forms of knowledge that do not conform to the requirements of a particular social philosophy. Knowledge here becomes the handmaiden and servant of a particular world view. In such a perspective, knowledge that cannot be used as a weapon is useless, nay dangerous. A few quotations from Mr. Massing's work will illustrate his orientation.

Comte's positivism, argues Mr. Massing, "bears witness to the capitulation of thought before the factual; since it refrains from justifying 'given' facts of experience before the critical tribunal of reason [Comte's] sociology with its fanatacism of reality becomes finally itself blind to reality" (p. 54). Hence, "adjustment and conformism in regard to that which exists are the final consequences of this positivism which does not ask critical questions about the given facts and does not possess the force to explode them through negation" (p. 62).

Not only does Comte, in this view, mislead the proletariat and obfuscate its real interests, he expresses and systematizes the interest of the ruling classes. His sociology is "nationalist-imperialistic" (p. 161). "The masses are led by their positivistic slavemasters to the bloodletting of world history" (pp. 159-60).

Ideas such as these can be found in the work of men like Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, who are presumably the spiritual mentors of the author. But what the masters distilled out of a rich philosophical culture and presented with a measure of originality becomes a collection of clichés in the hands of the disciple. When it is attempted to re-enact tragedy, to paraphrase Marx, the result turns out to be farce.

The book is written in a language which seems only peripherally related to the German of Heine, Boerne, or Nietzsche. In the author's jargon, undigestible lumps of pseudo-Hegelian profundity float on a watery soup of diluted Marxist rhetoric.

LEWIS A. COSER
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The Sociological Tradition *by Robert A. Nisbet. New York, Basic Books, 1967.—xii, 347 pp. $7.95.*

Perhaps the most significant thing about this many-sided and many-valued book is that it constitutes a major step in the ongoing reform of

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the history of social theory. It is one further milestone, and an important one at that, in the transition of the history of social theory to a more serious and complex genre. Substantively, Professor Nisbet's work focuses on the intellectual contributions of Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel, with strong references to their supporting epigoni, which are organized in terms of what he takes to be the five core ideas of sociology: community, authority, status, the sacred, and alienation.

Although in this volume the link is indicated somewhat more gently than in his earlier articles, Nisbet still essentially sees sociology as having been born as part of a conservative reaction against the Enlightenment, as a reaction to the French Revolution with its individualism, egalitarianism, and democracy. Nisbet also indicates, however, that sociology has its roots, too, in a critique of the culture of capitalism. For example, in Comte it entails a rejection of the individualism of the early market economy, while in Weber it entails a critique of modern bureaucratic impersonality and routinization. In short, sociology has its roots in the nineteenth-century reaction both to the French and the Industrial Revolutions, and insofar as it embodies a critique of the culture of capitalism, it is more than an expression of conservative values.

Western "academic" sociology, then, appears to be born of a joint revulsion, on the one hand, against liberal laissez-faire economics, and, on the other, against all state efforts at centralized control. Its implicit diagnosis is that social control can be left neither to the interests of individuals nor to economics to produce the necessary social reconstruction. Sociology thus proceeded historically by instituting a new conceptual reality—society—which it counterposed to both the state and the individual, by seeking to subsume the importance of both of these to a more comprehensive totality.

To sociology's distrust of the state and of the individual, as bases of social integration, there must also be added its dissatisfaction with conventional religion, which it concludes (often reluctantly) is historically exhausted.

To that extent, and to put the matter ideologically, the emergence of sociology premises a rejection of *conventional* conservatism no less than of liberalism and Jacobinism. The historical emergence of sociology then tokens the end of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ideologies. It is thus quite characteristic that today the "end of ideology" is a conceit that it took a sociologist to formulate, for nothing is more reminiscent of Daniel Bell's critique of "ideology" than Comte's attack on "metaphysics."

If I were to voice any reservations about Professor Nisbet's work they

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would be, first, an uneasiness about his *analytic* emphasis which tends to destructure theoretical architectures into their component bricks rather than to see them as more complex wholes and, secondly, his failure to develop conceptual tools for the generalized analysis of social theory itself. In short, the sifting out of substantive theoretical concepts presumably common to diverse thinkers—authority, status, and the like—still leaves us talking about social theories only in terms that these theorists themselves employ; it still leaves us without a set of conceptual grappling hooks which could handle the development of social theory as a set of protocols, in short, as data to be analyzed from the standpoint of a sociology of sociology.

The crux of the matter here is that without the development of a generalized theory of social theories, and without the development of a sociology of sociology, we are limited to the analysis of only the "ideological" implications of a social theory, an analysis which usually gives us no understanding of the specific mechanisms by which this ideology penetrates social theory, and which for the most part limits us to extremely crude differentiae, such as conservatism or radicalism. In the case of Nisbet's work, this, for example, leads to a failure to distinguish between Romanticism and conservatism, to miss the important impact of the Romantic movement on the development of social theory, and to assume that Romanticism was entirely conservative.

The fundamental shortcoming, then, of Nisbet's work is that it does not yet see the need for a sociology of sociology. The fundamental value of this work, however, is that it brings us to the very threshold in which this need and possibility become visible. It is thus a very good job indeed. Even those scholars who have spent the last twenty years studying the history of social theory will find that they have much to learn from it.

ALVIN W. GOULDNER
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The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages *by Walter Ullmann. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.—xiii, 160 pp. $5.00.*

These lectures, delivered at The Johns Hopkins University in 1964-65 by Professor Walter Ullmann of Cambridge University, are the product of profound learning in medieval law and careful reflection. No medieval scholar today surpasses Ullmann in mastery of the political theory propounded by civil, canon, and feudal law texts. The thesis of the present book is not startling, nor is there any reason to dissent from it: theo-

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cratic, civil-canonical, and feudal traditions subjected the individual to law and community, whereas late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century humanism provided "the release of the individual from the tutelage in which he had been kept for so long a time. This is the dawn of the modern era . . . in which the individual was liberated and emancipated."

If this book has the virtues of Ullmann's other excellent studies on medieval political and legal thought, it also exhibits the limitations of these works. For a reason I cannot understand, Ullmann insists at looking at the medieval world exclusively from the point of view of the ruling authorities. He perpetuates the ideology of the medieval establishment. There was another side to this problem of the individual and society. A radical libertarian ethos is indicated in twelfth-century romantic literature, particularly in the motif of the hero's perilous quest for the Holy Grail, and the writings of Peter Abelard are suffused with a radical self-consciousness that places individual feeling and reason against the sanctions of external authority. Furthermore, in heretical and mystical movements there is implied a radical individualism that leads on directly to the democratic ideas of left-wing Protestantism. In the middle ages these underground streams of radical individualism were not allowed to impinge on political and legal order; whenever they threatened to do so, they were put down ruthlessly by the feudal-theocratic-ecclesiastical complex, the power-brokers of that day. It is hard to see why Ullmann does not give due emphasis to this anti-establishment strain in medieval thought.

These comments do not detract from the merit of this book, which is extremely valuable for all students of medieval civilization and the history of political and legal thought.

NORMAN F. CANTOR
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Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945 *by Elizabeth Wiskemann. New York, Harper & Row, 1966.—287 pp. $6.95.*

International Politics Since World War II: A Short History *by Charles L. Robertson. New York, London, and Sydney, John Wiley & Sons, 1966.—x, 385 pp. $6.95.*

The coming of industry and the political impetus of the French Revolution combined to confirm the primacy of Europe, Western Europe especially, during the nineteenth century. But Europe's conquest of the

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world went hand in hand with the cultivation of her internecine quarrels. Hence the First World War.

The effect of that conflict was the demotion of the European powers. But the American withdrawal ostensibly left Europe in her former position of dominance. Within Europe herself the war failed to resolve what for some time had been the central problem of the place that properly belonged to Germany. Hence the depressing record of fumbling that followed the First World War, of which the Second was essentially an extension. The attempt to solve Europe's problem through uniting her by force had failed before; the peculiar imbecility of Nazi methods made that attempt even less likely to succeed. Laval was quite right when he told Hitler: *Vous voulez gagner la guerre pour faire l'Europe; faites donc l'Europe pour gagner la guerre.*

The inefficacy of French policy, matched only by the ineptitude of the British, the German aberration, the impact of the Russian Revolution, the problems of the minor states, are traced in Miss Wiskemann's survey. Despite its brevity the coverage is adequate and the tale that emerges is balanced, consistent, and clear. There are but few and minor errors—Briand's tenure of office did not end in 1930—and one may differ with some judgments; these are small matters. The emphasis is political, but the place of economics is acknowledged and even cultural trends are sketched.

The Second World War had a clarifying effect. Hitler indeed achieved the territorial concentration of the German people, if hardly in the manner intended, and the relationships of power are no longer beclouded. Robertson's book is a continuation of the story told by Miss Wiskemann and brings us very close to the present. The chronological divisions seem valid; the war itself constitutes an obvious unit, and it is reasonable to choose the following decade as another. By 1955 the damage of the war had in large measure been absorbed, the stalemate of power had produced a degree of stability and opened the door to new possibilities. The shape of things, however, was quite different from the expected. There was no question this time about the demotion of all the former great powers of Europe other than the Soviet Union. One aspect of that demotion was the rapid and thorough liquidation of the European empires, a result made possible by the combination of European weakness and the general climate of the day.

But Europe displayed unexpected vitality. Her recovery and the emergence of a large number of new states, together with the stalemate between the superpowers, created a more complex and flexible situation in which others could assert a growing independence. Robertson rightly stresses the importance of technological developments, in the domain of

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weaponry in particular. Whether the balance of terror will make the source of it, nuclear weapons, unusable remains an open question; such has been the case so far, and conflicts, while numerous, have remained of limited scope.

The role of the United States, suddenly launched on the uncongenial path of world power, looms very large. American reactions have often been *ad hoc* improvisations, and many of them are viewed critically. One is tempted at times to raise the question of how such a collection of mistakes could have added up to a total which, on balance, can hardly be described as either unintelligent or unsuccessful. The completeness of coverage, the mass of detail—proximity of time militates against significant selection—deprive the exposition of the more orderly simplicity of Wiskemann's much shorter book. This was probably unavoidable. To the student of contemporary history these two books, taken together, afford an adequate and highly useful introduction.

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Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 *by David Schoenbaum. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1966.—xxiii, 336 pp. $5.95.*

David Schoenbaum's book is an original and valuable attempt to analyze and interpret the practical social policy of National Socialism during the years of its rule before World War II. So far, most books concerning National Socialism have focused on the totalitarianism and military aggressiveness of the Third Reich. Here we find for the first time a comprehensive study of the domestic social policy concerning labor, business, agriculture, women, and the state.

The author has an interesting thesis to offer. In contrast to other current interpretations of National Socialism which classify it either as a specific version of the class struggle or as a German national phenomenon, Dr. Schoenbaum's analysis is based on the hypothesis that National Socialism was a social revolution that carried its own contradiction: ideologically it implied war against big business and industrial society, but practically its dynamics and international aggressiveness made it dependent on the very forces it claimed to fight. This inner inconsistency was brought about by the mobilization of all kinds of disaffected with no programmatic command of the issues involved. The conflicting ideals of equality and elitism, and the different practical interests of Nazi followers, of "Mittelstandspolitik" and rearmament, of

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industrial recovery and price stability, of high prices for farmers and low prices for consumers, remained incompatible. Under the leadership of Hitler, "motivated by a combination of pragmatism, resentment and indifference," the result was a transition from opposition to establishment to a "bureaucratization of charisma" and a state of continuous opportunistic improvisation with a strong element of favoritism.

The author traces the actual policy of National Socialism during the prewar years with reference to the various social strata and interest groups, and demonstrates the total lack of consistency in theory as well as in practice, particularly regarding agricultural policy, the status of women, and the interests of small business. As to labor and big business, contradictions were confined to ideological arguments; in practice, the overall aim of a state-controlled economy led to uniform measures carried out by a carrot-and-stick technique. They resulted in a complete loss of freedom of action and to subjection to the prevailing party line. It would, however, be altogether misleading to conclude that the position of labor within the Nazi system was relatively subordinated to the power of any other social group. The glorification of work and of equality strengthened the worker's pride, and the extra benefits he received (for example, through the "Strength through Joy" organization) gave him the satisfaction of being accepted as an important member of the new society where benefits and disadvantages were no longer a matter of class.

But the social-economic policy of National Socialism did not affect the basic structure of German society. The general trend of a growing industrial society continued: the farm population and the number of self-employed continued to decline and the number of white-collar workers grew. The "social revolution" under the paradoxical slogan "Free enterprise is the basis of German socialism" led only to the destruction of traditional institutions and values which in preceding decades had supported the various social groups in their struggle for self-improvement.

David Schoenbaum's book is highly enlightening as to the internal struggle which went on in Nazi Germany before the war; it gives us a picture of the chaotic condition of German society at that period and it illustrates that the leading force in the development was the appeasement of the various disaffected groups in favor of German national power and aggressiveness even at the price of complete suspension of the original social ideology.

† KAETHE MENGELBERG

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Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism Since 1945, 2 Vols., *by Kurt P. Tauber. Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1967.—xxiv, 1598 pp. $35.00.*

The Quest for a United Germany *by Ferenc A. Váli. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.—xii, 318 pp. $8.50.*

Scholars who lecture on German affairs in this country and in England would probably agree that the question most frequently asked by their auditors concerns the possibility of a re-birth of National Socialism in the Bonn Republic. It is understandable that this should be so, but the question may nevertheless indicate concern over the wrong kind of danger. Kurt Tauber suggests that, thanks to the war and the total defeat of the Hitler Reich, National Socialism "has been shattered and can never again be restored" and that the kind of neo-Nazism that seeks to restore it is "quixotic foolishness, condemned to failure, and of no practical interest whatsoever." On the other hand, radical nationalism, folkism, and various forms of anti-liberal and anti-democratic authoritarianism are very much alive in Germany today, and could, in certain circumstances, prove a potent danger to the present German experiment in democracy.

In elaborating this view, Mr. Tauber, who is associate professor of political science at Williams College, has written a book that is remarkable not only in bulk (995 pages of text and an additional 600 of notes, appendixes, bibliography, and index) but also in scope, systematic exposition, and analytical shrewdness. With enormous energy, he has studied the activities of 300 political parties, groups, and sects and 140 youth leagues, and the contents of 300 newspapers and periodicals, and hundreds of books and pamphlets written by ideologues and prophets of the Right, to say nothing of the postwar careers of dozens of "brown professors," Ribbentrop diplomats, Wehrmacht commanders who managed to survive the defeat, and civil servants who successfully made the transition from Hitler to Adenauer. The result of this scholarly tour de force is a work that is at once a history of postwar nationalism in all its forms and a comprehensive reference book on the German Right—a combination that no serious student of contemporary German politics can afford to neglect. For, whether he is looking for information about the recent activities of SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, the rescuer of Mussolini, or about the role of German historians in the rehabilitation of the military, or about nationalism in secondary school curricula, or about the early career of the present leader of the NPD, or about Adenauer's personnel policies, he is bound to find something here, generally presented objectively and always massively sup-

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ported with citations from and references to the available literature on the subject.

In his concluding section, Professor Tauber argues that, if radical nationalism has had unimpressive political results to date, its vitality should not be underestimated. Its lack of success has been due partly to failures of leadership, partly to the vigilance of the democratic parties, partly to the dangers of the international situation, and perhaps most of all to the fact that the growth of an advanced industrial system, the capacity of the *Wirtschaftswunder* society to satisfy social claims, and the growing preoccupation with material well-being have distracted Germans and made them indifferent to politics. But this indifference is in itself dangerous. "Noncommitment, anti-ideology, pragmatism, conventionality, and extroverted conformity"—all features of the contemporary German scene—have, Professor Tauber writes, "protected the injured psyche from therapeutic contact with past reality" and at the same time have "prevented the acceptance of the democratic ethos." Meanwhile, the state service and the universities have been penetrated by too many people who, in the Adenauer image, are impatient with democratic forms; and the prevailing style of the Bonn administration has become reminiscent of the Bismarck regime and "is anything but appropriate to a parliamentary democracy." All of this would seem to indicate that, twenty years after the founding of the Bonn Republic, its legitimacy is not yet firmly established, and this raises the question of what might happen if the effectiveness of the regime were to decline sharply. Such a contingency would obviously present new opportunities to the forces of anti-liberal and anti-democratic nationalism, and they might be more adroit in exploiting them than in the past.

One of the questions that might bring such opportunities is that of reunification, which, Professor Tauber believes, cannot remain unsolved without causing frustration and, eventually, crisis in German politics. This is a view with which Ferenc A. Váli is in fundamental agreement in his very useful, brief study of the origins and development of the reunification problem and of the current state of party, church, and mass opinion with respect to it. The author, who is professor of government at the University of Massachusetts, says, in the course of some "speculative assessments" of the trend of German opinion, that the longer the problem remains unsolved the greater the likelihood that a

> resurgence of nationalism, coupled with the mission to free East Germany from communism, might create a willingness to sacrifice democracy for the sake of national unity. Should the aim of reunification become the obsessive national objective, then West German internal politics would again, just as under Bismarck, become the victim of foreign policy.

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This hardly supports the views of those people in this country who have been telling themselves that it is better to keep Germany divided than to try to promote reunification; and, indeed, the thrust of Professor Váli's book is that it is in our interest to do everything in our power to find a solution to this intractable problem. Beyond that, he has no positive proposals of his own. As he admits, "the Soviet Union holds the key which can open the solution of the German question" and may be basing its policy on the belief that it can offer frustrated German nationalism something that is beyond our power.

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Stanford University

The English: A History of Politics and Society to 1760 *by Norman F. Cantor. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967.—526 pp. $10.00.*

In this first volume of a projected two, Mr. Cantor has written a highly personal book, and a rather mixed one. Ostensibly a conspectus of English history, it attends to that task in a series of careful, and carefully written, sections on the development of English government, law, and society. There are a few errors of fact or interpretation, but far fewer than one would expect in a work covering so much time and such controversial topics. Interspersed with these pieces of straight history, one finds the specialty of the book in lengthy discussions of the historiography of each separate section. These are in effect determined and sometimes disputable reviews of the main historians of England over the past century; Mr. Cantor minces no words and administers his prizes and thumps with a lavish hand. That these parts are not to everyone's taste matters little. Whether they are as important to an understanding of English history as Mr. Cantor clearly supposes depends on whether one agrees with him that history is historians' manufacture, a reflection of the past seen through a variety of minds, rather than a growingly accurate comprehension of what that past was really like. Given Mr. Cantor's stand on this question—and there are many today who would agree with him, though this reviewer does not—his analysis of the writers becomes material to the study of the subject and is well integrated with it. The analysis is often instructive, in general much more searching than appears at first sight, and altogether rather charming. Possibly, however, it was a mistake to combine both themes in one book; Mr. Cantor might now write a full analytical work on the English historians of the last century as a most illuminating piece of intellectual history.

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As for the English in general, Mr. Cantor explains from the start what to him seems significant. He sees the contribution made by England in terms of sound government and law, much too readily writes off English achievements in commerce and industry, and rightly regards English culture as both too personal and too universal to offer a useful conceptual tool for an understanding of the English past. In consequence he has written an almost old-fashioned account of an England governed by its monarchs and upper classes, a political history understood from within a developing system of rule. This does leave out more than is comfortable—especially the main part of the English nation—but it gives the book real coherence and a powerful sense of intelligent life. Good insights, often new, meet one at every turn, and Mr. Cantor is particularly good at linking the facts of government with the ideas behind them. His stencil may cover up many very important parts of the picture, but it brings up a comprehensible likeness painted with understanding and devotion. Even those who have their doubts about his main historical and historiographical theses should heed his positive views. Mr. Cantor lays about him with the sort of gusto that now and again makes the blows wild and more frequently makes enemies, but only the small-minded will refuse to recognize that behind the pugilist pose and the sharp remarks hides a deeply concerned and deeply serious historian.

G. R. ELTON
Clare College, Cambridge

The Passing of the Irish Act of Union: A Study in Parliamentary Politics *by G. C. Bolton. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1966.—vi, 239 pp. 38s, $6.10.*

The subtitle indicates the scope of Dr. Bolton's study. He is concerned, not with a comprehensive survey of the factors in Anglo-Irish relations that resulted in Union, but with a precise and particular enquiry into the circumstances in which the Irish Parliament, representative only of a minority of the population, was persuaded at the last to vote itself out of existence. He has pursued his enquiry by detailed analysis of constituency representation, of connection and patronage, and of the means employed by Dublin Castle for the furtherance of Union. His book is based throughout on firsthand sources from which much fascinating detail is drawn. It is his contention that "despite its manifest imperfections, the Irish Parliament could not be written off as a nest of place-hungry oligarchs" (p. 43) and he shows conclusively that, outside

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Dublin, Union had strong Catholic support in many localities and counties. Members of the last Irish Parliament, while certainly feeling the pressures of patronage, were not subjected to them to the unusual extent commonly supposed, and they were also not insensitive to their own local town or county opinion, in acting or voting as they did. Dr. Bolton has a theme which he argues with cogency; he is somewhat given to questionable dogmatic assertions—for example, "Irish separatism survived [after the Union], not because of cultural and religious peculiarities—similar factors existed in Wales and Scotland—but because these peculiarities were mingled with economic and social grievances which went unredressed" (p. 221)—and he leaves an impression at times of having allowed himself to be constricted unduly within a partially artificial imperial-colonial theme. But as a whole the work, discrediting the simple traditional, nationalist interpretation of how Union was effected, undoubtedly constitutes an original and important addition to modern Irish historical studies.

N. MANSERGH
St. John's College, Cambridge

New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth *by R. L. Watts. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—xii, 417 pp. 70s.*

The past decade has witnessed the rise of a new literature of federalism, particularly in the United States and Canada, consisting primarily of discrete studies of particular federal systems by individual scholars concerned with federalism or intergovernmental relations. R. L. Watts is one of the first to expand the horizons of the new school of federalists through a comparative study of six experiments in federation that makes use of theory developed in these recent discrete studies as his starting point. Though Professor Watts' study is limited by the data available in relatively meager published reports, he points out roads that will be followed by his colleagues with increasing frequency in the next decade and for this he deserves due recognition.

Professor Watts' six federations are all among the "emerging nations." All represent British-inspired efforts in the postwar period. The six have had various fates. Two, India and Malaysia, appear to have succeeded in becoming viable federal systems—in the sense that the historical record shows that no federation that has survived its first fifteen years intact and functioning has ever abandoned federalism of its own accord—with every hope of surviving in that form. One,

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Pakistan, has abandoned federalism for a somewhat decentralized unitary arrangement that is developing internal troubles of its own, and two, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the West Indies Federation, disintegrated before they were properly born. In the last, Nigeria, the issue is in doubt at this writing. Professor Watts chooses his emphasis purposely, to expand the literature of federalism to include such "third world" efforts.

The book is comprehensive in its comparative concerns, beginning with a survey of the federal concept and its concrete expressions. It properly delineates the coordinative character of federal systems that makes federalism a distinctive concept in political science and not just a point on some "centralization-decentralization continuum." In this vein, Watts properly takes issue with both the inordinate legalism that infected most earlier studies of federalism and the tendency on the part of contemporary behavioralist students of comparative politics to ignore the impact of ostensibly "structural" phenomena, such as federal principles and processes, as significant elements in certain political systems. He concludes, as do most of the new school of federalists, that federalism reflects the essential qualities of particular civil societies as well as their political arrangements. To this end, Watts devotes four chapters to a discussion of the six federations as federal societies, probing such issues as the motives for union and regional autonomy in each and the particular kinds of federal institutions they have developed and their use, concluding that the variety of federal solutions has paralleled the variety of societies involved.

Turning to an examination of the political systems of the six federations as they operate (or operated), Watts organizes his material following traditional patterns of institutional analysis: for example, the constituent regions, executive and legislative authority, and finances, discussing each with as much behavioral concern as his data allow him. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the book is that the data frequently do not allow him very much at all. As a result, his concluding section can do little more than affirm the obvious. The virtue in this is that he does so on a relatively new front, while, at the very least, opening up new research possibilities for students of federalism and of comparative politics generally.

The substantive analyses and conclusions in *New Federations* cannot be seriously discussed in this brief review. One point to emerge from them does deserve to be stressed here. As Watts demonstrates, all six federations have at least one thing in common; they exemplify the use of federal devices principally to achieve the political integration of disparate peoples into discrete nations within externally imposed

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boundaries. Insofar as the achievement of political unity rather than the securing of individual liberties has been their basic motivating principle, they accurately represent the mid-twentieth-century uses of federalism which differ from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century efforts that were at least as concerned with preserving the rights of people as with the attainment of a common nationhood. There is some evidence that the different results achieved by federal systems created in different centuries can be traced to these differences in motivation. Professor Watts makes it easier for us to consider this great question as well as others in the continuing study of federalism.

DANIEL J. ELAZAR
Temple University

Medical Practice in Modern England: The Impact of Specialization and State Medicine *by Rosemary Stevens. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966.—xiii, 401 pp. $10.00.*

This volume is the first part of a study designed as a comparative examination of medical care problems in Great Britain and the United States with particular reference to the impact of specialization and the organization of health services. Patterns of medical care in England and Wales are analyzed in the present book. A projected companion volume will study the evolution and impact of specialization in the United States. Finally, the author intends to compare the two countries in order to formulate generalizations on past and present trends and to offer possible alternative policies for future development. Clearly, this is an ambitious undertaking, and a final evaluation of this book might well await the completion of the projected enterprise. With this caution in mind, however, one can look at the author's objective in this volume and endeavor to assess the extent to which it has been achieved.

Mrs. Stevens' major objective is clearly stated. "Since the organization of medical practice," she says, "continues to shape the impact of medical specialization, it seemed both appropriate and important to undertake a study of the medical practitioner in relation to various aspects of his environment, past and present." Thus, by examining the social origins of medical organization, it may be possible to achieve greater understanding of problems and what might be done about them.

In line with this approach, the book details the development of British health services, taking account of the growth of hospitals, the evolution of medical education, and the financing of medical care from the eighteenth century to the present. A subsequent section deals with the

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political and professional environment within which the National Health Service was created and instituted. The largest section of the book, about two-thirds, analyzes the functioning of the National Health Service from 1948 to the present, the problems that have cropped up, as well as the roles and actions of the government and the medical profession in dealing with them. Mrs. Stevens clearly shows that the National Health Service came into being as a compromise between the government and the medical profession, with the result that it inherited profound organizational problems. A major theme involves the dysfunctions of specialization. Recognizing that the National Health Service did not create the dysfunctions, since it was "grafted onto accepted professional patterns," the author clearly shows how this process produced them by formalizing and exaggerating their effects. In short, by accepting pre-existing organizational arrangements and relationships in a context where lack of funds continued to be a chronic disabling factor, the British government and the medical profession essentially froze a situation which was already replete with problems. One was the dominant position of the specialists and their opposition to change and needed expansion; another, the desire of the general physicians to retain their traditional situation as solo practitioners. As consequences of these and related factors there have been problems in providing for new plants, for example, hospitals; in providing adequate incomes for physicians, except for the elite specialists; and in improving the quality of medical care, particularly that provided by general physicians.

In presenting the development of medical practice before and after the institution of the National Health Service, Mrs. Stevens does not stint on details. Indeed, at times the detailed information almost overwhelms the central themes, but the author does manage to keep them evident. The book is well documented and has an ample bibliography. On this ground alone it can be exceedingly useful to anyone seeking information on medical care and health policy in Great Britain. Beyond this, however, this study provides a detailed case study in the interaction of historical, political, scientific, and economic factors in the production and implementation of a health policy, in the way in which contending parties negotiate to achieve a settlement in a society such as ours. For these reasons this is a valuable book, and should be of interest to any student of health services organization, whether political scientist, sociologist, economist, or historian.

GEORGE ROSEN
Columbia University
School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine

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New Dubliners: Urbanization and the Irish Family *by Alexander J. Humphreys, S.J. New York, Fordham University Press, 1966.—x, 295 pp. $6.95.*

The impact of urban life upon the first generation children of rural migrants to Dublin provides the subject of inquiry which Father Humphreys examines in his *New Dubliners.* The problem of collecting the necessary data was in itself a task of great magnitude, as was the multidimensional analysis which the author handles so admirably.

For example, it was necessary for him to learn and then contrast the patterning of rural family and community life with that which emerges in the city. As background he presents a succinct statement of the organizational pattern of the city and then examines its effects upon interpersonal relations and reflection in family structure. He additionally seeks for the variations which accompany occupation and social class. He also examines the effect which urban values of secular individualism have upon traditional Catholic religious beliefs and practices. In his treatment of these several aspects of the problem Father Humphreys exhibits a breadth of historical and theoretical knowledge that enormously enriches his data.

The detail of his analysis was based upon systematic and intensive interviews with twenty-nine families. Of these, eleven families were classified as artisan and six each were classified as general laborer, clerical, and employer-managerial, a sampling roughly approximating the occupational structure of Dublin. The validity of his findings was further strengthened by interviews with friends and relatives of his core group of families and by short visits to rural communities where the kinfolk of some of these were still living.

Although space prevents a full description of the transformation in relationships between members of a family and between the family as a group and kin or neighbors which came about as a consequence of urban living, a brief statement of the findings seems desirable. Profound organizational changes in the inner structure of the family and in interfamilial cooperation were encountered. These were explained as originating in the wage employment of the male family head in contrast to the collective domestic responsibilities of farm life. The authority of wife and mother increases as she adds nearly full management of budget and children to her regular household duties, but with no income-producing activity her status vis-à-vis the community declines.

The absence of the need to transmit a farm holding to the next generation eliminates the lever of property as an instrument of parental control. The formal aspects of matchmaking involving the transfer of land

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and dowry now disappear. And although parents still attempt to regulate the range of choice of their children in the selection of a marriage partner to those who are socially acceptable, the young now have great freedom in this area and in others and achieve social adulthood earlier. The degree of parental control, however, does show some variability based on social class. In general, it is less effective among laborers and most pronounced among the employer-managerial class. The basic pattern of Irish family life still continues in spite of the adjustments which urban living brings.

Religious practices and values, however, do not exhibit the same degree of change as those found in other areas of life. If anything, the urban dwellers show a somewhat greater expression of devotion and a more reasoned approach to religious expression than that of the their country kin, although anti-clericalism is more openly expressed. Father Humphreys concludes from such evidence that the New Dubliners have not become secularized despite the many points of contact with such views.

This book is a valuable addition to the sociological literature about Ireland. Furthermore, it opens the way for further studies on Irish urban life and for comparison of the effects of urbanization upon migrants in other societies.

SOLON T. KIMBALL
University of Florida

The Soviet Middle East: A Communist Model for Development *by Alec Nove and J. A. Newth. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—160 pp. $6.50.*

This book has a good title, but a more suggestive subtitle than the one printed might be "A New 'Eastern Question'?" Its British authors announce that the purpose of their study is "to enquire into the Soviet record in their Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics from the standpoint of economic and social development . . ." (p. 13). Nothing controversial about that. But the real thrust of the inquiry goes into the Russian dealings with their subject nationalities. They seem to imply that we can no longer regard the relationship between Moscow and its outlying Asiatic regions as colonialist in the old sense.

American readers may be puzzled by this, for we generally recognize colonialism to be a policy of one nation to retain or extend its control over another nationality or territory, and most specialists agree that Russia still controls its Asian areas conquered in the nineteenth

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century. The authors of this volume, however, narrow the questions of colonialism to an economic shape, and thus undertake to approach the connection between Russia and "The Soviet Middle East" (an apt regional designation) purely in economic terms.

In examining recent economic interaction between central Russia and selected Soviet Asian republics Mr. Nove and Mr. Newth seek at least two major findings: (1) to learn whether input from Russia to "The Soviet Middle East" evidenced by published Soviet budget information exceeds or falls short of the output of the area in view; (2) to discover whether the Central Asians, Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanians are better or worse off than the ordinary Russians and Ukrainians in the European part of the U.S.S.R. Their answers—that the input from elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. to "The Soviet Middle East" surpasses that area's output, and that the mass of "natives," as Soviet Asians sometimes are called in Britain, are no worse off, economically, than the Russians in the R.S.F.S.R.—seem to prove, according to this book, that colonialism (that is, economic colonialism) cannot exist there.

Taken even on its own terms, the study does not explain sufficiently how economic questions may be divorced from political, cultural, and artistic problems in an analysis of colonialism. Also, it seems a faulty premise to claim that the economic equality said to exist among the working people of various nationalities in European and Asiatic Russia indicates the absence of a colonial bond between the Russian authorities in Moscow and their Azerbaijanian or Uzbek clients in Baku and Tashkent. The current agitation over decolonization in the Middle East and beyond has become a contemporary "Eastern Question." This study offers an interesting, even if limited, new look at the reluctant Russian sector of the decolonization movement in the East.

In these long-winded days, any single publication telling its story in fewer than two hundred pages deserves congratulations. Such a slim volume also immediately arouses the reader's lively expectation that its author is a poet or a pundit who has succinctly stated some definitive thought upon a question narrow in scope but profound in consequence. Although the producers of this little book allowed themselves frequent rhetorical flights, they remained regrettably inconclusive about the essence of this very broad subject. Therefore, greater economy of space could profitably have been effected by discarding the initial two chapters, devoted to a necessarily sketchy survey of the history, geography, and politics of the area, and the final chapter debating but temporizing upon the issue of colonialism. Because of over-simplification, those first chapters slip into occasional lapses like the remark (p. 29) that the 1916 uprising in Central Asia broke out in

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nomadic Kazakhstan and Kirgiziia, when in fact it appeared first in the settled south among the Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Withholding the introductory chapters could thus have brought the reader to grips at the outset with the bone and muscle of this work: the presentation and interpretation of the economic data. This includes chapters about industrialization, agriculture, finance, and income. One of these sections also treats "Social Services," meaning education, public health, and social security provisions. The penultimate chapter compares some "social services" in "The Soviet Middle East" favorably with those of Iran and Turkey—all of this on the basis of statistics which the authors warn are unreliable.

The appendix (pp. 133-54) provides additional data concerning the Soviet Seven- and Five-Year Plans of 1959-70, plus several brief Soviet discussions of the plan currently underway, as well as an extremely short bibliography.

EDWARD ALLWORTH
Columbia University

A Framework for Political Analysis *by David Easton. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965.—xiv, 143 pp. $5.95.*

A Systems Analysis of Political Life *by David Easton. New York, London, and Sydney, John Wiley & Sons, 1965.—ix, 507 pp. $8.95.*

Varieties of Political Theory *edited by David Easton. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966.—iv, 154 pp. $5.25.*

David Easton views political life as a complex process of interactions in which inputs (demand and support) are converted into outputs (authoritative allocations of values). Through feedback loops, the outputs dynamically affect the other components of the system and its environment. Easton presents his view as a purely analytic (that is, non-empirical) conceptual framework. Eventually, however, he expects the framework to form the basis for a general empirical theory of politics.

It would be unfortunate if political scientists were to base their evaluations of Easton's approach on his brief summary in *Varieties* or even on the admirably compact *Framework*. The richness and subtlety of the approach are revealed only in *Systems Analysis*, the third book in his projected tetralogy which began with *The Political System* in 1953. Even for those who do not adopt Easton's framework, *Systems Analysis* is a valuable compendium of factors that must be considered

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by any investigator concerned with how and why political systems persist. Especially useful is the analysis of "support" in Parts III and IV.

Systems Analysis also best reveals some potential problems in Easton's design. In the first place, Easton's categories may not be quantifiable in a way that would permit his general theory to apply, as he insists it must, to "systems in their entirety." If testable hypotheses are to be formulated about a system as a whole, the key variables of demand and support must be commensurable. Easton does offer some promising suggestions for constructing separate indexes of demand and support (pp. 63 ff., 161 ff.); but he does not indicate how these variables might be quantitatively compared so that it would be possible, for example, to determine for a whole system how much increase in support could compensate for a certain increase in demand.

In the second place, if a general theory were achieved according to Easton's plan, its scope would be limited by his framework. Intended to provide "criteria of political relevance," the framework does not stress the political significance of some phenomena with which a general theory of politics ought to deal. Three examples can be mentioned. First, it is largely irrelevant in Easton's analysis, framed as it is in mechanistic language, whether an action is done intentionally (pp. 330-31, 432-33). A consequence is that his framework does not emphasize the need to explain in terms of human purposes why one particular pattern of responses to stress is chosen over another. Second, the conception of a system *reacting* to disturbances does not naturally accommodate the creation of disturbances within the system by authorities. The inelegance of "withinputs"—the category devised to deal with this phenomenon—indicates that the framework encourages us to look *outside* the system for disturbances (pp. 55-56). Finally, since Easton takes "wants" as given by the environment of a system (pp. 71-72), his framework neglects processes in which wants may be created and shaped by political action before they are converted into demands.

Easton does not maintain that his framework is superior to all others in dealing with all politically relevant phenomena. Yet we might expect him to show to what extent his framework could accommodate political phenomena more readily and elegantly than alternative frameworks. He does not do so adequately. Even when confronted with competing approaches in the essays in *Varieties* (originally, papers at the 1963 APSA meeting), he does not take the opportunity to criticize them. At least three of these approaches seem contrary to Easton's on significant points—in particular, Herbert Simon's attempt to establish decision-making as a "core" of the political process; James Buchanan's

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choice of individuals rather than interactions as the fundamental unit of analysis; and M. G. Smith's rejection of the "functional" approach, which he misleadingly attributes to Easton. The other essays, by Talcott Parsons, and Anatol Rapoport on systems analysis and James March on power, also might have been analyzed profitably, at least from Easton's perspective.

The "basic premise" of the Contemporary Political Theory Series, inaugurated by *Framework* and *Varieties*, is that progress toward a consensus on a general theory will be best furthered by striking out in a "multitude of divergent and conflicting directions." That "empirically oriented" theory has not advanced beyond the proliferation of approaches and frameworks may be merely a symptom of its youth as a science. Or it may be an early sign that in political science the search for a paradigmatic general theory will prove to be misconceived. Only if the framework which Easton has so impressively elaborated is quantitatively applied and critically compared with alternatives can we judge whether it is a first step toward a truly general scientific theory of politics or a theoretical dead end.

D. F. THOMPSON
Harvard University

The Development of Political Attitudes in Children *by Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney. Chicago, Aldine, 1967.—xviii, 288 pp., $9.75.*

The findings of the most extensive survey yet undertaken in the field of political socialization are now available to the interested reader. Even the lack of theoretical depth in this volume has the virtue of releasing a flood of data (nearly 150 figures and tables based on questionnaires given to twelve thousand American elementary school children) and thereby permitting the observer to interpret them for himself.

The first four chapters refine and elaborate our existing knowledge. In Chapter 5 the authors contend that the school is the most important instrument of political socialization, in comparison even to the family. This contention, however, pertains most clearly to the kinds of knowledge which the school imparts, is qualified by other findings, as the authors themselves point out (pp. 108-14; table 20, fig. 21), and, finally, is inferential (a congruence of attitudes between teachers and students does not exclude the possibilities that parents' attitudes might also be similar and that the children might have been similarly influenced elsewhere). The remaining chapters suggest the effect of other socializing

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agents or factors including religion, peer group participation, social class, intelligence, and sex.

As one who is identified in the Preface as a research assistant in the study and also as one who has since employed the same data within a contrasting conceptual context for several forthcoming articles, I want the axe blade plainly in view as I offer this critical observation. A basic but questionable assumption is made when the authors define socialization as referring "of course to the process whereby a junior or new member of a group or institution is taught its values, attitudes, and other behavior" (p. 6). The "of course" only documents the late Gordon Allport's assertion that, "It is a limitation of current theories of socialization . . . that they tend to define socialization exclusively in terms of conformity . . ." (*Becoming* [New Haven, 1955], p. 34). The authors' passing observation that a child is not "a passive receptive object" and that intelligence is "the most salient" individual influence (p. 94) quickly becomes negated as the authors subsequently equate intelligence with maximum conformity to the influence of the school. Thus they confuse the intended aims of the socialization process with its actual outcome, especially in view of the paradox that the role of citizen to which conformity is encouraged is itself not a passive, conformist one, or at least not perceived as such by the older and brighter children (Chap. 7, table 20). This paradox is heightened by the authors' assertion that the school "under-emphasizes" the participatory aspect of the citizen's role (p. 218).

The apparent wealth of childrens' interview material, introduced elsewhere for more descriptive purposes, might have been put to good advantage in probing individual differences, including deviant or exceptional cases. As it is, the time seems ripe for intensive case studies to clothe these statistics, whose presentation here serves as a necessary and valuable point of departure. In this volume, however, the authors appear to be describing in static terms a process which is inherently dynamic.

ELLIOTT WHITE
Temple University

Law in the World Community *by C. Wilfred Jenks. New York, David McKay, 1967.—xii, 164 pp. $7.95.*

Some of the best jurisprudential writing has been produced by legal practitioners who have found time for scholarly examination of their own fields of work. Such a book was *The Common Law of Mankind*

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(1958), by this same lawyer, teacher, and international civil servant. A happy blend of practical wisdom, perceptive analysis of current needs and trends, and imaginative model-building for the future, it (1) developed the thesis that "international law represents the common law of mankind in an early stage of its development" (p. 14) and (2) proposed reorientation of the conceptual structure of international law to reflect and accommodate its continuing evolution toward a system having people rather than states as the primary subjects of legal relationships. More recent books (like *Law, Freedom and Welfare* [1963], *The Prospects of International Adjudication* [1964], and *Space Law* [1965]) have elaborated particular aspects of the thesis in well-documented detail.

Now the process continues with this compilation of lectures, given during the two-year period ending December 1966 in twelve cities throughout the world. For those familiar with the earlier work, *Law in the World Community* contains enough that is new to reward attention. Others may be disappointed, at least if the over-pretentious title and the slimness of the book lead them to expect a tabloid restatement of Jenksian jurisprudence. Taken in isolation, the book must surely look more like a collection of platitudes than a precise, economically stated, and cleanly reasoned refinement of the earlier thesis—which much of it is.

Even the cognoscenti will find the quality uneven. Half of the lectures (1-3, 6, 9, and 11) are superb. For example, the first, delivered to the Law Faculty at the University of Moscow, offers "an agenda for a dialogue" between Eastern and Western lawyers. As an accurate delineation of areas of present agreement (such as recognition that sovereignty no longer implies legal irresponsibility) and of possible rapprochement (such as acceptance of international adjudication to settle disputed questions of *fact*—which could resolve some disputes, e.g., Pueblo, and advance the resolution of most others), the lecture leaves little to be desired. The second, delivered to the Institute of Law of the Polish Academy of Sciences, justifies the federal principle of world organization (without once using the word "federal") and explains how freedom of expression and other basic liberties are essential to its effective operation. The third, delivered to the Panteios School of Political Science at Athens, is a brilliant critique of the sovereignty concept.

On the other hand, three of the lectures (5, 8, and 12)—despite occasional sparkles—are essentially trite. Two more (4 and 10) must be regarded as trivial: one, given at Teheran, demolishes the straw man of legal immobility (typified, in Iran as elsewhere, by "the law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not"); the other, at Salamanca, undertakes to show that Spanish legal tradition of centuries past is consistent with international protection of human rights. The Singapore lecture (7),

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which proposes "tolerance" and "good neighborliness" as new international law concepts, simply fails to come off. It bogs down on the basic question whether tolerance is owed to governments that treat their own people with intolerance.

Any compilation of lectures is bound to suffer from a good deal of repetition (see, for example, pp. 10 and 98 on the preconditions of international adjudication, and pp. 18 and 108-09 on expulsion from the United Nations). But annoyance on this score is mitigated by the frequent flashes of insight—for example: "The *South West Africa Case* may prove to be the *Dred Scott Case* of the International Court" (p. 138).

In short, this imperfect book is worth the reading—*after* a look at *The Common Law of Mankind.*

LOUIS LUSKY
Columbia University Law School

The International Protection of Human Rights *edited by Evan Luard. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—384 pp. $10.00.*

The authoritative collection of essays edited by Evan Luard furnishes a clear account of some international aspects of the international protection of human rights. It provides an articulate exposition of familiar Western approaches and may well serve as a companion volume to the basic legal text on this subject, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's *International Law and Human Rights.* Like many works on contemporary international law and practice, however, some essays, for example, R. V. Ballinger's "U.N. Action on Human Rights in South Africa," are overtaken by developments within months of their publication and are already out of date. Both the strength and the weakness of the collection lie in the homogeneity of the viewpoints represented. With one exception, all the authors have intimate academic connections with England and Canada and most have held official positions in England and in international organizations; their credentials and expertise are unimpeachable.

In his essay on "The League of Nations' Protection of Minority Rights," C.A. Macartney gives a valuable brief account of the too frequently forgotten League experiment for the protection of racial, religious, and linguistic minorities. J.P. Humphrey, former director of the Division of Human Rights in the United Nations Secretariat, lists the Charter provisions on human rights and provides a short history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sir Samuel Hoare, the learned representative of the United Kingdom on the United Nations Human Rights Commission, writes a comprehensive chapter on the Commission's work and makes a realistic estimate of its effectiveness.

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A. H. Robertson's contribution on the European Convention on Human Rights carefully spells out the principal features of the European system and practice under the Convention. Peter Archer, M.P., offers a useful survey of some non-governmental activities for the protection of human rights. Evan Luard, the editor of the collection, contributes a short review of the promotion of human rights by UN political bodies indicating that action by UN political bodies has been a great deal more influential than action by the Human Rights Commission. Armand Gaspard (the only continental contributor) discusses the organized efforts to secure press freedom on an international scale. C. Wilfred Jenks writes a comprehensive essay on the international protection of trade-union rights and on the significant practice and methods used by the International Labor Organization for the protection of such rights. R.B. Ballinger's piece on the United Nations action in South Africa, though dated, contains a useful section on the effect of United Nations activities in South Africa itself. J. E. S. Fawcett's all too brief discussion on human rights and domestic jurisdiction does not either replace or update better accounts available elsewhere on this subject (for example, R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations* [1963]).

The heavily juridical emphasis of these essays naturally leads to emphasis of past practice. The collection presupposes philosophical and policy commitments which are unfortunately neither discussed nor questioned. No attempt is made to outline or appraise the approaches of Socialist and new states to human rights questions. Political and civil rights are predictably more closely scrutinized than social and economic rights. None of the essays is concerned with the relationship between the protection of human rights and resort to armed intervention, notably in the Dominican Republic and in the Congo. More attention might well have been given to some of the new proposals for action, such as to the proposal for a high commissioner for human rights and especially to the whole question of methods for the implementation of human rights which is unquestionably the principal problem for their international protection. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights is equally neglected and the impact of technological change on rights such as privacy is not even mentioned.

This catholic collection of articles is more successful as an account of methods applied during the first twenty years of the United Nations Organization than as a critical appraisal. Events in the past years do indeed belie the rather complacent and mildly optimistic tone of some of the contributors.

GIDON GOTTLIEB
New York University Law School

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The Insanity Defense *by Abraham S. Goldstein. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1967.—vii, 289 pp. $6.00.*

This book delivers exactly what its title promises. It is a remarkably powerful, logical, and sweeping analysis of the legal options available to those who wish to revitalize the insanity defense. It is written rather like a brilliant legal brief; it marshals its arguments systematically, presents them cogently, and it almost always maintains the legal ambiance —the temperate climate, the avoidance of shrillness, the appeal to reason, the preference for old forms with newly developed meanings over new forms for emergent ideas. The law has demonstrated, over the centuries, extraordinary inventiveness in adapting archaic language to novel problems. Indeed, among the sources of a layman's bewilderment when faced with legal literature are the semantic forms, phrases, and words which are unintelligible, not because they have been invented to epitomize new observations, operations, or concepts, as the sciences do, but because the language has been held over from earlier times to fulfill new legal purposes.

The "insanity defense" is a phrase which epitomizes the virtues and limitations of this work. The word "insanity" was incorporated into the law from that specialty of medicine concerned with the care of those persons so severely alienated from the intellectual, perceptual, and emotional processes of most other people in their environment that they were labelled not sane, that is, not sound and healthy in reason, judgment, and the sensory perceptions of most men, and, therefore, not presumed to be responsible. The medical doctors who employed this term were then called "alienists." The professional descendants of those alienists have become psychiatrists, and the patient equivalents of the "insane" have become the seriously mentally ill. The term "insane" has persisted in the law, but it has disappeared from the technical language of its originating specialty.

The law reinforces social stability by making predictable some of the exigencies of life. Predictability makes human existence lawful, in the widest sense. The "reasonable" man is persuaded that he lives in a lawful world, that he can predict the limits of lawful behavior by his sense that the traditional power of his government has already set and has effectively enforced those limits. Hence the law's preoccupation with tradition and with continuity. Acts which do not conform to legal requirements must be carried out by persons *with a certain state of mind* in order to be properly adjudicated as criminal. So, the insanity defense is a professional soubriquet, which means whatever it means only to lawyers and only within the operations of the legal process.

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Professor Goldstein is justified in his use of this archaic phrase because he has written a lawyer's book. A reviewer must resist the temptation to take the writer to task for the book which he neglected to write. Since political scientists are concerned with the political consequences of legal practices, they may share my disappointment that so admirable an essay did not attempt more. Essentially, Professor Goldstein's argument is that there now exists in case law, statutory and codified law, the potential for utilizing the knowledge of experts to the fullest extent, providing meaningful response to the needs, jurisprudential as well as therapeutic, of those who stand accused. He argues that not the restrictions of the law but the inertia and lack of awareness of most participants determine that such potential remains latent rather than realized.

He apparently prefers the century-old McNaughton formula, which exculpates those who lack knowledge of right and wrong, together with laws which are generally referred to as "irresistible impulse" laws but which he prefers to interpret as "lack of power to control" laws. Properly invoked, together with other interventions available from the pre-arrest period onward, he believes that justice and maximum utilization of the "helping" professions can be achieved. Apparently, because he sees the reaction against McNaughton and "irresistible impulse" to be so powerful, and because he believes it to approximate them closely, he somewhat grudgingly recommends the relevant formulas on criminal responsibility put forth by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code.

The precision of his legal brief, together with the broadness of his legal purview and the clarity of exposition, make this book an essential part of the reading of anyone whose concerns impinge on human responsibility. It must be said, though, that from a broader perspective its historical sense is curiously truncated and its social and psychological observations are more clever than contributory. But to go into these questions would be to discuss a different book.

LAWRENCE ZELIC FREEDMAN
Center For Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

John Jay, the Nation, and the Court *by Richard B. Morris. Boston, Boston University Press, 1967.—xi, 114 pp. $4.75.*

This little book of three chapters dealing with the career of John Jay is one of the series of Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution

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of the United States. The author is the editor of the John Jay Papers being assembled at Columbia University. His purpose is to stress Jay's "seminal contributions as statesman and constitutional expositor," and to show that Jay belongs not in the secondary place often assigned to him but in the first rank of statesmen of his period.

The exposition does indeed show Jay preoccupied with the basic problems of what was to become the American constitutional system, including problems of federalism, separation of powers, democracy, the status of property, and various others. He was a practicing lawyer, a member of the Continental Congress, a framer of the first constitution of New York, a chief justice of the highest court of New York, secretary for foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation, a co-author of *The Federalist*, a leader in the New York convention which ratified the Constitution, one of the negotiators of two major treaties with Great Britain, the first Chief Justice to head the Supreme Court of the United States, and then, if somewhat anticlimactically, governor of New York. He was a well entrenched member of the diverse but generally elitist group of Americans who formed the Union and put its republican and federal system into operation.

There is no question of Jay's prominence as a leader in a critical period, but hesitation to attribute to him the highest rank has been understandable. Although as secretary for foreign affairs he held what was perhaps the highest executive office under the government at the time, the weakness of the government in foreign relations hampered his achievement of distinction there. Although, as seen by the author, his strong federalist views debarred him from membership in the Constitutional Convention, Alexander Hamilton, with still stronger views, was chosen from the same state. Burdened by serious health problems he wrote only five articles of *The Federalist*, leaving most of that task to Hamilton and Madison. While he was entitled to credit for helping establish the Supreme Court and for keeping it a strictly judicial body, and dealt with important constitutional problems both on that Court and on circuit, he shared in the Supreme Court decision of only one important case, *Chisholm* v. *Georgia*, having to do with the right of a citizen of one state to sue another state in a federal court. Even this decision had the doubtful distinction of becoming the first of the few Supreme Court decisions ever to be directly counteracted by a constitutional amendment. In circuit court at Richmond he delivered an important grand jury charge upholding the treaty requirement of payment of debts to British debtors; but a circuit court opinion allegedly written on this issue in *Ware* v. *Hylton* seems to have been lost, and by the time that important case had reached the Supreme

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Court Jay had left the Court for a governorship. When President John Adams later offered him a reappointment as chief justice he declined, leaving to John Marshall the building of the prestige of the Court and the entrenchment of federalist doctrine in our constitutional law.

Yet if fate or personal choice or limits of vision decreed that Jay was not to follow through in important posts to stand in history's judgment beside the other great men of his time, he was for a quarter of a century engaged in important affairs in association with others whose names have been written larger in the records of the times. The story of his career is, therefore, a rightful part of the annals of the men we label as the Founding Fathers. This book, with the *Papers* yet to be published, will help round out those annals for the readers of today and tomorrow.

CARL BRENT SWISHER
The Johns Hopkins University

Isolationism In America: 1935-1941 *by Manfred Jonas. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966.—xi, 315 pp. $7.50.*

Profesor Jonas analyzes isolationist thought from its apex in the nineteen-thirties to its deterioration as an important political force. Possibly he exaggerates in stating that nowhere else in the nature and content of isolationism adequately described, but his approach is different enough to warrant another treatment of such well-worked territory and this volume is a contribution to the growing historiography on the subject. Jonas emphasizes the importance of a simple faith in unilateralism and a nagging fear of war, rather than the usual interpretation of isolationism in terms of ethnic, economic, political, and geographic factors. He finds that American insulation from foreign events allowed other nations to determine policy questions and resulted not only in isolation, but in drift. The concomitant lack of faith by isolationists in their country's power was equally unfortunate.

Isolationism has commonly been regarded as monolithic, but Jonas correctly demonstrates that there were both hawks and doves and that, as a movement, it enjoyed no ideological, political, economic, or social unanimity which would permit simple definition. Isolationist ranks included traditionalists concerned with domestic problems, frustrated idealists whose internationalist dreams were blunted, and the politically apathetic who resented outside interference in an already disrupted economy. Thus, a Communist such as Earl Browder and a conservative like Robert A. Taft both receive due consideration. Jonas also

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corrects the view of the isolationists as bogey-men, maintaining that most were sincerely motivated but probably misguided. His portraits of such isolationist bellwethers as Nye, Borah, Johnson, and Fish and lesser lights such as Viereck and Townsend are skillfully drawn and scrupulously fair.

This reviewer has previously suggested that the Republican congressional victories of 1938 were due in part to the foundering of Roosevelt's diplomacy on the rocks of isolationist-internationalist cleavage. The impact of isolationism on Roosevelt's domestic program, its heightened intensity, and the obvious role of the presidential personality are subjects which seem slighted.

Some questions arise in Jonas' frequent use of public opinion polls which, as barometers of cumulative thought, have always proved at best awkward to assess and even, at times, embarrassingly contradictory. For example, if the pollsters were correct in the fall of 1940, then public opinion was ahead of Congress in its belief that a German defeat was more important than avoiding war. Such assertions, while possibly correct, can only be regarded as tentative even if based upon more than one survey.

Jonas' sources are varied, well-chosen, and well-researched. Noteworthy is his discovery of rare books, forgotten periodical articles, and government documents. Interesting are his unusual backward glances revealing the contributions of such diplomatic pioneers as Hamilton, Clay, Seward, and Schurz to the continuity of isolationist thought.

Though the isolationists clung to many of their old shibboleths after VJ Day, Professor Jonas sees no revival of the earlier, genuine isolationism. He argues preceptively that contemporary "neo-isolationism" is more a nostalgia for earlier times. Despite the skillful use of historical analogies, which while popular often distort realities, Jonas does not draw too many lessons for today from the period 1935-41, when the death-knell of one hundred per cent "Simon-Pure" isolationism was actually sounded.

MILTON PLESUR
State University of New York, Buffalo

Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II *by Robert A. Divine. New York, Atheneum, 1967.—x, 372 pp. $8.50.*

This book tells the story of the men and organizations who during the Second World War worked to convert Americans to the internationalist

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cause or to becoming supporters of an international organization which eventually became the United Nations. As the title implies, the theme of the book is that these "internationalists" worked unstintingly "to assure the United States a second chance at world leadership." Implicit in this idea of second chance is the assumption that Americans had muffed their first chance when they repudiated Woodrow Wilson by turning down membership in the League of Nations he had helped to create. "The American people," the author maintains, "were determined not to waste their second chance."

As Professor Divine shows, the "internationalists" were in large part old-stock Protestants, often crusading zealots intolerant of opposition, who thought they really had a chance to create a structure that would almost magically keep the peace. Listen, for instance, to Joseph H. Ball, the internationalist Republican senator from Minnesota: "This time," he said in September 1944, "let us keep the faith with those who are fighting to make this second chance for a lasting peace possible" (p. 225).

The story of the internationalist movement begins with those men who all through the isolationist twenties kept alive the concept of collective security in the United States. They worked mainly through organizations such as the League of Nations Association and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. Then the story goes on through the thirties and into the wartime forties, when "internationalist" views became popular. It traces the growth of the United Nations idea, inside and outside government, and ends with the Senate's approval of the Charter of the United Nations in July 1945.

This is an important, and occasionally dramatic, story, and no one has told it as well and as authoritatively as Professor Divine. He sometimes slows his narrative with too much detail—some of it confusing—on various plans for peace, world federation, and other private schemes for remaking the world. As he himself points out (p. 103), "The overlapping activities of the United Nations Association, the Non-Partisan Council and the Woman's Action Committee probably bewildered as many Americans as they enlightened." So it is with readers who are confronted with detailed accounts of what these organizations did.

Nonetheless, Mr. Divine's prose is usually graceful, clear, and brisk. He has researched his subject thoroughly, organized his material with intelligence and sensitivity, and when he expresses views he does so with restraint and objectivity. If there is any noteworthy flaw in the book it is that he does not express his own views often enough; he has chosen to concentrate far more on narrative than on interpretation. But

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his narrative is good. He is particularly effective in the handling of personalities, such as Clark Eichelberger, Tom Connally, Arthur Vandenberg, Cordell Hull, Wendell Willkie, and others.

While this study focuses steadily on the internationalist movement and does not concern itself much with actual diplomacy and the intricacies of the making of foreign policy, it is nonetheless a diplomatic history broadly conceived. As a diplomatic history, it is excellent.

ALEXANDER DE CONDE
University of California, Santa Barbara

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience *by Kenneth N. Waltz. Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown, 1967.—xii, 331 pp. $7.50.*

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy *edited by James N. Rosenau. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967. —xiv, 340 pp. $7.50.*

The rapid emergence of the United States as a world power, after a century or more of relative insulation from international pressures, has faced Americans with the need to adapt their democratic processes to tasks for which they were not designed. Europeans, including the British, have shown much less interest in this question, since foreign policy has always been a major preoccupation of their governments. Moreover, they have never fully shared the American conviction that democracy necessarily requires popular participation in every policy decision.

Professor Waltz analyzes and compares the British and American political systems as they affect the exercise of power by prime ministers and presidents, concentrating especially upon their affect on freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. He concludes that, contrary to the opinion of Walter Lippmann and others, the American system is better suited than the British to the conduct of foreign policy. In fact, he believes, the American system, by forcing free and public discussion in advance, clarifies issues and facilitates the evolution of policy; while British secretiveness and the inability of Parliament to intervene until after major decisions have been taken lead to evasion of issues and the self-deception of ministers and public alike. Moreover, the American system produces strong and daring presidents, while the British makes for cautious and conservative prime ministers.

Anyway, Professor Waltz suggests, even if these generalizations are

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too sweeping, as I think they are, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and United States policies have been better than British, at least since 1945.

All this is brilliantly and perceptively argued with a wealth of knowledge to support it. I go a long way with Professor Waltz, for instance, in thinking that the United States has achieved bolder and more constructive international policies than the endless clashes between presidents and Congress would have led one to expect; while Britain has often been slow in adjusting to her reduced role in the world and her new relationship with Europe. But I wonder how far the relative merits of the two systems really account for this contrast.

Britain has been performing the hideously difficult task of continuous retreat from Great Power status against a background of economic difficulty at home and constant pressure from Commonwealth and United States governments not to leave a vacuum behind her. This is a far harder task than the exhilarating one, which has faced Americans, of flexing newly developed muscles in the context of steadily expanding power. When Britain was in her expansive phase, her statesmen and Parliament seemed at least as impressive as a modern president and Congress do today. When I reflect on the way American opinion has responded to the relatively marginal frustrations of Korea and Vietnam, I wonder whether the American system would be proof against a long-drawn-out contraction of power and international influence of the kind to which British governments have had to adjust their policies.

I cannot say that I found the essays collected under the title *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* anything like as stimulating as Professor Waltz's impressive study. The publishers describe them as "a pioneering effort to apply the knowledge of the behavioral sciences to an unexplored research area," that is, to foreign policy.

On the evidence of this book, behavioral science has a longish way to go before it begins to tell us anything which is not easily discoverable by more conventional types of analysis. No doubt its day will come, but at present it makes very laborious reading and ends mostly in blinding glimpses of the obvious.

KENNETH G. YOUNGER
Royal Institute of International Affairs

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A Tower in Babel: A History of Broadcasting in the United States, Vol. I: to 1933 *by Erik Barnouw. New York, Oxford University Press, 1966.—344 pp. $8.50.*

Erik Barnouw, in this first of three volumes, has written an adventure story which reaches its grand climax in the swift unfolding of a tale of monopolistic plotting that is unmatched in our time for its boldness and scale. A folk-hero, risen from Russia and New York's Lower East Side, who had started a paper-route, sung in the synagogue, sent his mother most of his wages, and in general did what ambitious, young immigrants were expected to do at the turn of the century, now—in 1930—was being crowned president of RCA, having already set in motion a breathtaking plan.

As Mr. Barnouw tells it, the Radio Corporation of America, having already organized NBC and purchased Victor as its own large manufacturing arm, proposed that General Electric and Westinghouse turn over to RCA their radio set manufacturing activity and various plants, in return for large blocks of RCA stock. By thus "unifying," as it was euphemistically called, RCA, NBC, GE, and Westinghouse into a single force for broadcasting and for manufacturing radio receivers, and by tying all their stations into a web of lines owned by AT&T, RCA would be in a position of command of virtually all public communications in the United States. As a bonus to itself, RCA at the same time held in its grip other radio set manufacturers both large and small by demanding tribute in the form of license royalties for alleged RCA patents.

With clarity and some irony, Mr. Barnouw builds this main structure of his history on the disarming and often charming tales of radio's innocent years of studio potted palms and midday organ recitals, of Little Jack Little and Graham McNamee, of the *Eveready Hour* and the Silver Masked Tenor. But he never lets us lose contact with the main stream of this new force called broadcasting, developed by the youthful Marconi, improved by a long list of other scientists and engineers, and finally, through the entrepreneurial foresight of a Westinghouse vice-president and an AT&T officer, delivered over to the advertising community as a sales tool which would, incidentally, carry programs.

Mr. Barnouw introduces us to the rather small group of men who were in radio's control room during its formative years. They seemed to see it as simply another ordinary instrument of the marketplace–something to be put to work, to have an air of respectability, and, above all, to earn its own living. First, it was put to work selling radio receivers for a Pittsburgh department store; ultimately, through AT&T's quirkish interpretation of its own expanded role as owner of WEAF, responsi-

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bility would be turned over to sponsors, on the novel theory that AT&T's radio station was simply a new kind of telephone-booth-without-wires, and that it should naturally be put out for hire to anyone with the equivalent of a nickel and a message to transmit. The message, of course, grew up to be the commercial; the nickel became the rate card. On these two concepts, ever since, have hung all the law and the profits.

With such myopic vision, the founding fathers tamed their rampageous young offspring, took it out of school and brought it up to be the All-American Salesman. What it might have been—whether a genius, a poet, a troubadour, a shining knight, a circuit-riding school-master—we may never know (unless Mr. Barnouw will publish the Revelations as his next volumes of this history). For radio—and now television—learned to succeed in business at a precociously early age.

The author dissects the corporate octopus with the skill of a biologist. We see its arms reaching out to control the field of performance through an NBC Artists Bureau; of program control through the CBS-spawned "network option time" plan; of control of radio station licensing through pressing small-time competitors, including educational radio stations, to the wall. But he also traces the beginnings of foreign correspondents, and of free speech.

For those who have long despaired of broadcasting in its present state there is comfort to be found in Mr. Barnouw's history, for somehow, largely due to the vigilance of the Department of Justice, the whistle was blown more than once and some of the gross monopolistic plans had to be discarded. The author, a university professor, saves some of his best-aimed scorn for a man named Merlin H. ("Deak") Aylesworth, first president of NBC, whose previous post had been head of that rich and stealthy lobby of private utilities called the National Electric Light Association. In his earlier capacity Aylesworth had, throughout the nineteen-twenties, led the battle against public power, in the course of which campaign he advised local power executives to bribe college professors of economics to sell NELA's ideas to their students. It was "Deak" Aylesworth who, above all others, must have represented the qualities which would take broadcasting most swiftly toward its chosen goals, for it was he who was called to the first presidency of the greatest network.

With irony but not bitterness, with affection but not sentimentality, Mr. Barnouw has shown himself to be the Lincoln Steffens of the broadcast era and one looks forward with anticipation to his forthcoming volumes on the years after 1933.

ROBERT SAUDEK
New York University

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The Image Candidates: American Politics in the Age of Television *by Gene Wyckoff. New York, Macmillan, 1968.—ix, 274 pp. $6.95.*

The thesis of this book is that television has sharply changed the whole field of politics, even to the point of changing the rules of the game.

This book, by one of the best known "image-makers" in the political arena, makes the point that what a candidate *is* no longer is nearly as important to the voter as what he can be made to *seem* to be. What a candidate thinks and says on any given subject is no longer anything like as important as *how* he says it—and where and under what circumstances.

The book opens with the important point that there is, among today's voters, a vastly increasing amount of "partisan fluidity," a departure from voting either for the party of one's ancestors or voting invariably for the party of one's choice. Many people, particularly the politically unsophisticated, are prone to vote for "images" to which they have been attracted even if the candidate belongs to a political party they rarely, if ever, support. Wyckoff credits some of this to television and some to the professional "image-makers."

The bulk of the book is given over to the details of how the images of certain of our recent political candidates were altered with the aid of television—and Gene Wyckoff. He states in a summing-up chapter: "By controlling the presentation or theatrical setting of candidates on paid political programs and commercials, propagandists can encourage viewers to perceive a favorable characterization of the client-candidate."

"A candidate's appearance and demeanor appear to provide viewers with the most '*substantial*' [italics mine] clues to his character. The rational import of what the candidate says on television, as long as it is not blatantly offensive to the great central cluster of the electorate, appears to have very little influence on viewers' perception of image."

I doubt if there is very much in the book that will come as a surprise to people intimately involved in the art of politics—although even they may learn a thing or two about some of the specific tricks that go into image-making. I suspect that the vast body of voters—particularly those who are politically unsophisticated—will be rather shocked at what Mr. Wyckoff has to say, and may grow even more cynical of the whole political process than they are now.

For them, however, there is one rather encouraging note: there is a strong indication that the author has come to the conclusion that it is very much easier to make a reasonably "good" candidate seem *better* than he is, than to make a "bad" or even mediocre one seem *good*.

Mr. Wyckoff is quite frank in some of his characterizations of some

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of our recent political candidates—and not always very flattering. I am sure he will be hearing from some readers whose analysis of some of the characters is quite different from Wyckoff's.

Mr. Wyckoff believes that one potential antidote for the growing use of "image-makers" by politicians is a modest amendment to the rules governing the equal time provisions of the law as it applies to television candidates. He believes that some direct confrontations between the two important candidates will do much to bring out their true qualities and that the law should be amended to permit "special pre-election programs presenting at least two candidates for the same office to be exempt from equal-time claims by all the candidates for that office." He makes no case that such face-to-face confrontations have been well done in the past, but he submits that they *could* be well enough done that the true character of each of the candidates would come through in such a way as to negate, or at least minimize, the best-laid plans of the "image-makers" to present their client for at least more than he is—if not for something entirely different than he is.

ELMO ROPER
New York City

The Promise of Politics *by Henry S. Kariel. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966.—117 pp. $1.95.*

Henry S. Kariel continues in this slim but lively essay to pursue two themes of criticism developed earlier in his *Decline of American Pluralism*. The first of these themes focuses on what he describes as the "pseudo-realism of contemporary political science" (p. 1). Functionalist and group decision-making theory is attacked as "a methodological formulation of an unstated faith" (p. 95) in American politics, "as an interminable process which gives every interest its due" (p. 106). Refusing to examine that denial of man's capacity for generosity and devotion informing the organization and operation of the fragmented and pluralist decision-making process he studies, the "pseudo-realist" is prevented from questioning the merits of public decisions in terms other than their effect on the polity as a self-righting mechanism whose chief end is to balance whatever units of power are capable of impressing their weight upon the whole. Accordingly, defining the public good in essentially procedural and "functional" terms, empiricist-minded political science is led away from distinctively political phenomena and increasingly "finds life's nonpolitical dimensions the most interesting ones to capture in its conceptual nets" (p. 15). Meanwhile little attention

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is paid to the "awesome human wastage considered 'functional' " (p. 113), for example, the mechanistically contrived equilibrium's own "indifference to the aspirations of the defeated, the depressed, the unborn, or the arrested" (p. 112). What is noteworthy about this critique is that it can call into question contemporary political science's relevance and adequacy in the light of its underlying ideological biases without at the same time offending the reader with an opposing methodological dogmatism.

The second theme of criticism that serves to establish a link of continuity between this essay and Kariel's earlier work focuses upon the quality and structure of contemporary American pluralism. The maintenance of private rights for groups (corporations, professional associations, trade unions, educational institutions, communications media, and the like) that are in fact no longer the personalized participatory structures of an earlier era only serves, Kariel contends, to leave "individuals at the mercy of elites accountable only to themselves" (p. 55). These same bureaucratized groups today exercise what amounts to public authority in their respective oligopolistic environments. The shortcomings of a "public interest" procedurally effected by the balancing of such elites should be obvious. The structure of Kariel's argument, too rich to be related here in full, and treating intelligently the role and limitations of our aggrandizing parties and the shortcomings of mass society theory, certainly impresses the reader with this conclusion.

Connecting these themes of criticism is the author's unifying preoccupation "to make a specific orientation toward public life plausible and relevant" (p. 3). The task is a challenging one: to dispense with the prevailing conception of politics, reflecting classical liberalism's denial of man's capacity for civility and selfless participation, without falling victim to the opposing excess of asserting a transcendent public identity that men would acquire only through submission to authority. Thus Kariel seeks to steer something of a middle course between an individualist-girded pluralism that assumes men are by nature irresponsible and which aims at good through a balance that need not create good men to be effective and a corporate monism or neo-feudal pluralism that makes men good and capable of selfless action by divesting them of their self. Kariel calls for the maintenance of healthy skepticism toward all the roles an individual might play in order to assure that any one role will not be thwarted by over-commitment to other roles. In such role tension there is located choice, authentic self, "transcendence and triumph" (p. 34). In such role-tension management is located the lost integrating experience of citizenship, the opportunity to authenticate one's own condition as a natural political man by willingly sup-

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porting whatever public decisions and policies are necessary to sustain the efforts of others in their search for autonomy. Kariel calls for the development of a truly federal society composed of groups that provide "opportunities for direct individual participation in public life," that serve as "independent sources of political support," and that allow men to "test their diverse ideals within them" (p. 75).

Whether Kariel's existential pluralism can deliver the goods is a point the more corporativist-minded communitarian might dispute. But there can be no disputing the fact that the author has made a positive and provocative contribution to the continuing dialogue on this subject while at the same time reminding us that political science and political philosophy can be relevant to one another and all the more exciting and adequate for this reason.

DARRYL B. BASKIN
University of Hartford

The Power Broker: A Biography of John M. Bailey, Modern Political Boss *by Joseph I. Lieberman. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, and Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 1966.—xi, 365 pp. $6.00.*

Some now defunct political theorist is said to have believed that men are political animals. Some men are barely so; others are overwhelmingly so, and Joseph Lieberman has neatly demonstrated that John Moran Bailey is among the most political of all men. Lieberman's now published Yale senior thesis is a balanced, thorough, and admiring portrait of one of the more interesting political figures of our time. It cannot be said that Lieberman achieves any high level of analysis of state or national politics in his biography, but then he did not attempt such; he set out to tell the story of John Bailey's life; of his progression from Hartford ward leader to Connecticut's Democratic state chairmanship, and then to the national chairmanship of the Democratic party.

He does, however, identify two or three basic precepts by which this master politician has operated so successfully. One is that "You've gotta do what you gotta do," by which Bailey means that if the circumstances call for sharp disciplinary action, or the denial of a nomination to someone desperately anxious for it, then so be it; the discipline or the denial has to be delivered, personal feelings notwithstanding. Lieberman illustrates innumerable cases where Bailey felt compelled to do things that he personally—even organizationally—would have preferred not to do, but the cost to the party of not going along would have been ruinous, as Bailey saw it, and therefore the action was taken. This re-

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viewer recalls that during a long battle over the passage of a party primary law in Connecticut Bailey told him that if the primary went through the party would have to turn aside some liberal non-Catholic candidates when Catholic candidates with a strong hold on the large city vote threatened to force a primary fight. His threat seemed a mere ploy in a legislative campaign at the time, but later when faced with exactly that situation "he did what he had to" and accepted a Catholic candidate he did not want instead of more liberal ones he would have preferred.

Another of Bailey's principles is that there is nothing to be gained by nourishing old grudges in politics; when a particular candidate is needed Bailey will put him on the ticket even if that person has opposed Bailey in the past. More than once Bailey has shocked the faithful with a seemingly unbelievable decision to back an erstwhile enemy or unexpected program, but this merely demonstrates Bailey's uncanny capacity to size up a political situation, determine what price must be paid for factional harmony or what kind of candidate or legislative program will "work," and then to deliver the convention or legislative votes needed.

As everyone remembers, Bailey played his cards in his typically shrewd way by becoming one of John F. Kennedy's earliest supporters. Shrewd in two ways: Kennedy might go all the way and give Bailey the chance to be the new James Farley, but even if that failed the presence of Kennedy on the ticket would be bound to produce a whopping Democratic vote in Connecticut. Being right in both ways led him to an office that has meant little in terms of the kind of political maneuvering at which Bailey is so adept. When Bailey wants to flex his muscles and really play politics, he comes back home to Hartford where he retains his place as commanding general in the state Democratic ranks.

DUANE LOCKARD
Princeton University

Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America *by Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton. New York, Random House, 1967.—xii, 198 pp. $4.95.*

A serious brief for Black Power can today rely on a concerned, indeed anguished, readership. In itself this is significant, even if, as events place its assumptions under scrutiny, it may possibly fail of vindication. The mingling of passion with scholarship insures that familiar grievances do not lose their impact in the re-telling.

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To blacks the authors offer this challenge: is there an alternative to withdrawal from the game of white party politics? The challenge is answered by their own evidence. The activities of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization of Alabama are contrasted with those of the Tuskegee Civic Association in two central demonstration chapters: "Black-Belt Election: New Day A'Coming" and "Tuskegee, Alabama: The Politics of Deference." The moral is clear: where the blacks have built their own organizations, spurning the regular parties, they have gained self-respect and the potential for future self-government. Where they have attempted to work within the existing white power structure, even when they have achieved a measure of political visibility, they have unwittingly served the racist program of their oppressors. Carmichael and Hamilton show that in community after community it has been independent black power that has succeeded in awakening the politically complacent black voter and exacting concessions from whites.

The political strategy outlined in this volume is undergirded by a philosophy of separatism that is as much an outgrowth of the radical disillusionment of the mid-nineteen-sixties as it is of a belief in the deficient morality of white America. It is here that the authors take their stand and it is here that criticism of their efforts must begin.

In the minds of Carmichael and Hamilton the intrinsic character of American society is at fault. Consequently they are unwilling to imagine that "black people can form effective coalitions with groups which are not willing to question and condemn the racist institutions which exploit black people; which do not perceive the need for, and will not work for, basic change" (p. 66). Their argument is incontestable; the problem, of course, is that Black Power advocates are equally wary of working with groups who do see the need for, indeed the urgency of, change. Moreover, the authors' logic recoils upon itself when they add that "black people cannot afford to assume that what is good for white America is automatically good for black people." If the white America to which they refer is the heartless and affluent America which whites themselves are now uneasily assessing, then surely it is not honest to assume it is "good for white America."

To the authors' implicit claim that, however much he is needed by the society which has victimized him, the Negro must not attempt assimilation until it is universally agreed that "it is just as good to be a black American as it be a white American," the experience of the immigrant is not so irrelevant as Black Power has felt. Immigrants did not await such a millennium before attempting assimilation, and their wisdom in this respect has been upheld. Granting the qualitative differences in discrimination against the Negro and the immigrant, it would seem that

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Carmichael and Hamilton dismiss too easily the altered environment in which integration occurs today. While nativist varieties of resistance to assimilation may be as firmly embedded in the national psyche as in the past, countervailing pressures which have made speedy integration seem not only possible but desirable are overridingly present, even when they are not always effectual.

The politics of Black Power can be instrumental in a new turn toward national integrity only if its disciples examine their own moral confusion. As they do, they may find the courage to dissent from a position which reserves to itself exclusively the imperative of personal self-sacrifice for larger goals and the luxury of communal retreat from social crisis.

ANNETTE K. BAXTER
Barnard College

Planning U.S.A. *by George Soule. New York, Viking Press, 1967. —xi, 180 pp. $4.95.*

This is an unsatisfactory book. It is difficult to see who its intended readers are. As history, its narrative is too concise to serve as instructional material for freshmen, sophomores, or educated laymen; on the other hand, it is too superficial to be of use to juniors, seniors, or graduate students. Four pages on Hamilton's economic theories, fourteen on Roosevelt's first administration, ten on the postwar period, all are too short to be informative. Without prior knowledge of the period one would derive little benefit, yet, because Professor Soule does not assume that his readers have this knowledge, he does not devote his attention to the analytical problems and issues of interpretation in his subject matter.

The same criticism may be levied at the economic analysis involved. The author presumes a fair grounding in basic macro-theory; he does not spell out his analytical propositions in terms of first principles, yet he confines himself to only the most obvious economic conclusions. The economics involved would be beyond a freshman but of little interest to a junior or senior.

And yet, the book is not without interest. Professor Soule starts with an idea, a proposition that seems to derive from Albert Hirschman: cooperation and organization are as important as competition in economic activity, in economic development. What distinguishes the mature from the underdeveloped economy is a greater capacity for organization; this ability to organize is the essential element of success-

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ful economic activity. The author identifies this ability with planning and tries to show how political leaders at different times in the past have attempted to produce consistent macro-economic policies designed to achieve accepted policy objectives. He also indicates some of the undesirable consequences of the American acceptance of the ideology of competition and free enterprise. He is at his best on the well-worked ground of the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations. This is a worthwhile objective because popular tradition and economic historiography have tended to falsify the past in terms of an over-simplified paradigm of private property, private enterprise, and the Protestant ethic. But even in this, the book fails; it fails ultimately because it is too simple itself, because it also is conceived in terms of the same simplified neo-classical models, because it claims too much.

This brings us to the book's basic weakness in conception and content, its identification of government policy with planning. Consequently, the more extensive the concerns of economic policy, the more "planned" the economy becomes. There is a Coué-like atmosphere about the book of increasing competence and success. (This atmosphere is very common in both American and Soviet textbooks in the social sciences; perhaps it is because the writers like to think that their teachings are having some effect.) In conformity with this approach, the stagnation of the fifties is barely mentioned, nor are the causes of the present high level of economic activity discussed.

It is really nonsense to call government attempts at implementing policies economic planning if one wishes to use the same term to refer to the activities of the Soviet or even the postwar French governments. The history of U.S. economic policy is not a history of planning—and saying so will not change matters. Nor is it a history of the triumph of unbridled laissez faire. What needs stressing is the extent that market forces have been regulated and the reasons for these controls, rather than a semantic misidentification of this regulation with a different kind of activity.

Finally, I am doubtful whether a historical narrative is the best vehicle for justifying current theories of functional finance. Surely it is more appropriate to explain the rationale in terms of externalities and Keynesian economic theories rather than to imply that current policy is acceptable because it is "American," because it has been pursued by American governments since the time of the revolution. There are two books here: a reinterpretation of U.S. economic history and a justification of postwar government policy, but they should not have been combined into one.

ALASTAIR N. D. MCAULEY
Princeton University

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United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics *by Samuel A. Lawrence. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1966. —xiii, 405 pp. $8.75.*

This interesting and provocative study of United States merchant shipping policies as they affect dry cargo shipping in the nation's foreign trade was written while its author was a Brookings federal executive fellow on leave from the Bureau of the Budget. Failure to adjust the government's programs to new defense requirements and new economic and technological conditions are found to have frustrated the government's efforts to build an efficient merchant marine. The failure is attributed on the government side to excessive executive turnover, lack of clearly defined objectives, fragmentation of political power, and confused organization; while the industry has been weakened by the rivalry prevailing among its several sectors for government aid, and by the demands of seagoing personnel.

The study is especially notable for its analysis of the political and administrative structures that have so far prevented a reformulation of government aid in a manner consistent with changing requirements. The descriptions of the pressure groups concerned and of the industry's "private government" (government-industry complex) cover new ground. The discussion of the nation's merchant shipping defense requirements sheds more light on this still murky subject than is publicly available elsewhere. The rapid growth in the movement of bulk cargoes and consequently of the volume of tramp shipping in contrast to the slower increase of liner shipping is documented, as is the enormous expense of supporting the nation's shipping by cargo preference legislation. The substantial cost of direct operating and construction subsidies and their impact on the efficiency of liner operations is also well described.

The author provides general guidelines for a new maritime policy to increase the competitiveness of the nation's merchant fleet. The basic point is to replace present direct subsidies and indirect aids by a single comprehensive subsidy system. This reviewer found the objectives of the new program persuasive and the guidelines for its achievement extremely interesting, but without greater elaboration of the details of a comprehensive subsidy program it is impossible to assess with reasonable confidence the net long-term costs and benefits of the proposal. Perhaps the abolition of cargo preference is alone worth the price of this uncertainty.

Unfortunately, a subterranean gremlin appears to have been at work in some of the footnotes: for example, footnote 27, page 119, where over 30 per cent of the world's trade (by value) should read about 15 1/2 per

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cent; and footnote 35, page 121, where the figure of $2.6 billion cannot possibly be correct but may be $2.6 million. These are minor flaws, even though they may cast a small shadow over data less obviously in error. Mr. Lawrence has made a thoughtful contribution to the subject, and his volume will prove rewarding reading to all businessmen, government officials, and others concerned with the United States merchant marine.

DANIEL MARX JR.
Dartmouth College

Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 *by Frederick Wakeman Jr. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—xi, 276 pp. $6.00.*

It is easy to read *Strangers at the Gate* because of its short chapters and short sentences, but it is hard to review it, for there is a lack of coherence and central theses. There is a brief introduction: no conclusion or summary. The author begins with "The Sen-yuan-li incident," but says little about the Opium War as a background. The book continues with chapters on "The Militia of Kwangtung," "The Gentry and San-yuan-li," "Traitor in Our Midst," and another chapter entitled "We and They," with no clarification as to whom these terms refer.

Part two of *Strangers at the Gate* deals with the politics of resistance, 1842-49, discussing whether "the people's will" or popular sentiment was righteous or rebellious in refusing to allow the British to enter the city of Canton. A number of British merchants had trouble with native hucksters in 1847. The resulting melees caused the death of a few Cantonese. The Chinese governor-general, Ch'i-ying, was sympathetic to the victims. On December 6, 1847, six Englishmen who went to hunt near a militia headquarters at a village called Huang-chu chi were reported killed. Governor-General Ch'i-ying sent imperial troops to occupy the village and executed four ringleaders on the spot. The Peking emperor disapproved of the policy of Ch'i-ying who was replaced by Hsü Kuang-chin in February 1848. The anti-foreign crises reached a pinnacle in 1849, while the British continued their demand to enter the city of Canton.

The third part covers "Rebellion and Reaction" in the Canton area in 1850-56. The author very briefly discusses the social conditions of class and clan, secret societies of south China, Kwangtung, and the Taiping Rebellion, and the Red Turban Revolt. This last coverage is succinct. The British-French occupation of Canton in 1857-61 is then

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discussed. Thus, the book is a study of the anti-foreign movement by the people in Canton—a regional history mingled with social and diplomatic episodes.

Strangers at the Gate is well documented with an impressive bibliography of Chinese, Japanese, and Western sources and archives from the British Foreign Office. However, much of the information and footnotes are close to the Chinese articles on San-yuan-li and its correlated subjects in the "Special Collection of Essays on the History of the Opium War" which is written in Chinese under the title *Ya-pien chan-chen shih lun-wen chi* (Peking, 1958). The viewpoints are, nevertheless, entirely different. The writers in Communist China eulogize the anti-imperialist fighters in San-yuan-li and its adjacent areas; the author of this book seems to lean toward the British side, chiding the "virulent xenophobia of Canton."

Concerning the legal problem of entering Canton, the author simply says that the second article of the English version of the Treaty of Nanking gave the British the right to reside in the "cities and towns" of the five treaty ports. The Chinese text only allowed them to reside temporarily at the *kiang-kou*, or river's mouth, which was interpreted by the editor of the *Chinese Repository*, a journal published in Canton, as "referring to the location on shore where traders collect from their ships to barter and exchange their goods. Such places are not necessarily . . . walled cities" (Vol. 18 [1849], 276). Wakeman seems to have oversimplified the matter and has put the blame entirely on Chinese troublemakers and dishonest officials.

As is common, some minor mistakes also occur in this book. "An insertion in the sixth article of the Chinese version of the Supplementary Treaty" may give a reader the impression that Chinese diplomats could have the freedom to insert characters in the Chinese text of a treaty. Actually, it is not an insertion but an official version sanctioned by the two signatory nations (*Treaties between China and Foreign States*, I, 392). It is doubtful that the wealthiest member of the Cohong, Howqua, estimated his personal fortune in 1834 to be twenty million silver dollars (U.S. $52,000,000); one wonders what kind of exchange rate the author uses in figuring out this equation. Dubious, too, is the accuracy of Wakeman's account of Ch'ien Chiang as the man who invented the *liken* tax (p. 70). Had Wakeman really read the *New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion* and Edwin G. Beal's *The Origin of Liken*, his conclusion might have been different. The author believes that the "Red Turban Revolt" (1854) occurred with no "plotted conspiracy" and "coordinated plan" (p. 139). As a matter of fact the revolt was inspired by the Taiping Rebellion and one of the rebel

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leaders, Ling Shih-pa, was a member of the Godworshipping Society. Some typographical errors, inconsistent capitalizations, and misleading indications of pronunciations need no detailed mention.

On the whole, Professor Wakeman has done assiduous research and produced a remarkable book which makes a considerable contribution to the academic field.

S. Y. TENG
Indiana University

Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History *by Lyman P. Van Slyke. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967.—viii, 330 pp. $8.50.*

Only twenty-two years after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was "defeated fatally" in 1927—when Chiang Kai-shek by a military coup broke their alliance with the Kuomintang (KMT) formed years before by Sun Yat-sen—the Communists came to power over all mainland China. Before 1949 all influential American voices that warned against Chiang Kai-shek's disastrous policies (for example, General Stillwell and Davies) were purged from public life. After 1949 a flood of books and Ph.D. theses explained and analyzed this shocking event. The latest of these is Professor Van Slyke's book under review.

In a brief review it is impossible to do justice to Van Slyke's formidable study of the complex, myriad facts spanning an era. He singles out the United Front as the "protean theme" to reveal the factors that after years brought the Communists to power, and the degree of "sincerity" (p. 109) of its partners. Presumably the only measurement of "sincerity" is the judgment, not of the historian, but of the population of whom he writes.

It denies nothing of the merits of the book to note that the term "United Front" as Mao Tse-tung often used it, especially after 1941, is inaccurate. It loses meaning and becomes an abstraction when applied to anything less than a specific agreement between two or more parties to work for a common objective, to which all parties subordinate the aims which cause them to be separated; for instance, the original alliance between Communists and Kuomintang, or their alliance in 1938 to fight the Japanese invaders.

Could there have been a renewal of the United Front except to defeat the new Japanese invasion? The answer of both Professor Van Slyke and Mao Tse-tung is "No." Van Slyke notes that the army under CCP

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control grew from thirty thousand in 1937 to one million in 1945; this is objective evidence that the Chinese generally accepted the "sincerity" of CCP devotion to the United Front's goal. After Japan's defeat, when Chiang Kai-shek was openly proclaiming the United Front as ended, the CCP entered into United Front agreements with all the small parties that split off from the KMT. Many of these were personal followings and native capitalists coming to terms with the impending Socialist revolution; interestingly, there have been no claims that the terms of these agreements have not been meticulously enforced.

China's current internal difficulties arose not from the 1949 revolution, but from a post-revolutionary split between the cadres who set up the government of 1949; Mao's faction insists on the primacy of will-power and governmental decrees, while the Liu Shao-ch'i faction opts for step-by-step building of the preconditions for socialism.

Although Van Slyke does not use all the available material, he does amply prove that the CCP never wavered in its aim to make the Chinese Revolution finally Socialist. He goes into quite some detail describing the secret military work carried on in White (KMT) areas under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i. All this leads to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the CCP was "sincere" in using the United Front to defeat Japan, but that it also used all Chiang Kai-shek's internal enemies to prepare the downfall of his regime after the war. Only the hollowness of Chiang's power, its crumbling, allowed the CCP to absorb most of Chiang's armies, and march into power almost overnight in the whole mainland, so rapidly as to shock Moscow as well as Washington. If I am not mistaken it shocked also Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists themselves.

Way back in 1927-28, not long after Chiang Kai-shek began to seize control of the KMT by shooting all his opponents, an unknown American writer on the British-owned *North China Daily News* wrote a column of friendly advice to him. I arrived back in Shanghai about the turn of the year to read his column, which read something like this: "Be careful, Chiang Kai-shek, we're for you but don't shoot too many Communists, or you'll bring the Communists to power." I quoted this in an article I wrote in the *Pan-Pacific Worker*. My article was reprinted in the *China Outlook* of Peking, editied by T. A. Bisson and Maxwell Stewart. The *North China Daily News* writer was George Sokolsky. Thus easily are prophets made! Long after Sokolsky forgot his light-hearted column, twenty-two years later, it came true.

EARL BROWDER
Princeton, N.J.

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Burma: From Kingdom to Republic, A Historical and Political Analysis *by Frank N. Trager. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—xiii, 455 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Trager's basic theme is "the independence of Burma, how it was lost and regained and retained," with particular emphasis on postwar international relations. He posits the dubious assumption that "central to an understanding of [Burma's] 1500 years of recorded history are the ideas of independence and unity of [its] several ethnic groups," a tradition which allegedly began to disintegrate after British India detached the border provinces of Tenasserim, Arakan, Manipur, and Assam in 1826. Actually, Burma's Tenasserim coast from the fall of Pagan in 1287 to the British occupation in 1825 was under Burman control only 115 of the elapsed 538 years; Arakan was independent from 1430 to 1784; Manipur and Assam never constituted an integral part of Burma. Burmese historians themselves interpret the First Anglo-Burma War as a clash between two imperialisms. If any such generalization is called for, a stronger case could probably be made for the contrary view that factors of political and ethnic *disunity* are central to an understanding of Burma's history. The three Burman dynasties which succeeded in unifying the country ruled, down to 1825, for a total of only some 400 years. Minority elements such as the Mons, Shans, and Arakanese were perennially resistant to harsh Burman control. The author makes no attempt to describe pre-colonial Burma; he attributes loss of independence to nefarious British designs going back to the seventeen-nineties; his discussion of a succession of episodes in British-Burman relations down to 1885 is uniformly Burmophile and stridently anti-British in tone. He also makes no effort to evaluate discriminatingly the impact of colonial rule, does not explain the ineffectiveness of Burmese nationalist protest down to 1920, makes no reference to the example of the Indian Congress party movement, to the importance of the presence of Indian aliens, or to Burmese negotiations at London. He greatly exaggerates the political importance of the prewar Thakin movement and its assumed success in enlisting a mass following of "workers and peasants." Marxist terminology is also evident in Trager's gratuitous denunciation of the unscrupulous and self-seeking U Saw as "the stuff from which Fascists were made in the 1930s." The author's plethora of footnote documentation reflects a great deal of reading, but his dependence on sources is selective and too often subordinated to partisan interpretation. Even the deserved tribute accorded to the postwar political leadership of Thakin Aung San is not supported by any careful delineation of his methods, his personality, or his political principles.

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The book makes a substantial contribution to Burmese history and politics covering the fifteen years since 1951, following the subsidence of the insurrections. The author here speaks with an authority born of firsthand knowledge and personal involvement. The Burma scene for the first time comes into sharp focus. Especially penetrating is his critical evaluation of American relations with Burma both politically and in terms of economic aid. His explanation of Premier Nu's deficiencies as political leader and his assessment of General Ne Win's rise to power also command careful consideration, if not full agreement. Portions of five chapters have appeared in other publications of the author. Less than satisfactory is his labored effort to put as good a face as possible on the abortive *Pyidawtha* (welfare state) program. He implies that socialism could really succeed in Burma if intelligent leadership could be found. Trager poses but fails to answer the basic question whether Socialist objectives can really be reconciled with traditional Buddhist values. While the chapters on the political, economic, and international problems of Burma since 1951 merit respectful attention, the book throughout is highly partisan in tone and generally lacking in scholarly detachment. It does not trace in any adequate fashion Burma's transition from kingdom to republic.

JOHN F. CADY
Ohio University

The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years *by Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener. New York, Macmillan, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.—xxviii, 431 pp. $9.95.*

As nightmarish in its own way as Kahn's *Thinking about the Unthinkable,* this book might have been entitled *Predicting the Unpredictable.* The authors themselves recognize the hazards of social and political predictions even when backed up by the facilities and resources of a "think tank" like the Hudson Institute and by all the elaborations of the Games Theory. They admit that "useful or interesting as such long-range predictions can be it is just too difficult to make them well and even more difficult to estimate how this relatively distant future depends on current policies. . . ." Then they go on to fill four hundred pages, preceded by the alarming reminder by the publishers that for ten years Herman Kahn has "shaped U.S. national defence planning and

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public policy-making." In other words, he has been responsible for the current policies on which the future depends.

With commendable caution, which distinguishes them from most extrapolists, the authors hedge their bets by "scenarios" dramatizing various alternatives (what in political warfare planning in World War II we frankly called "Contingency Plans against the Moment of Maximum Confusion"). Unfortunately, none of the choices are very comforting. For example, in the chapter on "Some Possibilities for Nuclear War" the likelihood of such a war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is discarded (the unthinkable is rethought), but in its place we have "A Sino-American Outbreak Scenario" and the consequences are just as unpleasant. In this gamesmanship, there are many ploys and many gambits but mankind does not seem to win. In the chapter properly called "Other Twenty-First Century Nightmares," the account of the conditioning of American schoolchildren ("Capture the Flag") is terrifyingly plausible.

Beyond the morbid fascination ("sick" in the Newspeak of the younger generation) and the insight into the cult of model-making ("surprise-free," "standard worlds," "canonical variations," "synergism," "serendipity," and the like), the reader ranges over economics, demography, philosophy, comparative civilizations, urbanization, techno-ecology, and the whole range of science and technology. He gets a mail-order catalogue of technological innovations, including the biological manipulation of man and how it would be possible to produce a conformist population. Man-machines and machine-men!

The documentation is prodigious and intimidating in its implications. To the extent that it reminds us that the forces of science and technology dominate international and domestic relations today it does a salutary job. It is avowedly American-oriented and to the extent that the United States is the flywheel of technological change this is defensible. Alongside the scientific and technological revolution, however, there is the revolution of rising expectations—expectations which in two-thirds of the world are being frustrated. What are needed are not flywheels but gearwheels which can mesh the two revolutions. Present policies or archaic financial crises (like the present one which has anticipated the Kahn-Wiener dating by ten years) which prevent this will create situations and alignments which, with all their versatility, the authors have not "simulated." The challenge is there in their "surprise-free" estimates of the population increase (the "surprise" will be if they are less) and of the persistent disparity in the GNP's.

This is the first volume of studies done for the Commission on the Year 2000 sponsored by the Academy of Arts and Sciences, sup-

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ported by the Corning Glass Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. If it is regarded as the prognosis and further studies suggest the treatment, maybe the world of 2000 will not be as sick as it sounds.

LORD RITCHIE-CALDER
Edinburgh, Scotland

Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives *by Bela Balassa. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967.—xvi, 252 pp. $7.95.*

Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues, 1945-1965 *by Gardner Patterson. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xvi, 414 pp. $10.00.*

These two books have much in common; both are concerned with the future of international trade, and both are well-documented, scholarly works which provide a wealth of information on the intricacies of recent trade policy. Yet their focuses are different. Balassa criticizes the existing protection among developed countries; Patterson wants to do away with discrimination, differential treatment in international transactions according to the national origin of the goods. Now discrimination may, and often does, imply protection, but the opposite is also conceivable, that discrimination may be a step toward liberalization. Patterson admits this possibility in the case of the Sterling Area and EPU, but he is utterly suspicious of EEC and EFTA. He disagrees with those who see these arrangements as conducive to free commercial relations.

Balassa's plea for free trade among the Atlantic nations (and Japan) is strong and convincing. Political and economic arguments are admirably intertwined. Balassa contributes to the traditional economic insights by estimating the static benefits of complete tariff disarmament; the figures suggest that these are rather modest, especially for big countries (0.5 per cent of gross domestic product for the United States; about 1.1 per cent for the Common Market, the United Kingdom and Japan; 2.8 per cent for Canada). But, says the author, the main benefits are dynamic; they result from changes in production methods. Liberalization may also lead to an expansion of the international flow of capital into hitherto protected countries, and this leads Balassa to a discussion of the aversion, found in some European (especially French) circles, to

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American investments; the aversion is shown to be economically unfounded.

Balassa considers several roads to free economic relations. He rejects the idea that the United States enter into preferential trade agreements; in particular, an Atlantic Free Area without the EEC, as proposed by some Americans, would obviously be harmful to Atlantic unity. A real Atlantic Free Trade Area is still impossible because the countries are not yet willing to accept the risks and the solidarity of such an enterprise. The author recommends multilateral negotiations under the most-favored-nation clause. On the other hand, he accepts European integration. Indeed, his gradual and pragmatic approach seems the most feasible of the policy alternatives.

If one were to criticize Balassa, one might point to his rather inconclusive stand on EEC-EFTA relations, and in particular on Britain's problems. The author is inclined to leave these matters to the judgment of the European governments, but this need not preclude comment upon the desirability of, for instance, Britain's entry into the Common Market, its present awkward position vis-à-vis the EFTA and Commonwealth-partners being clearly unsatisfactory. One reason for this reserve may be that Balassa addresses his advice mainly to the U.S. government; another, that the author leaves agricultural protection out of account, whereas one of the main reasons Britain finds it so difficult to make up its mind is precisely its preferential relations with the Commonwealth in the difficult field of agriculture.

Patterson's work gives an interesting survey of the various forms and goals of discrimination; it is, as far as I know, the most exhaustive book on this subject. The author defends the pessimistic thesis that since the mid-fifties "the world is caught up in a headlong flight towards a massive recrudescence of discrimination" (p. 395). The main reason: regionalism, fostered by the examples of EEC and EFTA. Much of the book is devoted to the discriminatory effects of these arrangements (including the Common Market's relations with the associated overseas territories). Here Patterson's reasoning does not always carry conviction. It is true that customs unions are in fashion, and it is a truism that they constitute discrimination toward third countries; but the same holds for Alabama, which imports duty free from Arkansas but not from Switzerland. One cannot condemn EEC, EFTA, LAFTA, and the like on such grounds. If one disregards or doubts the impressive internal effects of EEC (this is what Patterson does), the evaluation of its role in the world economy depends mainly on the way one sees the future of the Common Market's external policies. Here, too, some unwarranted pessimism creeps into Patterson's reasoning. For instance,

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on pages 187-88 he speculates on "the unhappy event" that "an acceptable agreement under the Kennedy Round is in the end frustrated by the EEC" ("making it quite clear to the entire world that the responsibility rested on the European Economic Community") without mentioning the possibility, clearly visible in 1965 (the year of writing) that the negotiations might be frustrated by other parties, for example, the United States. One need only think of the disparities issue and the American selling price system. Furthermore the author seems to forget that the United States tariff is higher than that of the Common Market. It is perhaps characteristic that Patterson's text is continuously marred by expressions like "regionalism enthusiasts".

These critical remarks are not meant to deny the soundness of some of Patterson's policy conclusions. Regional blocs should be made as open as possible. Also, Patterson's recommendation that departures from nondiscrimination be subject to international approval and supervision —that is, a strengthening of GATT—should be welcomed.

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Economic Enquiry in Australia *by Craufurd D. W. Goodwin. Durham, No. Carolina, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1966.—xv, 659 pp. $12.50.*

In 1949 Professor J. A. LaNauze presented in *Political Economy in Australia: Historical Studies* a short but perceptive sketch of nineteenth-century Australian writings in economics. He commented that a "critical history of Australian economics . . . must someday be written, perhaps by an Australian living abroad." Now Professor Goodwin of Duke University has published a full-scale study of the history of economic thought in Australia from the early years of British settlement to the Great Depression that began in 1929. He has not limited his discussion to formal treatises or "textbooks," but has extended the scope to include newspaper and magazine articles, parliamentary debates, and unpublished correspondence and documents; or, as he put it, "more attention has been given to purely polemical literature than is customary in studies of the history of economic doctrine." Furthermore, he has organized most of his discussion not around the concepts of formal economic analysis but around the great economic problems with which Australia has had to cope; namely, foreign trade, distrib-

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ution of land, money and banking, transportation, business cycles, population, labor, and the role of the state in the economy. Finally, he has been willing to transcend the conventional boundary lines between the social sciences when necessary, as in his enlightening discussion of the use of the Spencerian doctrine of evolution first by conservative thinkers and then by radicals. Not least of his contributions is his presentation of Australia's pioneering role in the use of statistics for public policy, and his comprehensive treatment of economics as a university discipline.

Informative, too, is the discussion of the influence of American thinkers from the days of Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and Henry Carey and, later, David Ames Wells, Henry George, Francis A. Walker, and Irving Fisher.

The author is very modest in claims for originality of Australian economists, but he does stress "two pioneers of macroeconomics"—Alfred di Lissa and his embryonic formulation of that important tool of Keynesian analysis, the multiplier, and Sir Anthony Murgrave's neomercantalist treatment of money. It is to be hoped that Professor Goodwin will do for other British dominions what he has now done for Australia and Canada.

JOSEPH DORFMAN
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NATO and the Range of American Choice *by William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—xii, 352 pp. $7.95.*

This book provides useful insights into the reciprocal influences of the United States and NATO's policies, strategies and structures, and the impact of NATO upon the range of American policy and action choices. The authors have sought to delineate aspects of the political processes in NATO and "only incidentally to assess its effectiveness in coping with subsequent problems." While the authors modestly state this limitation on their work, they have in fact dealt by way of example and illustration with many of NATO's policy problems and have provided a balanced judgment of NATO's performance. The Foxes have also traced the labyrinthian process by which the gargantuan United States government has dealt with an involved commitment to Western Europe expressed primarily, although not exclusively, through America's membership in NATO. Chapters such as "NATO and American Decision Processes: The Executive Branch," "NATO and Congress," and "Decision-Making

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in NATO and the United States Government," although focusing on but one aspect of American foreign policy concerns, reveal how the American government makes up its collective mind with regard to the shifting issues that confront policy-makers. The book is an excellent example of analytical scholarship. It is comprehensive in scope, well-organized, and precisely documented. This reviewer found particularly interesting the chapter on "NATO Potentialities and United States Choices." The impact of changes and fluctuations in U.S. strategy to its European allies is well documented. "Since the Americans did not want the Europeans to follow suit, their guiding precept seemed to be 'Do as I say, not as I do' " (p. 161). The authors are on firm ground when they observe that "the use of NATO for protection against Communist expansion and the concomitant effort, especially when reciprocated on the other side of the Iron Curtain, to relax tensions between the two camps are in potential conflict and have posed an increasingly awkward problem for the United States" (p. 180). Their most telling criticism was that U.S. policies and actions

> are sometimes in conflict with declared American military and political objectives; are transparently designed to promote narrow private or sectional interests, though ostensibly to promote national security; are damaging to the economic interests of the allies of the United States without any commensurate gain to the United States itself; are so narrowly focused that they alleviate one problem while they exacerbate others; or are ineffective as cold war measures (p. 181).

The analysis contained in "NATO and American Decision Processes: The Executive Branch," was both lucid and charitable They summarized their investigation with these words of Sir Solly Zuckerman: "... the more vast, the heterogeneous, the more scattered any organization becomes, and the more complicated its component parts ... the more difficult it is to control and to concert its multitudinous activities to a single common purpose" (p. 229). In view of the present indifference, if not aversion, on the part of many American intellectuals to the existence of NATO, the objective assessment made by the Foxes of NATO's achievements is most welcome. In their own words, "the burden of proof lies with NATO's critics to demonstrate that a different kind of organized alliance would do as well what NATO is now doing. Only then may NATO's critics legitimately focus public debate on goals which would be better served if the prescriptions of the critics were followed" (p. 312) .

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Book Notes

Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1967; xv, 197 pp., $6.50) by James M. Clark is an extremely useful addition to the growing number of monographs on European interest groups. The group which the author has chosen for his investigation is so deeply imbedded in French republican traditions that the careful study of its material, political, and ideological aims and of its methods of action illuminates significant aspects of French political history, more particularly since the Liberation in 1944. Abstract concepts in French trade-union development and general characteristics of the French administrative system become concrete in a well-informed account of the evolving relations between the Ministry of National Education and the Federation of Teachers. The author is able to explain how organizational ingenuity and skilled leadership together with a common value commitment have been able to overcome centrifugal forces in a federation which encompasses the organizations of teachers at all levels of the system of public education. The book incorporates two case studies: the struggle over the school laws of 1951 and of 1959 both involving the status of (and subsidies to) the Catholic parochial schools. The comparison between two legislative battles, one fought under the Fourth, the other under General de Gaulle's Republic, illuminates the differences in governmental process and in the formation of public opinion under the two regimes. The author makes frequent and appropriate references to the French "political culture" as an important determinant of both the success and the defeats of the teachers' federation. He might have arrived at even more convincing conclusions if he had raised the question whether the concept of *laicité*, the militant commitment to the separation of church and state in educational matters, has not lost much of its

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significance at least for the younger generation. The fact that with the decline in importance of village and small town, the role of the public school teacher as a notable is no longer as meaningful as in former times might be even more significant for the future strength of the teachers' union. The study is particularly successful in determining which of the generalizations developed in the literature on pressure groups, American and European, are applicable to the activities and organizations under scrutiny. Since the author is thoroughly familiar with the hypotheses developed in that literature, he serves well a cause often extolled and frequently "betrayed": that of a genuinely comparative and cumulative political science.—HENRY W. EHRMANN, *Dartmouth College.*

William B. Bader's *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966; ix, 250 pp., $7.50) is neither a complete history of the second Austrian republic in the first ten years of its then precarious existence, nor even a full fledged account of the interplay of four-power military occupation. It is in essence a study of selected important problems of the dealings of the Western Allies, above all the United States, the Austrian government, and organized labor with the Russian occupying power and the Austrian Communist party. Within these topical limitations the author has easily written far and away the best monograph on the history of new Austria. This pertains in the first place to the analysis of heretofore inaccessible copious primary sources, particularly Allied Commission records and the J. F. Dulles papers in the Princeton University Library. The author's highly sophisticated conclusions add much weight to the volume. They certainly destroy the myth that the Soviet government and local Communist parties always worked hand in hand, even in the nineteen-forties and fifties, prior to the Polish and Hungarian crises. Whether the Soviet government committed a major tactical blunder in the modification of the Inter-Allied Control Agreement, and whether the loose definition of German assets in Austria at the Potsdam Conference was a similar error on the part of the Western powers may remain debatable until the Russian archives will be opened. In this respect, as well as in regard to the even more interesting question why, in 1955, the Russians suddenly and unexpectedly agreed to the signing of a State Treaty with Austria, Mr. Bader offers valuable and plausible suggestions. Here, however, we may have to look not only for the documents of the past but for the course of events of the future to understand why the Soviets acted as they did. To sum up, this

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should be a book of equal value for the historian, the student of East-West relations, and above all for the practicing diplomat.—ROBERT A. KANN, *Rutgers, The State University.*

Yugoslavia—A Multinational State: Regional Difference and Administrative Response by Jack C. Fisher (San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Company, 1966; xxiii, 244 pp., $15.00) is a pioneering work in the field of urban development and modernization in Communist nations. The study is built around a statistical analysis of urban and communal (local government) development in Yugoslavia. Multivariate techniques are used to distinguish patterns of modernization and development among cities which have experienced differing patterns of growth or have been exposed to contrasting historical and cultural influences. The material gathered by Professor Fisher should be well received by the political scientist who wishes to gain insights into the modernization process in Communist countries. Nevertheless, there are drawbacks in the volume. Factor analysis tends to give a statistical dimension to well-known differences in economic development and cultural patterns among regions in Yugoslavia, but is less successful in generating new insights into the modernization process. Many intriguing questions raised by the study (for example, the contention that modernization is not coterminus with industrialization in Communist countries) require further clarification and additional data. The treatment of local government reforms is uneven; basic sources on this problem (Dereck Scott) are not utilized and the account fails to mention the important recentralization of the administrative system in Yugoslavia resulting from the law on State Administration of 1956, subsequently incorporated into Article 127 of the 1963 constitution. Finally, the presentation suffers from repetitiousness. Notwithstanding these problems, Professor Fisher's volume is a significant work. It gathers together immensely useful data on Yugoslavia and its regional development. By undertaking a quantitative analysis of the modernization problem in a Communist country, it points to new paths of research in the comparative study of political systems.—PAUL SHOUP, *University of Virginia.*

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